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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to the 2017 World Economic Forum, the factors that pose a serious risk
to today’s global economy are rising inequality and the polarization of societies,
which in turn threat the social cohesion1. In particular, This doctoral dissertation
contributes to the understanding of these major current challenges, by investigating
the extend of unequal access to opportunity in education and in the labour market
in the former communist countries; the potential of diversity in the South African
multicultural society in terms of employment; the formation of interpersonal trust
at the individual level in Germany.
Chapter 2 provides estimates for inequality of opportunity in post-communist coun-
tries in terms of individual labour income, employment status, quality of jobs, and
educational attainment. Inequality might not always be considered undesirable. In
fact, differential achievements reflecting different level of effort and/or freely made
choices are deemed fair. Equity in accessing opportunities, rather than equality in
the distribution of outcomes, has thus become the goal of policy-makers and the
focus of a lively debate about inequality and social welfare among researchers. Us-
1The Global Risks Report 2017, 12th Edition published by the World Economic Forum available
online at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017/
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ing data from the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (2016), we show that
inequality of opportunity for earning an income is higher in the transition region
than in Western European countries. Parental background is the key circumstance
to explain unequal access to opportunity, both in the labour market and in educa-
tion. As for employment opportunities, access to good-quality jobs is more unequal
than access to any kind of job, on average. In terms of the evolution of inequality
of opportunity over time, we show that individuals who started their education
right after the fall of the Berlin wall are confronted with higher level of inequity
in accessing tertiary education. This chapter is the result of a joint project with
Michelle Brock, from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
Vito Peragine, from the University of Bari.
Chapter 3 investigates how within-black ethnic diversity affects labour market out-
comes of the black South Africans in post-Apartheid South Africa. Results suggest
that ethnic diversity has a positive effect on employment rate among the black
South Africans, and it mostly affects ethnic groups with relatively larger popula-
tion size and people who are less educated. To address the endogeneity of ethnic
composition, we exploit the historical origins of the location of blacks’ homelands
and argue that districts more equidistant to multiple homelands are more diverse.
We then propose a model of a coordination game to explain these findings, implying
that as inter-ethnic communication requires more skills and efforts than intra-ethnic
connection, ethnically diverse districts motivate people to invest more in social skills
in response to higher rate of inter-ethnic interaction. The acquisition of these social
skills can make them better equipped for the labour market. We show that our
mechanism is related to, yet distinct in important aspects from current models on
inter-group interaction. This chapter has been produced together with Peng Zhang,
from the University of Cambridge.
In chapter 4, we aim at understanding the formation of trust at the individual
level, given the impact that it has been recognized to have on economic develop-
ment. Theoretical work highlights the role of the transmission of values such as
trust from parents to their children. Attempts to empirically measure the strength
of this transmission relied so far on the cross-sectional regression of the trust of
children on the contemporaneous trust of their parents. We introduce a new identi-
fication strategy which hinges on a panel of parents and their children drawn from
the German Socio-Economic Panel. Our results show that a half to two thirds of the
observed variability of trust is pure noise irrelevant to the transmission process; this
noise strongly biases the parameter estimates of the OLS regression of children’s
trust on parents’ trust. However an instrumental variable procedure straightfor-
wardly emerges from the analysis; the dynamics of the component of trust relevant
to the transmission process shed light on the structural interpretation of the pa-
rameters of this regression; the strength of the flow of trust that parents pass to
their children as well as of the sibling correlations due to other factors are easily
summarized by the conventional R2 of a latent equation. In our sample, approxi-
mately one fourth of the variability of children’s trust is inherited from their parents
while two thirds are attributable to the residual sibling correlation. This chapter is
a joint contribution together with Corrado Giulietti, from Southampton University
and Enrico Rettore, from University of Trento.
Throughout this work, the concepts of transmission and persistence, both across
generations and more broadly of historical patterns, has an important role to play.
In particular, the analysis of inequality of opportunity (chapter 2) is primarily con-
cerned with the estimation of the degree to which family background, together with
other predetermined personal characteristics determine a person￿s educational and
labour market outcomes. Similarly, when studying the formation of interpersonal
trust at the individual level (chapter 3), we are interested in understanding (and
estimating) how much of this personal trait (or value) is inherited from parents.
In investigating the effect of ethnic diversity on labour market outcomes in South
Africa (chapter 4), we could not overlook the persistent pattern of cultural medley
resulted from centuries of historical events.
Chapter 2
On Fairness: Evidence from
Post-Communist Countries
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, inequality of opportunity has attracted considerable interest from
researchers and policy makers1. Evidence from existing surveys shows that people
consider income inequalities arising from exogenous circumstances less acceptable
than those resulting from individual choices and effort. In other words, what seems
to matter for a just society is the access to opportunities, rather than the dis-
tribution of outcomes. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) argue that the origin of
inequality, more than its level, affects social attitudes towards redistributive poli-
cies. Moreover, recent studies investigating the relation between inequality and
aggregate economic performances find that unequal access to opportunities, more
than income inequality, has a negative impact on economic growth (Marrero and
Rodríguez, 2013; Ferreira et al., 2014; Murphy and Topel, 2016).
1See Roemer and Trannoy (2015); Ramos et al. (2016); Ferreira and Peragine (2016) for a
comprehensive review of the literature on inequality of opportunity, both from a theoretical and
a methodological viewpoint.
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The issue of inequality, especially of its fairness, is particularly relevant in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. In fact, after experiencing decades of communism, with
its egalitarianism, the countries of the region have undergone major economic and
social changes. As they transitioned from a planned to a market economy, those
countries faced processes of privatization and trade liberalization, and the dynamics
of wage setting started to follow the law of demand and supply (Mitra and Yemtsov,
2007; Milanovic, 1999; Rose and Viju, 2014). Highly qualified workers could enjoy
significant earning premiums when employed in highly skilled occupations. Addi-
tionally, de-industrialization (Ivaschenko, 2002) and reforms in the social and tax
systems (Flemming and Micklewright, 2000) have been serious challenges for the
transitional governments. The result of this restructuring was an increase in income
inequality (Milanovic, 1998).
Despite the abundance of studies investigating the degree of total inequality, its
roots and its socio-economic repercussion in the post-communist countries2, esti-
mates of inequality of opportunity for the region are scarse and often limited to few
countries that joined the European Union, for which data is available. Above all,
the empirical literature lacks comparable estimates for the whole Eastern Europe
and Central Asia region. We contribute to the literature by filling this gap, and
provide estimates for inequality of opportunity in 29 post-communist countries of
the region and 5 comparator countries in Western Europe. To calculate how un-
equal is the access to opportunities in the different countries of our sample, we use
data from the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (2016). Importantly,
we do not focus exclusively on inequality in earning an income, rather we estimate
inequality of opportunity for getting a job, distinguishing between any kind of job
and a ”decent” one, and for attaining tertiary education. The objective is twofold.
Firstly, unequal access to income might be, at least partially, the result of inequality
2See Perugini and Pompei (2015) for a comprehensive review of the changes in inequality in
Central and Eastern European countries, during and after the transition from socialism
in accessing opportunities at different stages of an individual’s life (unequal access
to good-quality job or, earlier, to education). Furthermore, when focusing on in-
come, unemployed and inactive individuals are generally disregarded. By analyzing
inequality of opportunity for getting higher education and a job, we propose an
alternative approach to the imputation of income (Checchi et al., 2015) for taking
into account non-working individuals.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a conceptual framework
for our analysis and discuss the methodology used. We describe the data employed
in Section 3, and present the results for the different outcomes in Section 4. Finally,
we draw some conclusions in Section 5.
2.2 Conceptual Framework and Methodology
Conceptually, the study of (in)equality of opportunity requires the distinction be-
tween the effects on individual outcomes of factors for which the subject is not held
responsible - called circumstances - and of effort (or any other factor over which the
individual has control) (Roemer, 1993, 1998). While circumstances are generally
measured by aspects of an individual’s childhood and family environment at birth3,
his/her effort is empirically proxied by years of schooling or productivity at work.
Rooted in a Rawlsian philosophical tradition, inequality of opportunity theories
support the idea that only inequality arising from different levels of effort can be
considered ethically acceptable. In other words, inequality due to differential access
to opportunity depending on circumstances is considered unfair. Therefore, the aim
of egalitarian policies is to compensate individuals who face inequities (compensa-
tion principle), without impeding outcomes to vary in response to effort (reward
3In their recent contribution, Hufe, Peichl, Roemer, and Ungerer (Hufe et al.) argue that
all achievements and decisions taken by the child before the age of consent can be considered
circumstances.
principle).
In accordance with this conceptual framework, empirical studies have developed two
main approaches to measuring inequality of opportunity. In the ex-ante approach,
individuals with the same set of circumstances are grouped together to constitute
different types. Inequality of opportunity is then calculated as the inequality be-
tween types. The differences in outcomes after circumstances have been taken into
account are assumed to be due to effort. Clearly, the residual category of ”effort”
includes all of the factors which affect individual outcomes other than the specific
set of circumstances considered (i.e. luck, ability, innate talent, other unobserv-
able circumstances)4. By contrast, the ex-post approach focuses on the inequality
among subjects who have exerted the same level of effort. Since it is plausible to
assume that circumstances themselves affect the level of effort, Roemer (1993) sug-
gested to rank an individual in the effort distribution of his/her own type. The
population is thus divided into tranches, which group together individuals at the
same percentile of the type-specific distribution. Given the considerable difficulties
in measuring effort, empirical contributions have normally rely on the ex-ante per-
spective to estimate inequality of opportunity (Bourguignon et al., 2007; Checchi
et al., 2010; Lefranc et al., 2008, 2009; Marrero and Rodríguez, 2012; Brunori et al.,
2013). In line with the literature, we follow the same approach to analyze inequality
of opportunity in the transition region.
Formally, consider an outcome y and a vector of circumstance variables, C. Effort is
measured by a scalar variable, e. Let suppose that all determinants of y, including
luck, can be classified into either the vector C or the scalar index e, such that:
y = g(C, e) (2.1)
4Due to data limitations, the set of circumstances included in any study is only a subset of all
possible exogenous factors. Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Niehues and Peichl (2014) show how
to calculate the lower and upper bounds of inequality of opportunity, respectively.
The population can be partitioned into a set of groups (types, T) that are completely
homogeneous in terms of circumstances. Within each subgroup k, individuals differ
only in their level of effort. Given the outcome distribution for type k, Fk(y), and
its population share, qk, the overall distribution of the outcome for the population
as a whole is F(y) = ∑ qkFk(y).
In this context, the inequality due to circumstances would be eliminated when
all types faced the same opportunity set (or opportunity sets with the same value).
Inequality of opportunity can thus be estimated by computing an inequality measure
I(.) over the counterfactual distribution where each individual’s outcome is replaced
by the value of his/her opportunity set, vi:
I(y˜), y˜ = vi (2.2)
The opportunity set faced by subjects belonging to a given type k is extracted from
the outcome distribution of individuals in the same type. In empirical analysis, the
value of the opportunity is very often summarized by its mean, µk, so that vi = µk.
In other words, estimating inequality of opportunity amounts to measuring the
inequality in the counterfactual (smoothed) distribution. The specific index I(.)
employed varies across studies and depends on the nature of the outcome of interest
(continuous versus binary variable). The most used indexes are the Gini, the mean
logarithmic deviation and Theil for continuous variables, while a dissimilarity index
is generally utilized when the outcome is dichotomous.
2.2.1 Decomposition of the inequality of opportunity mea-
sure
To investigate the relative importance of each circumstance in explaining unequal
access to opportunities, a Shapley decomposition has been employed. The Shapley
value has been firstly used in game theory with the aim to provide a rule for dividing
a given surplus among members of a coalition and has been extended to inequality
analyses by Shorrocks (2013). By applying the Shapley decomposition, we aim at
identifying how much the measure of inequality of opportunities would change when
we add a circumstance to different pre-existing sets of circumstances.
Formally, the change in the inequality index when circumstance k is added to a
subset Z of circumstances is given by:
∆Ik = ∑
Z⊂K
|m|!(κ − |m| − 1)!
κ!
[I(Z ∪ k)− I(Z)] (2.3)
where K indicates the whole set of κ circumstances, and z is a subset of K that
includes z circumstances variables except k. I(Z) is the inequality measure for the
subset Z and I(Z ∪ k) is the index obtained after adding circumstance k to the
subset Z.
Let I(κ) be the inequality index for the set of κ circumstances. The contribution
of circumstance κ to I(κ) is defined by:
Ck =
∆Ik
I(κ)
(2.4)
where ∑i∈K Ci = 1.
2.3 Data
To estimate inequality of opportunity in the region we use data from the third wave
of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), conducted jointly by the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. The survey has been
carried out in 2016 in 34 countries, mainly in the Eastern Bloc and Central Asia,
interviewing about 51,000 households5. Importantly, the LiTS contained informa-
tion on individual earnings, in addition to labour market outcomes and educational
attainments. Moreover, the survey included a module with detailed questions on
the respondent’s socio-economic background, which are useful to measure circum-
stances in empirical applications. In particular, there is information on the educa-
tional levels and sector of occupation of the parents and the respondent’s place of
birth (rural/urban).
In calculating the inequality of opportunity measure, we follow the literature (Mar-
rero and Rodríguez, 2012; Checchi et al., 2015; Brunori et al., 2013) and consider
gender, birthplace, ethnic and family background as circumstances affecting indi-
vidual outcomes irrespective of one’s responsibility. More in details, place of birth
identifies whether the individual is born in a rural or in a urban area. Ethnicity
is summarized in a binary variable which takes value 1 if the respondent claims
to be part of a minority group in the country where s/he lives, and 0 otherwise.
Clearly, being part of a minority may represent very different concepts, depending
on how discriminated the group is. For example, Roma people in Czech Republic
do not face the same challenges as Russian people in Kyrgyzstan. As for the family
background, we use the parental educational attainments, measured on a four-point
scale, and whether at least one of the parents has been a member of the Commu-
nist Party. For the estimation of inequality of opportunity for education, we also
use the number of books at home during childhood to capture more broadly the
parental human capital. The categorical variable is coded in five categories: a) 0 to
10 books; b) 11 to 25 books; c) 26 to 100 books; d) 101 to 200 books; e) more than
200 books. We do not include the father’s and mother’s sector of occupation since
5The previous waves of the survey have already been used to analyze inequality of opportunity
in the region. In particular, Abras et al. (2013) estimated the degree of inequality of opportunity
in labor market outcomes for a number of countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, using
data from the Life in Transition Surveys conducted in 2006. Based on the second round of the
Life in Transition Survey (2010), Brock et al. (2013) estimated the inequality of opportunity with
regard to household assets.
it might suffer from important recall bias (a substantial proportion of answers is
missing) and it may not be very informative of the type of job (and tasks).
We apply different sample selection rules, according to the specific outcome un-
der study. Details will be given in each of the dedicated subsection of Section
4. However, we anticipate that only working age individuals (18-64 years old) are
considered when focusing on labour market outcomes (earnings and employment
status), while we do not impose any restriction for educational outcomes.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Inequality of opportunity for earnings
Following a number of empirical contributions on inequality of opportunity, we
begin by focusing on the acquisition of individual labor income. The main reasons
for choosing individual earnings over household income are twofold: one has to do
with the quality of the available data, and the other is a more conceptual motive.
Firstly, answers to the question on household income are not always reliable: in a
number of cases, the reported monthly household income is lower than the monthly
individual earnings. Conceptually, household (per capita) income conveys a bunch
of other elements unrelated to the individuals’ effort, luck and opportunities in the
acquisition of their labour income, such as assortative mating, fertility decisions
and non-labor income sources (Bourguignon et al., 2007).
The non-response issue is common to the questions on both individual and house-
hold income and the relative bias cannot be disregarded. As reported in Table 2.1
(Column 4), the non-response rate varies considerably among countries. In order to
investigate the potential differences between the group of the respondents and the
group of the non-respondents in terms of individual labour income, we estimate the
predicted earnings based on a number of observable characteristics6. Despite being
selective, non-response does not lead, in general, to economically worrisome differ-
ences in the predicted income distribution for the two groups (Table 2.2 and Table
2.3). Thus, we are confident that the estimates based on the sub-sample of the
respondents are representative of the whole population of interest7. Despite some
significant differences, the comparison between the inequality of the income distri-
bution from our data with official sources displays a positive correlation8 (Figure
2.1).
The analysis uses individual self-reported earnings over the past 12 months, which
may come from formal or informal, permanent or seasonal employment9. We do not
include self-employed and employers in our estimates, since their self-reported labor
income is more susceptible of measurement error. The universe examined consists
of all employees aged 18-64.
In general, inequality of opportunity for earning an income10 is higher in the for-
merly planned economies than in the Western countries in our sample (i.e. Ger-
many, Italy, Cyprus) and varies considerably across the region (Table 2.5, columns
(a)). This result confirms the findings of previous contributions, which have esti-
6More in details, we regress the logarithm of earnings on the following set of variables, which
are relevant in explaining differences in the acquisition of income: birthplace (whether rural or
urban), gender, age (and its squared values), self-reported health status (binary variable), own
education (binary variable for having attained tertiary education), parental education, parental
membership to the Communist Party, ethnicity (whether part of a minority group), and marital
status. Then, we predict the (log)earnings of the individuals who declare to be working but choose
to not report any labour income
7An alternative approach to the problem, which has been followed by Checchi et al. (2015), is
to include the non-respondents in the analysis by imputing their income. The estimates for the
inequality of opportunity for earning an income and all main results in this section are robust to
this alternative specification. Nevertheless, given that the imputation methodology assumes that
data are missing at random and in some countries the proportion of the missing information is
high, we prefer to rely on the results obtained from the non-missing data only.
8Official estimates refer to the latest observation of the Gini index on net income available for
each country in the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2016). Note that for
some countries, for example Azerbaijan, the latest recorded observation refers to 2010 or earlier.
9The values of the labour income variable have been winsorized at the 0.5% level at the top.
Due to data unavailability, Albania has been removed from the sample
10The value of inequality of opportunity for income is equal to the Gini index calculated on the
distribution of the OLS regression’s predicted log-income.
mated inequality of opportunity in Europe (Marrero and Rodríguez, 2012; Checchi
et al., 2015). In a global perspective, unfairness is much lower than in other emerg-
ing economies (i.e. Brazil and India) and in the US. It has to be underlined that
estimates of inequality of opportunity are not immediately comparable across stud-
ies, though. In fact, methodologies (parametric versus non-parametric), outcomes
(individual earnings versus individual disposable income) and circumstances can
differ substantially11. On average, inequity in acquiring a labour income is lower
in the 15 countries that are part of the European Union than in the remaining
18 countries (0.105 versus 0.12), despite the relatively high estimates for Estonia,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria, where inequality of opportunity is above
the regional mean value.
In order to be informative of the importance of (un)fairness in accessing opportu-
nities, the absolute level of inequality of opportunity has to be related to the total
level of (income) inequality. Firstly, it has to be noted that the relationship between
total inequality and inequality of opportunity is strong and positive: countries with
high levels of income inequality also have high levels of inequality of opportunity
(Figure 2.2). In order to understand how much of the total income inequality can be
explained by circumstances we may want to use the relative measure of the inequal-
ity of opportunity, i.e. the ratio of (the absolute level of) inequality of opportunity
to the Gini coefficient calculated on the distribution of individual earnings. Figure
2.3 shows that in the great majority of countries (75% of the sample), a third or
more of the total income inequality is due to individual circumstances. On average,
the relative importance of circumstances in explaining total inequality is higher in
the EU countries than in the rest of the formerly planned economies (37% versus
34.7%).
11Many studies use the mean logarithmic deviation, or Theil 0, instead of the Gini index, as
an inequality measure. In our sample, the average inequality of opportunity estimated using the
Theil 0 equals 0.024, compared with 0.04, 0.082 and 0.22 for the US, India and Brazil, respectively.
The relative contributions that specific circumstances make to overall inequality
of opportunity also vary greatly across regions and countries12. Figure 2.4 shows
the role played by parental background (i.e. parental educational attainments and
membership to the Communist Party), gender and other circumstances (i.e. the
status of the birthplace and ethnicity) in explaining the ”unfair” part of inequality.
In both EU and non-EU members states, a large percentage of inequality of op-
portunity can be traced back to an individual’s parental background: nearly 50%
in the EU countries and about 40% in the remaining countries, on average. De-
spite being different from the analyses on intergenerational income mobility, the
relative importance of the parental background in explaining inequality of oppor-
tunity speaks in favor of some degree of intergenerational persistence. Gender is
the second most important factor, explaining between a quarter and half of over-
all inequality of opportunity in most countries, with a stronger role in EU states.
Place of birth and ethnicity contribute only residually to explaining unequal access
to income opportunities.
The estimates presented in this section suffer from a number of limitations. As
we have discussed at the beginning of the section, non-response can be a serious
problem and potential errors in the reported earnings have also to be taken into
account (especially in the case of self-employed individuals). In order to strengthen
our results, we estimate the inequality of opportunity for having a job as well as
for getting a decent one (for more details and the definition of ”decent” job, see
the following section). This way, we can include in the sample all (working age)
individuals, regardless of the availability of information on their income. Even
when available and reliable, data on 12-month individual earning raises another
problem. In fact, for the estimation to be more precise, the outcome of relevance
should be the individual permanent income (earnings). In periods during which the
12We calculate the relative contribution of each of the circumstances by employing the Shapley
value decomposition (Shorrocks, 1982; Sastre and Trannoy, 2002).
”job churn” (short-term employment and a number of career changes in a person’s
life) and the labour market flows are considerable, the observation of earnings at
a single given point in time can be very misleading. The lack of panel data does
not allow us to construct a more robust income (earnings) variable. Using a binary
variable that indicates whether the individual has a job (at the same single given
point in time) does not help solve the issue either. To bolster our analysis, we
additionally estimate the inequality of opportunity for education, in particular for
having some tertiary education. For adults, education can be considered stable over
time. By including estimates for education, we also aim at tacking another potential
problem: the difference across countries in the labour market participation and in
the unemployment rate, which may raise concerns about the comparability of the
estimates across countries.
2.4.2 Inequality of opportunity for employment
The empirical literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity has mainly
focused on opportunities for the acquisition of income, but it may be useful to adapt
the same framework to the space of employment and education. In fact, in order to
better understand the drivers of unequal opportunities to earn income, it is helpful
to explore inequality of opportunity at key junctures along the career path. These
include getting a job, the ”quality” of the job, and obtaining higher education.
At each stage, pre-determined circumstances may affect the available opportunities
and thus the choices made by individuals.
We consider two definitions of opportunity in the labor market: having a job, and
having a decent job. The universe examined consists of all adults aged 18-64 in the
labour force, i.e. individuals who are working - both as employees and self-employed
or employers - or unemployed available for work, and actively looking for a job.13
13More precisely, we include in the labour force all individuals 18-64 years old who: a) work
On average, in our sample, the unemployment rate based on a reference period of
a week is 16.5%, with big differences between countries. This figure is higher than
the ILO estimated average unemployment rate both for Central Europe and the
Baltic region (9.1% in 2014), and for Europe and Central Asia region (9% in 2014)
(Figure 2.5).
Another important aspect of the labour market conditions faced by workers is the
quality of jobs. The definition of a decent job derives from the ILO standards on the
quality of employment, taking into account the information that are available in the
survey. In particular, the quality of the job is determined on the basis of the contract
arrangement and the working time. An individual of our reference population has
a decent job if he works under a written contract (has a registered enterprise, in the
case of self-employed) and he has enough but not excessive working time (more than
20 hours per week, but no more than the median number of hours worked during a
standard week in the country14). According to our definition, among those having
a job, on average only about 50% have a decent job. Among the countries with a
percentage of decent jobs lower than 50%, there are none of the EU member states
(Greece being an exception).
Being interested in measuring inequality of opportunity in the labor market, we fo-
cus on the inequality deriving uniquely from circumstances, for which the individual
cannot be held responsible. Since our outcomes (i.e. having a job and having a de-
cent job) are binary variables, the between groups inequality is summarized into a
dissimilarity index, D-index, and is estimated by running a logistic regression model
to establish the relationship between access to a particular opportunity and a set of
as wage employees; b) have an unpaid job (internships or apprenticeships, or are unpaid workers
in the family business); c) are self-employed or employers; d) are unemployed but are looking for
a job; e) are unemployed and declare not to look for a job for temporary reasons (temporarily
sick/injured; waiting for an answer; have already found a job that will commence in the near
future).
14The ILO Statistical Decent Work Indicators consider excessive working time a working week
with more than 48 hours. In order to take into account the differences in the structure of the
various labour markets, we adopt a more flexible classification.
pre-determined circumstances. Inequality of opportunity is then measured as the
contribution of these circumstances to the inequality index. By construction, the
measure of inequality (D-index) can change according to the specific set of variables
that are used to define the groups. In particular, the D-index can only increase or
remain constant when additional circumstances are added to the initial set of cir-
cumstances. In other words, our estimates represent the lower-bound of inequality
of opportunity15. The circumstances used to measure the inequality of opportunity
in the labour market are the same as for the analysis on earnings: whether the place
of birth is rural or urban, gender, parental educational attainment and membership
to the Communist Party, and ethnicity (belonging to a minority group).
On average, inequality of opportunity for having a decent job is 50% higher than
inequality of opportunity for having any job (Figure 2.6). Both these measures tend
to be lower in countries with lower unemployment rates. This could reflect differ-
ences to workers￿ bargaining power. As demand for labour falls, employers can more
easily make arbitrary trade-offs between workers without sacrificing productivity.
Workers who are then unjustly discriminated against do not have leverage to make
demands to employers, because employers can easily replace them. Increases in
employment may therefore be one way to decrease inequality of opportunity. Addi-
tionally, when inequality of opportunity for having a decent job is higher (compared
to any job) the difference between male and female labour force participation is also
larger (Figure 2.7). This might suggest that women are less likely to participate in
the labour force in countries where access to better-quality jobs is constrained by
circumstances. In principle, the lower female participation could be the result of
discouragement that follows the unsuccessful search for a job that matches their (on
average) higher (with respect to men) level of education. Given that our definition
15See Luongo (2011) for a discussion and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) for a formal proof of the
lower-bound result. The intuition is that the specific set of circumstances upon which we rely to
split the population into groups, and thus to estimate inequality, is a subset of all possible circum-
stances. The existence of unobserved circumstances guarantees that the estimates of inequality of
opportunity could not be lower if one were to consider the full set.
of a decent job has to do uniquely with the contract arrangements and the working
time, this is not the more convincing interpretation. It rather seems to relate to the
security of the job. Women, who in many cases still bear the burden of caring for
children and the family, may require more stable job, with more flexible working
hours.16
In general, parental background remains the most important circumstance for ex-
plaining inequality of opportunity in the labor market, and it is even more so in
the countries that joined the European Union (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). Parents￿ mem-
bership to the Communist Party is on average more important for getting a decent
job than any job (Table 2.6, Panel (a) vs. Panel (b)), suggesting the persistence
of networks dating back to pre-transition times (in Western European comparator
countries this effect is predictably absent). The evidence on the overwhelming con-
tribution of parental education to the inequality of access to opportunities in the
labour market is in line with previous findings by Abras et al. (2013). Although not
directly comparable, their results highlight the importance of father’s education for
explaining inequality of opportunity in having a good job17.
2.4.3 Inequality of opportunity for education
Equitable access to tertiary education is often seen as a first hurdle that countries
must tackle in order to reduce inequality. Since 1980, income gains in the United
States have accrued almost exclusively to those with tertiary education. Meanwhile
lower-skilled workers have not seen real wage increases since 2003 (Goldin and Katz,
2009; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Higher and better education is associated not
16See Bender et al. (2005) for a discussion on how women and men differently value flexibility at
work; and Neyer (2006) for a discussion on the interplay between family, fertility and employment
policies in Europe.
17Abras et al. (2013) use data from the Life in transition Survey conducted in 2006, focus on a
reduced sample of countries and have a different definition of having an opportunity in the labor
market, based on the available information contained in the data.
only with higher employability, income and wealth, but also with a better health
status, higher civic engagement and higher level of social trust (Cutler and Lleras-
Muney, 2008; Campante and Chor, 2012; Easterbrook et al., 2016 Moreover, the
benefits of education spread beyond the individual level. Improvements in human
capital are beneficial to firms, industries and the economy as a whole Blundell et al.,
1999; Prskawetz et al., 2007.
Following the global trend in education, educational attainment levels of the pop-
ulation in the transition region have improved significantly over the last decades
(Barro and Lee, 2013).18 Despite the increase in the percentage of individuals get-
ting higher education and the persistent skills mismatch19, returns to a tertiary
degree are still high in most of the 34 countries, and comparable to what has been
found in some Western European countries, such as Spain and Netherlands, but
lower than Eastern Europe in the early years of transition (Badescu et al., 2011;
Bartolj et al., 2013). Individuals with a tertiary degree earn, on average, 29% higher
income than those with a secondary (or lower) degree, and the returns are robust
to the inclusion of several controls (Table 2.4).
Given the profound effect of market liberalization on the education systems in
former communist countries, it is interesting to study the level of inequities in ac-
cess to education for two separate cohorts: the younger cohort (those who started
education after 1989) and the older cohort. With the transition from plan to mar-
ket, tertiary education in post-communist countries went from being free, although
competitive, to often having a non-trivial cost. Even where education remained
nominally free, scholarships to cover the cost of living, generous before transition,
have been effectively phased out, resulting in much higher costs of being a student.
18In 2015, almost 29% of people aged 25-54 had attained a tertiary level of education, compared
with 19% of those aged 55-74. According to Eurostat statistics, comparable figures for the EU-28
are 32.6% and 20%, respectively.
19In the region, the average percentage of people under the age of 30 who are overqualified for
their job has steadily increased over the last decade, rising from 12.5% to 15.1% (for Reconstruction
and Development, 2016)
Furthermore, the previously strong and heavily controlled link between education
and jobs effectively disappeared, and new skills where rewarded in the labour mar-
ket (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009).20 The younger cohort would have faced the
option to start tertiary education in the early 2000￿s, by when education systems
had been reformed and many Central and South-Eastern European countries had
stronger prospects of EU membership.
Figure 2.10 shows the change in educational attainments across the two cohorts.
For the younger cohort, the percentage of people completing some tertiary edu-
cation is almost double that of the older cohort and overall schooling inequality,
as proxy by the standard deviation of educational attainment, is slightly higher.
While the total level of inequality in achievement might reflect differences in effort,
we are interested in analyzing how much of that inequality is explained by pre-
determined circumstances beyond individual’s control. Table 2.5 (columns (d) and
(e)) reports the estimates of the inequality of educational opportunity for the two
cohorts21, considering place of birth, parental background, ethnicity and number
of books at home during childhood as circumstances, which the individual cannot
be held responsible for. The estimates range between 0.15 (Azerbaijan) and 0.39
(Russia) for the older cohort, and between 0.17 (Slovenia) and 0.52 (Bulgaria) for
the younger cohort. Figure 2.11 provides the same results graphically. Clearly,
inequality of educational opportunity has generally increased: pre-determined cir-
cumstances matter more for educational attainment in the young cohort than they
do for the older cohort. On the other hand, no clear regional pattern emerges ,
neither in terms of sub-regions (South-eastern -, Central -, Eastern Europe, Central
20See Brunello et al. (2010) for a discussion about the changes in the economic and education
systems of Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Interestingly, they find evidence
that having obtained primary and/or secondary degrees (but not tertiary) under communism
is penalized in the economies of the late 2000s. Confirming their findings, results in Table 2.4
suggest that tertiary education acquired under the communism is not penalized by the radical
transformation of the Eastern bloc economies.
21The value of inequality of opportunity for tertiary education is equal to the Dissimilarity index
calculated on the distribution of the logistic regression’s predicted probabilities of having tertiary
education.
Asia) nor to the extent of being a member state of the European Union. Slove-
nia, Poland, Russia and Latvia are the only four countries where the inequity in
accessing tertiary education for the younger cohort is lower than for the older ones
(Figure 2.11). On average, inequality of educational opportunity for the younger
cohort is lower in the countries that joined the European Union during the 2000s,
than in the non-EU member states.
The decomposition of inequality of opportunity into partial shares by individual
circumstances is presented in Figure 2.12. The shares of the six predetermined
circumstances add up to the total inequality levels in Table 2.5 (columns (d) and
(e)). The highest portion of inequality of opportunity in education is attributable to
family educational and cultural resources. For example, parental education typically
explains half of the inequality in educational attainment. A third of the inequality
is explained by the availability of books in the house during childhood. Being
born in a rural area is also an important determinant of inequality in educational
attainment; it accounts for about 10% of the estimated inequality of opportunity,
on average. Parental membership in the Communist Party and ethnicity prove
to play a minor role across countries. Of particular note is the increased role of
parental background for educational attainment in the young cohort. This increased
dependence on parental education can be explained by the fact that parents with
tertiary education gained more from transition: They have been better positioned
to send their kids to universities and bear the associated costs, in terms of both
university fees and foregone income of children. In contrast, the importance of
parents￿ Communist Party membership has almost halved.
Unlike in the case of income and employment, when it comes to education, women
are more likely to obtain a tertiary degree than men. This ￿reverse￿ gender gap
is more prevalent in the younger cohort. This evidence may simply reflect the
long term legacy of the soviet organization, where men were encouraged to attend
vocational schools supplying the industrial and agricultural sectors, while women
were more likely to gain higher education (Terama et al., 2014). It could also be
the result of inequality of opportunity in the labour market that induces women
to select into jobs that require more education. Autor et al. (2010), focusing on
the United States, finds that women with less than a college degree experienced a
more dramatic decline than men in the share of their employment in middle-skill
occupations, between 1979 and 2007.
2.5 Conclusions
The transition from a planned to a market economy in the post-communist countries
was accompanied by expectation of greater and fairly distributed opportunities
for all. These expectations have been only partially met. In fact, inequality of
opportunities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is higher than in many Western
European countries, being nevertheless restrained in comparison with the US and
other developing countries. On average, post-communist European Union member
states display lower levels of ”unfair” inequality, especially in the acquisition of
labour income and in accessing tertiary education.
Given the importance of working-poor phenomenon, especially in developing coun-
tries, we investigate not only the inequity in getting a job, but also in getting a
”decent” job. Inequality of opportunity for getting a ”good job” is significantly
higher than for finding any kind of employment. Importantly, parental member-
ship to the Communist Party still plays a role in explaining inequality, particularly
in having a ”decent” job, suggesting the persistence of networks dating back to the
pre-transition period. In order to study the evolution of inequality of opportunity
over time, we estimate the level of unfair inequality in accessing tertiary education
separately for a younger cohort (individuals who started their schooling after the
fall of the Berlin wall), and for an older cohort (the rest of our sample). Our results
point in the direction of an increase of inequality of opportunity, mostly in non-EU
members.
Among the circumstances that explain inequality of opportunity, parental back-
ground is the stronger driver. Parents’ education plays a particularly important
role in determining children’s educational attainments. Gender is another notewor-
thy source of inequality of opportunity, especially in labour income acquisition, as
a substantial gender wage gap persists. Moreover, female participation falls consid-
erably when inequality of opportunity for ”decent” jobs is higher. Disadvantages
deriving from being born in a rural area is relatively more modest in the countries
under study.
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Figure 2.1. Comparison between the Gini index calculated on the winsorized
distribution of earnings from the 2016 LiTS and the Gini index from the World Bank
statistics. The correlation between the two measures of inequality is 0.42.
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Figure 2.3. Absolute versus relative measures of inequality of opportunity for earnings.
The relative measure is given by the ratio between the absolute measure and the Gini
index of the overall distribution of earnings.
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Figure 2.4. Relative contribution of circumstances to inequality of opportunity.
”Parental background” includes both mother’s and father’s educational attainment and
parental membership to the Communist Party. ”Other circumstances” groups together
birthplace (whether rural or urban) and being part of a minority.
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Figure 2.5. Comparison between the unemployment rates calculated from 2016 LiTS
and from the ILO statistics.
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Figure 2.6. Level of inequality of opportunity for having a job and for having a
”decent” one.
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Figure 2.7. Relationship between the labour force participation rate, separately for
women and men, and the difference in the level of inequality of opportunity for having a
decent job and inequality of opportunity for having any job.
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Figure 2.8. Relative contribution of circumstances to inequality of opportunity for
getting any kind of job. ”Parental background” includes both mother’s and father’s
educational attainment and parental membership to the Communist Party. ”Other
circumstances” groups together birthplace (whether rural or urban), gender, and being
part of a minority.
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Figure 2.9. Relative contribution of circumstances to inequality of opportunity for
getting a decent job. ”Parental background” includes both mother’s and father’s
educational attainment and parental membership to the Communist Party. ”Other
circumstances” groups together birthplace (whether rural or urban), gender, and being
part of a minority.
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Figure 2.10. Educational attainments by cohorts. The younger cohort comprises all
individuals who started education after 1989, while the older cohort groups together
everybody else.
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Figure 2.11. Inequality of opportunity for tertiary education for the two cohorts.
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Figure 2.12. Relative contribution of circumstances to inequality of opportunity for
getting some tertiary education, separately for the younger and for the older cohort.
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Table 2.2. Comparison of characteristics between the group of those reporting labour
income and the group of those not reporting labour income (all countries)
Reporting Non-reporting Min Max
Gender .50 0.53 0 1
Age 40.90 40.61 18 64
Education 0.34 0.36 0 1
Marital status 0.60 0.62 0 1
Health status 0.67 0.71 0 1
N 14,877 5,307
Note: ”Education” is a dummy variable taking value 1 if individuals have some tertiary education.
Table 2.3. Comparison of the distribution of log-earnings (for those reporting labour
income) and the distribution of predicted values (for those not reporting labour income)
Country Mean Standard deviation
log earning fitted values log earning fitted values
ARM 13.40 13.56 0.97 0.35
AZE 8.12 8.16 0.55 0.35
BLR 17.70 17.78 0.61 0.23
BIH 9.10 9.11 0.51 0.20
BGR 8.84 8.96 0.55 0.25
HRV 10.88 10.90 0.50 0.24
CYP 9.30 9.44 0.82 0.37
CZE 12.08 12.16 0.59 0.21
EST 8.99 9.05 0.68 0.40
MKD 12.12 12.21 0.57 0.25
GEO 7.96 7.93 1.13 0.42
DEU 10.09 10.18 0.56 0.27
GRC 8.80 8.83 0.70 0.32
HUN 14.07 14.12 0.61 0.33
ITA 9.56 9.60 0.56 0.27
KAZ 13.26 13.25 1.07 0.41
KOS 8.28 8.25 0.56 0.37
KGZ 11.33 11.40 1.08 0.26
LVA 8.47 8.62 0.74 0.41
LTU 8.53 8.63 0.69 0.30
MDA 10.12 10.17 0.99 0.42
MNG 15.30 14.41 0.81 1.08
MNE 8.34 8.36 0.60 0.29
POL 10.15 10.19 0.51 0.26
ROU 9.60 9.63 0.70 0.26
RUS 12.29 12.37 1.19 0.36
SRB 12.83 12.81 0.70 0.25
SVK 8.79 8.83 0.51 0.27
SVN 9.20 9.28 0.52 0.29
TJK 8.84 8.93 0.75 0.32
TUR 9.80 9.81 0.88 0.41
UKR 10.19 10.22 0.73 0.24
UZB 15.58 15.77 0.82 0.43
Table 2.4. Returns to tertiary education
(1) (2)
log earnings log earnings
tertiary education (d) .352∗∗∗ .293∗∗∗
(23.695) (14.514)
gender (d) -.253∗∗∗ -.265∗∗∗
(-19.300) (-19.471)
years of experience .021∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗
(7.806) (6.627)
years of experience2 -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(-8.657) (-7.633)
tertiary education communism (d) .002
(.054)
marital status (d) .027∗∗
(2.258)
birthplace (rural/urban) (d) .080∗∗∗
(5.235)
ethnic minority (d) -.074∗∗∗
(-3.727)
father’s tertiary education (d) .047∗∗
(2.287)
books .046∗∗∗
(6.921)
parental membership Communist Party (d) .059∗∗∗
(2.985)
Constant 10.701∗∗∗ 10.559∗∗∗
(332.185) (262.036)
Observations 1.41e+04 1.33e+04
R2 .066 .075
R2 adj. .063 .072
F-stat 247.13 97.53
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(d) indicates dummy variables.
Table 2.5. Inequality of opportunity for earnings, employment and education
Country Obs IOp earnings Obs IOp any job Obs IOp decent job Obs IOp education (older) Obs IOp education (younger)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
ALB 952 0.087 780 0.208 999 0.334 300 0.394
(0.006) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
ARM 298 0.162 643 0.049 414 0.153 1020 0.290 247 0.350
(0.048) (0.009) (0.027) (0.022) (0.037)
AZE 339 0.105 630 0.148 418 0.248 730 0.153 360 0.326
(0.015) (0.013) (0.033) (0.037) (0.040)
BLR 604 0.107 921 0.033 878 0.075 1068 0.345 278 0.379
(0.015) (0.003) (0.007) (0.021) (0.036)
BIH 386 0.059 822 0.173 624 0.143 918 0.233 258 0.264
(0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.030) (0.031)
BGR 549 0.122 854 0.163 751 0.115 1178 0.351 171 0.516
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.026) (0.077)
HRV 450 0.073 804 0.077 696 0.080 1057 0.299 227 0.306
(0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.022) (0.033)
CYP 401 0.087 705 0.096 516 0.082 1217 0.275 175 0.385
(0.018) (0.009) (0.015) (0.027) (0.033)
CZE 549 0.104 928 0.027 884 0.117 1168 0.160 216 0.263
(0.013) (0.003) (0.009) (0.030) (0.046)
EST 480 0.151 650 0.068 606 0.057 1109 0.265 122 0.287
(0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.041)
MKD 387 0.082 741 0.114 578 0.234 1002 0.244 241 0.373
(0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.026) (0.030)
GEO 272 0.186 669 0.076 421 0.161 1116 0.377 215 0.477
(0.035) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016) (0.029)
DEU 469 0.075 1084 0.032 1012 0.088 1029 0.302 322 0.301
(0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.030)
GRC 343 0.133 838 0.125 628 0.147 1189 0.322 201 0.433
(0.020) (0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.039)
HUN 427 0.131 742 0.107 656 0.093 1148 0.223 173 0.397
(0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.027) (0.041)
ITA 622 0.093 934 0.058 806 0.071 1195 0.271 193 0.304
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.023) (0.056)
KAZ 541 0.167 955 0.031 835 0.104 1004 0.287 284 0.455
(0.025) (0.005) (0.011) (0.017) (0.029)
KOS 324 0.100 729 0.142 469 0.227 882 0.211 287 0.335
(0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.033) (0.035)
KGZ 309 0.123 699 0.050 547 0.103 983 0.261 328 0.389
(0.030) (0.007) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
LVA 428 0.130 650 0.113 587 0.095 947 0.282 169 0.272
(0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.030)
LTU 526 0.113 736 0.079 650 0.110 1065 0.333 180 0.503
(0.014) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.035)
MDA 367 0.169 662 0.147 474 0.208 954 0.227 220 0.457
(0.022) (0.009) (0.017) (0.027) (0.032)
MNG 451 0.104 893 0.083 699 0.138 980 0.222 351 0.396
(0.021) (0.007) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024)
MNE 445 0.054 802 0.155 614 0.148 873 0.251 283 0.324
(0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.025) (0.027)
POL 346 0.075 868 0.092 775 0.134 1120 0.322 274 0.280
(0.012) (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) (0.029)
ROU 385 0.110 647 0.141 559 0.124 1115 0.329 171 0.473
(0.019) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021) (0.034)
RUS 619 0.147 928 0.042 887 0.087 935 0.393 276 0.371
(0.023) (0.003) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
SRB 377 0.085 725 0.108 620 0.060 1010 0.201 224 0.391
(0.020) (0.006) (0.009) (0.030) (0.041)
SVK 424 0.109 793 0.091 707 0.109 1220 0.222 166 0.304
(0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.026) (0.055)
SVN 333 0.079 632 0.057 547 0.079 1179 0.233 126 0.175
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) (0.051)
TJK 348 0.114 750 0.089 557 0.085 855 0.184 306 0.290
(0.029) (0.007) (0.022) (0.024) (0.043)
TUR 307 0.157 636 0.022 570 0.129 721 0.162 466 0.350
(0.029) (0.004) (0.030) (0.044) (0.029)
UKR 307 0.124 794 0.043 742 0.119 1129 0.344 247 0.369
(0.021) (0.004) (0.014) (0.018) (0.025)
UZB 379 0.107 700 0.062 552 0.152 864 0.269 266 0.282
(0.021) (0.007) (0.020) (0.022) (0.047)
Note: Gini index is used as an inequality measure for earnings, while Dissimilarity Index (D-Index) is used for employment and
education (binary variable outcomes). Bootstrapped standard error computed with 99 replications in parenthesis.
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Chapter 3
Ethnic Diversity and Labour
Market Outcomes: Evidence from
Post-Apartheid South Africa
3.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature studies the link between diversity and the economic
performance of regions and countries. One aspect of diversity which has increas-
ingly attracted the interest of social scientists is ethnic diversity. Conceptually,
the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic development can be both
positive and negative, as is summarised in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). On the
one hand, in highly heterogeneous communities, new and innovative ideas are more
likely to emerge and to consolidate into what Sobel et al. (2010) calls ”cultural
capital” (i.e. cultural and artistic creativity). Diversity is also potentially benefi-
cial to technological and scientific innovation due to the complementarity of skills
of individuals from different ethnic backgrounds (Fainstein, 2005; Eraydin et al.,
2010).
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On the other hand, more ethnically fractionalized communities can experience
slower economic development measured by GDP per capita (Easterly and Levine,
1997) or city size growth (Glaeser et al., 1995), as ethnic diversity may be related
to high social costs which are reflected in lower level of trust and participation in
social activities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002), inefficient public goods pro-
vision (Alesina et al., 1997) and higher inequality (Alesina et al., 2016). The ethnic
cleavage may also be detrimental to the establishment of a culture of inclusiveness
and tolerance which is favorable to economic growth.
A general perspective from macro-level empirical studies (mostly cross-country stud-
ies), however, is that ethnic diversity is negatively associated with economic op-
portunities especially in African countries featured by high ethnic fragmentation
(Michalopoulos, 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013)1. Ethnic fragmen-
tation harms the economic performance in these countries as it is associated with
the under-investment of public goods (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013), con-
flict (Amodio and Chiovelli, 2017) and the collective action failures resulting from
the difficulties in imposing social sanctions in diverse places (Miguel and Gugerty,
2005).
Much less is known about the micro-level evidence on how ethnic diversity affects
individuals’ outcomes, especially labour market performance which is of great im-
portance in driving economic development. For example, increase in employment
can significantly reduce inequalities (Anand et al., 2016). There is some firm-
level microeconometric evidence on the direct effect of ethnic divisions on workers’
productivity in Kenya which documents that upstream workers undersupply down-
stream workers at the sacrifice of total output if these people come from different
1More research in developed world finds support for the positive side of diversity (Andersson
et al., 2005; Niebuhr, 2010; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). The relationship between diversity and
economic performance can also be non-linear. For example, Nikolova et al. (2013) use data from
the post-soviet states and show that entrepreneurship is increasing in ethnic heterogeneity at low
level of diversity, while it loses its positive impact when diversity reaches a certain threshold.
ethnic groups (Hjort, 2014). Some other literature looks at how entrepreneurs from
a specific ethnic group make use of their ethnic networks to develop social capital
and mobilise resources (Iyer and Shapiro, 1999), but they are not directly linked to
ethnic diversity. In general, how the level of ethnic fractionalization affects labour
market outcomes in African countries and how it affects people’s choice between
self-employment and being an employee remain unclear.
This paper investigates how within-black ethnic diversity affects black individuals’
labour market outcomes in post-Apartheid South Africa. We focus on how their
employment rate responds to the composition of black ethnic groups in the district
of their residence2. Post-Apartheid South Africa provides a unique and interesting
setting for the study of the diversity-labour market nexus. On the one hand, eth-
nic identity remains distinct even after generations of integration and interaction
among different ethnic groups. This is because ethnicity became a salient concept
during Apartheid (from 1948 to 1994) when pervasive racism, discrimination and
segregation were meant to guarantee the power of the whites. The Apartheid gov-
ernment deteriorated inter-ethnic relationship by reinforcing the ethnic solidarity
to prevent black ethnic groups from forming a coalition to fight against the white
government (Gradin, 2014). Therefore distinctive features and identities between
ethnic groups are not completely mitigated by hundreds of years of integration.
On the other hand, the Apartheid regime has largely destroyed both the regional
path dependence in demand of black labour and the intergenerational occupational
persistence in labour market outcomes by compressing the educational and job op-
portunities of the black South Africans universally. The Apartheid government
imposes strict labour regulations to prevent the black South Africans from per-
forming semi-skill and skilled jobs or running their own business in ”white” areas.
2There is literature about ethnic diversity at the workplace level, which shows the complemen-
tarities between workers from different cultural backgrounds as a rationale for the existence of a
global firm (Lazear, 1999b). This is beyond the scope of this paper as we do not have access to
firm-level data reflecting the ethnic composition in the workplace.
Therefore the post-Apartheid era is the first time since early 20th century when the
majority of the black South Africans could freely make decisions on occupations
and set up their own business. Thus contemporaneous labour market outcomes of
the black might convey less information on the persistence in regional labour de-
mand or inherited abilities, but is more related to their own experiences and living
environments including the ethnic composition of their communities.
Baseline results, based on 1996 and 2001 census data, show that black individuals
are more likely to be employed in a more ethnically diverse district (measured
by intra-black ethnic diversity), especially more likely to work as an employee (as
opposed to setting up their own business).
One challenge in interpreting this as a causal relationship is that the formation of
ethnic diversity in a district may not be random. For example, if a district has
more job opportunities or higher levels of development, it will attract people from
different ethnic backgrounds and they will be more likely to be employed simply
due to potentially higher labour demand in those districts. Or if people with some
specific characteristics (i.e. higher ability) are attracted by more ethnically diverse
districts, they might also perform better than less-abled counterparts wherever they
go. A simple OLS regression will therefore amplify the effect of ethnic diversity on
employment 3.
We therefore turn to an instrumental variable strategy, which relies on the historical
origins of blacks’ settlements (known as ”homelands”). In particular, our instrument
exploits the fact that assuming the magnitude of migration decreases with the
distance between the original homelands and the destination districts outside those
homelands, a district tends to host a more diverse population if it is equally distant
to multiple homelands. On the contrary, a district becomes more homogeneous if
3OLS may also underestimate the effect if individuals with lower ability move to more diverse
places if it is easier to find jobs in those places.
it is relatively close to one homeland but far away from the rest. Importantly, the
equidistance to multiple homelands remains a strong predictor of ethnic diversity
even after controlling for the proximity of the district to the closest homeland.
This further confirms that what can be captured by this instrument is not purely
the absolute distance to these homelands but the equal distribution of distance to
multiple homelands.
In our main IV regressions, one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity in-
dex in 1996 (2001) decreases unemployment (including those who are economically
inactive) by 0.0262 (0.044) point, which is 4.27% (6.92%) of the average unemploy-
ment rate in 1996 (2001). This positive association is more prevalent among the
black ethnic groups with relatively larger population size and among people with
lower levels of education.
We propose a model of a coordination game in the spirit of literature on social
interaction to explain the unusual finding of the positive effect of ethnic diversity in
an African country. Especially it can explain why only groups with relatively larger
population size respond to ethnic diversity in our empirical results. As inter-ethnic
communication is more costly (because one needs to cross language or cultural
barriers for example) than intra-ethnic connection and that people get positive
utility from social connection with diminishing returns (because they can get tired
from social life), we document that in a more ethnically diverse place people have to
communicate with a larger proportion of individuals outside their own ethnic group
to maintain a certain level of social connection. Therefore it is more necessary for
them to invest in social skills to be prepared for inter-ethnic connection. Their
labour market outcomes will improve accordingly as these additional social skills
can help them in job search, either by reducing search cost or by improving their
productivity.
We then show why only groups with larger population size respond to ethnic di-
versity, starting with the initial condition where everyone in the district invests in
social skills and participates in inter-ethnic communication. Groups with larger size
are more likely to deviate from this coordination in a homogeneous place (where
they dominant in group size) because they can get enough social connection purely
by intra-ethnic communications. This is less likely to be the case if the district is
more diverse where they are no longer the dominant group. For groups with smaller
size who heavily rely on inter-ethnic connection, they do not have the incentive to
deviate and will always participate in inter-ethnic interaction and invest in social
skills regardless of the ethnic composition of the district.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, we propose an
instrumental variable to capture ethnic diversity, in a setting where two commonly
established identification strategies might not be feasible. The first approach relies
on the exogenous change of ethnic diversity in the time dimension, for example
due to the implementation of new jurisdictions (Alesina et al., 2016). The second
approach is based on natural or quasi-experiments which directly affects the level of
ethnic diversity. For example, Algan et al. (2016) explore an exogenous allocation
of public housing in France at the apartment block level and Dahlberg et al. (2012)
make use of a policy on the compulsory allocation of refugees in Sweden. In South
Africa, however, ethnic diversity does not change dramatically over time, which
means there is not enough time variation to identify changing levels of diversity.
It is also hard to find proper natural and quasi-experiments due to the political
sensitivity of ethnic topics in this country.
Furthermore, our instrument has advantages over some other instruments (not nec-
essarily instruments for ethnic diversity) which explore geographical features. For
example, distance to certain places is largely used as an instrument for migration
but whether this is orthogonal to economic conditions has been challenged4. By
4For example, a place close to an economic centre might get the positive spillover from the
centre; or a place close to the road might perform better than others so that the demand for road
construction we control for the distance to the closest homeland and explore the
remaining variation in equidistance to multiple homelands, which could be less
problematic than distance itself. Alternatively, one can use the historical ethnic
diversity directly as an instrument for contemporary diversity level, as is exploited
in Miguel and Gugerty (2005) who use the historical distribution of ethnic residence
in two districts in Kenya as an instrumental variable to study ethnic diversity and
public goods provision. Such a historical distribution of ethnic settlements might
also be correlated to other factors. For example, they find that places where several
settlements intersect are in lack of sufficient public goods provision. This might
however not be because there are fragmented ethnic groups but just public policies
are less effective at the border between different districts in general (whether or
not these districts represent different territories of ethnic groups). Our instrument
mitigates this violation of exclusion restriction by focusing on districts outside these
settlements instead of the settlements themselves. More importantly, by construc-
tion we can have places relatively far from all homelands but still with reasonably
high ethnic diversity level as long as they are equidistant to all homelands. These
places are less likely to be affected by the initial conditions of original homelands.
In addition, our identification strategy can easily be generalised to studies on other
types of diversity. For example, replacing homelands with individuals’ countries
of origin, one can instrument the ethnic composition of immigrants in Europe or
the U.S. with a measure of equidistance to multiple home countries (Alesina et al.
(2015) implements an approach similar to this).
Secondly, we contribute theoretically to the mechanism through which ethnic diver-
sity affects economic performance. The theoretical analysis in this paper, together
with literature on the importance of social skills in employment, provides a new
perspective on how ethnic diversity potentially affects labour market outcomes in
is higher in this place.
a positive way in South Africa (potentially in other developing countries as well).
Traditional explanations indicating why diversity improves labour market perfor-
mance, such as knowledge spillover, skill complementarity and discrimination, are
not completely compatible with our empirical evidence5. We therefore mainly relate
to literature on social interactions in communities with different levels of diversity
for an explanation consistent with our results.
There are two key differences between our model and several models documenting
social interactions in response to diversity in current literature. On the one hand,
unlike models relying on the intrinsic ethnic-specific parameters of taste, preference
or discrimination (for example, Morgan and Vardy (2009) shows minority candi-
dates produce noisier signals of their ability), we show that ethnic diversity still
affects people’s decision in investments in social skills without documenting those
assumptions. This is in line with the recent finding that ethnic diversity can be
independent of cultural diversity (Desmet et al., 2017).
On the other hand, unlike Glaeser et al. (1992) which requires that communication
is more extensive or the amount of social connection is larger in more diverse places
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), in our model the overall level of social interaction
does not necessarily increase with ethnic diversity (total social interaction is the
sum of both intra- and inter-ethnic connections). Ethnic diversity results in more
investments in social skill because inter-ethnic communication is more costly (or
requires more skills) than intra-ethnic connection.
The mechanism in our paper is the closest to, yet distinct in important aspects from
two existing papers. In the story in Lazear (1999a), he finds that immigrants to the
U.S. have higher English proficiency when there are smaller proportions of people
from their native country in the communities in their destination. Our paper also
documents that people are incentivised to learn another language for more poten-
5Detailed discussion is in the theoretical section of the paper.
tial communication partners (in our story we generalise ”language” to a broader
concept of social skill). The key difference is that they focus on the assimilation of
the immigrants to the U.S and therefore the majority group (i.e. the U.S. native) do
not respond to the diversity of the population in those communities. However, both
the theoretical model and empirical findings in our paper show that only groups
with larger size (analogue to the U.S. native) are affected by ethnic diversity of the
districts whereas smaller groups (analogue to the minority group of immigrants in
the U.S.) behave indifferently between ethnically diverse and homogeneous places6.
What generates this difference is that his model is featured by unilateral assimilation
of the immigrants to the U.S. while in our model social interaction and skill invest-
ments are bilateral. This makes more sense when we study a highly fragmented
society where no ethnic group has dominance in group size (even the largest ethnic
group makes up only around 25% of the whole population in our sample). Also
due to strong ethnic identities, groups with smaller size will invest in a common or
official language (groups with larger size do so as well) rather than the language of
the large group.
In another model on social interactions between different groups, Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000) assume that individuals prefer to communicate with people with
similar income, race or ethnicity and conclude that homogeneous communities have
higher levels of social capital. Instead of making the assumption of group-based
preference directly, we treat this as an implicit implication of the model and ex-
plain that the reason for people’s preference towards groups similar to them is lower
intra-ethnic communication cost.
Moreover, our mechanism expands the literature on the importance of skill com-
position in labour market by linking skill mix to ethnic relations. Researchers in
labour economics have highlighted the importance of skill mix (Acemoglu and Au-
6We control for the proportion of the black over the whole population in our analysis and focus
on within-black communication.
tor, 2011) and social skills in production function (Deming, 2017). For example,
our finding that individuals especially low-educated black people are motivated to
invest in social skills in addition to human capital is consistent with the idea that
when the labour market size is small, workers tend to invest more for the breadth
instead of the depth of skills as there is less worker specialisation in certain tasks
(Kim, 1989).
Recent literature also argues that higher communication skills in the workplace can
facilitate people’s trading of tasks based on each other’s comparative advantage,
therefore increasing their productivity (Deming, 2017). Taking a step back, we
provide some insight on how to motivate the acquisition of social skills in preparation
for the labour market. Our mechanism shows that this could potentially be achieved
by encouraging the ethnic diversity of their communities.
Thirdly, we contribute to the literature on South African labour market by empha-
sising another dimension of inter-group relations in addition to black-white divi-
sions. Studies on South Africa have been focusing on the interaction and segregation
between black and white populations while each group within the black population
is implicitly seen as being homogeneous. However, inter-ethnic relationship within
the black population can also affect labour market outcomes. Especially, in the
specific context of post-Apartheid South Africa, finding a positive effect of ethnic
diversity on employment may be particularly unexpected after almost half a cen-
tury of Apartheid which contributed to the erosion of inter-ethnic relationship and
social capital.
Furthermore, major obstacles to contemporary unemployment in South Africa can
potentially be well-tackled by looking at within-black ethnic diversity. Banerjee
et al. (2008) propose that the stagnancy of the high-unemployment rate among the
black in post-Apartheid South Africa might be mainly due to high search cost in
job hunting and little growth in the informal sectors. On the one hand, social skill
acquisition can reduce the high search cost in an ethnically diverse district. On
the other hand, as the informal sector is not powerful enough to generate more
employment opportunities, black South Africans still rely heavily on jobs in formal
sectors where social skills can be important as these jobs require more skill com-
plexity. Coupled with the empirical finding that the high returns to education is
only important for high-school graduates and above (Wittenberg, 2002), our story
shows that ethnic diversity and investment in social skill can perform as substitutes
for formal human capital accumulation which especially benefit the less educated.
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a historical overview of the
pattern and formation of ethnic diversity as well as summary statistics of labour
market in South African context. In Section 3, we describe the data sources used
for the analysis and how we construct the variables of interest. Section 4 details the
empirical methodology used for the analysis, focusing on the instrumental variable
and its validity. In Section 5 we comment on the results about how ethnic diversity
affects labour market outcomes in post-Apartheid South Africa and how this impact
differs across sub-groups. Section 6 proposes a plausible theoretical model to explain
the above empirical results and rule out some alternative explanations. Finally we
draw some conclusions and policy implications in Section 7.
3.2 Institutional Setting
3.2.1 Ethnic groups in South Africa and the formation of
ethnic diversity
None of the black ethnic groups in contemporary South Africa are indigenous in
this country. These groups migrated from eastern and central Africa to southern
Africa starting from centuries ago, as part of the so-called ”Bantu migration”.
Before explaining the narratives, two concepts should be made clear. The first is
”homeland” which refers to the original settlements of those ethnic groups when
they first moved to South Africa. The second is ”white areas” or ”white South
Africa”7 which refers to places in South Africa outside those homelands. Many
years after arrival in South Africa, those black people moved out of their original
homelands and ended up in these ”white areas” due to different reasons, mainly the
pressure of conflicts with the British and Dutch colonisers as well as other ethnic
groups. Therefore, ”white areas” are not areas where only white people reside, but
places outside original black homelands (the proportion of the black over the whole
population can be large in those ”white areas”).
Based on Mwakikagile (2010) and Gradin (2014), we provide historical narratives
on the mass migration of ethnic groups from central Africa towards South Africa,
the original settlements of these ethnic groups and the migration of these people
out of their homelands to ”white areas” in South Africa. The timeline about the
history of the settlements and migration of the black ethnic groups outside their
own settlements up till the time of South Africa’s independence can be found in the
upper panel of Figure 3.1.
The indigenous groups in South Africa are San and Khoikhoi (both are ”coloured”
groups) residing in the southwestern and southeastern coast about 2000 years ago.
Around 700s A.D., black Africans had settled in the northern part of what is South
Africa today8. They were members of different Bantu ethnic groups who had moved
southward from East-Central Africa (the Great Lake district around Congo) and
spoke related languages.
Ethnicity-specific information on the Bantu migration from eastern and central
Africa towards South Africa and the formation of ethnic diversity in South African
7It became an official terminology during the Apartheid regime.
8Some argue it is as early as the third century (Gradin, 2014).
”white areas” is summarised in Appendix A1. The table contains information on
the time of their migration into South Africa, geographical location of original
homelands, time of migration outside homelands and the Bantustans assigned to
them during Apartheid (which will be explained in constructing our instrumental
variable). For example, Zulu are believed to be descended from a leader named
Zulu born in the Congo Basin area. In the 16th century, they migrated south
and eventually settled in the eastern part of South Africa, an area now known as
Kwazulu-Natal. The Zulu empire, in the 1800s helped with their vast migration
and expansion of territory.
One indication from the narratives is that Africans had settled in the country
long before Europeans arrived. For example, the diaries of shipwrecked Portuguese
sailors attest to a large Bantu-speaking population in present-day Kwazulu-Natal
by 1552. In 1652 Jan van Riebeeck and about 90 other people set up a permanent
European settlement as a provisioning station for the Dutch East India Company at
Table Bay on the Cape of Good Hope, beginning the era of European colonisation.
Due to the pressure from the potential conflicts with white colonisers and the other
ethnic groups, the nine black ethnic groups began to move out of their homelands
or change their territories. By the early 1700s, there were already some African
groups migrating into the interior of the country to shield themselves from European
domination. By 1750 some white farmers, known as Boers, expanded to the region
where they encountered the Xhosa and Zulu. Starting from 1789, a series of wars
and conflicts over land and cattle ownership broke out between the Boers and the
black ethnic groups. In early 1800s the British replaced the Dutch at the Cape
as the dominant force. The Boers, defeated by the British, migrated eastwards
into today’s Kwazulu-Natal and Free state where the conflicts between the Boers
and Zulu people continued. Many other ethnic groups have encountered similar
conflicts.
The destination of their migration is not well-documented. This information, how-
ever, can be reflected from today’s distribution of ethnic groups across South Africa.
This pattern of migration will also affect today’s distribution of ethnic diversity.
For example, a place would be more diverse potentially if more ethnic groups moved
in. Details will be shown in the next section. One thing which has to be emphasised
here is that in most of the cases the key driving force of emigration from ethnic
homelands is mainly the conflict either with the white or with other ethnic groups
and less likely to be the economic benefits in the destination.
Importantly, further evidence shows that the mass migration both from central to
southern Africa and from homelands to ”white areas” took place mainly before the
spur of industrialisation and modern economy. The discovery of mineral resources
is a milestone in the economic development and transformation towards modern
South Africa. Diamonds were first discovered in 1867 along Vaal and Orange rivers,
and in Kimberley in 1871. In 1886, gold was first discovered in Witwatersrand,
around today’s Johannesburg, which stimulated trade and construction (building
infrastructure for example) in large dimensions. This timeline confirms that the
mass migration largely occurred before the rise of industrial sectors. This means
the migration from homelands to ”white” areas, although not completely random,
may not be purely driven by the higher economic prosperity in the destination which
attract more diverse migrants.
In 1910 the Union of South Africa was established, which declared the superior socio-
economic status of the white politically and created a white-dominated society.
Since then racial discrimination has been a prominent feature of South African
society even before the official institution of Apartheid, and the mobility of the
black was largely restricted.
Summary demographic statistics about the nine ethnic groups are reported in Table
1.1 for 1996 data and Table 1.2 for 2001 data. The patterns of the distribution of
population share among these nine groups and their labour market outcomes are
similar in these two years. In both 1996 and 2001 there are three out of nine ethnic
groups (Xhosa, Zulu and South Sotho) who have relatively larger population size
(i.e. their share of the whole population is over 20%). We define them as large
groups. Another two ethnic groups have smaller size (Tswana and North Sotho),
and are therefore defined as medium groups. The remaining four ethnic groups have
much smaller population share (less than 5%) and are defined as small groups.
3.2.2 The role of Apartheid in shaping inter-ethnic relations
and labour market outcomes
Since mid-1900s, inter-ethnic relationships and labour market outcomes have been
significantly shaped by the Apartheid regime and related regulations. The regime
reinforced the ethnic identity and destroyed much of the path dependence in the
opportunities in education and labour market for the black. The timeline of the
Apartheid regime can be found in the lower panel of Figure 3.1.
Starting in 1948, the ruling Afrikaner National Party (NP) implemented a program
of apartness and formalized a racial classification system, which transformed into
official Apartheid by the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act and 1953 Bantu Self-Govern
Act. Each individual living in South Africa belonged to one of the four races (White,
Indian, Colored, Black), which essentially defined an individual’s social and political
rights. In addition, the government over-emphasised the differences among the
various ethnic groups, in the spirit of the ”dividi et impera” principle. The ethnic
segregation, on top of the racial separation, was aimed at guarantying the political
and economic supremacy of the white minority. This exacerbated division of ethnic
groups served as a tool for the white to control the black in an easier way (Gradin,
2014).
With the introduction of the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act in 1959, the
government delimited a number of scattered rural areas as ”native reserves” for
blacks (called ”Bantustans”), one for each ethnic group. The designated areas for
the reserves amounted to 13 percent of the total South African territory, while the
blacks accounted for more than 75 percent of the total population. Blacks’ land
ownership was restricted, as well as their ability to freely move and settle in the
white South Africa. Internal migration was severely regulated until the repeal of
the Pass Laws Act in 1986. With the forced removal of the blacks from the ”white
areas” of South Africa, the Bantustans became over-densely populated territories,
where land was overgrazed and afflicted with serious soil erosion. The economic
development of these reserves never materialized, leaving their inhabitants in acute
poverty (Christopher, 2001). In 1970, the regime promulgated the National States
Citizenship Act, which provided citizenship to blacks in their homelands. The
ultimate aim was to create a number of ethnicity-based independent states.
In conclusion, the Apartheid regime used separation along racial lines and ethnic
lines as a fundamental device for the demarcation of physical and social boundaries
for all interactions.
One thing which needs to be pointed out is that Apartheid did not shift the big
picture of the magnitude and distribution of ethnic diversity in these ”white areas”,
despite the campaign of forced-removal during this time. This is proved by the
high correlation of district-level ethnic diversity between 1996 and 1985 (the corre-
lation is 0.918, calculated from 1985 and 1996 census by the authors). Therefore in
this paper we link contemporaneous distribution of ethnic diversity to the location
of historical homelands without incorporating the forced removal of black people
during Apartheid into the story.
The Apartheid regime also severely limited the allocation of job opportunities and
resources among the black (Posel, 2001). The Bantu Education Act of 1953 en-
sured that non-whites received a substandard quality of education, while access to
occupation was regulated by the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act. Whites were
authorized to determine the racial allocation of jobs (Mariotti, 2012) and to reserve
certain professions, especially in the manufacturing sector, for themselves. In par-
ticular, the black were banned from semi-skilled and skilled occupations. Similarly,
blacks were not allowed to run their own businesses in white areas. In fact, only
with the advent of the democracy, in 1993, non-whites were able to make their free
occupational choices. This, together with the reallocation of industries, changed
the industrial and occupational structures in white areas, which partly weakened
the path-dependence in regional demand of black labour. Moreover, the intergener-
ational occupational persistence, which has been shown to be particularly relevant
for employment (Sørensen, 2007; Pasquier-Doumer, 2012; Magruder, 2010), does
not represent a very important issue in the early post-Apartheid era. In other
words, blacks may rely more on resources outside their families in helping overcome
the entry barriers to jobs (barriers such as information about trade partners and
market opportunities, informal credit and insurance arrangement).
3.2.3 Labour market in post-Apartheid South Africa
Labour market prospects for the black actually have worsened since the end of
Apartheid in 1994, featured by the rise in unemployment and increased proportion
of discouraged workers (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2005; Leibbrandt et al., 2009).
Based on 1996 census data, over 60 percent of the working-age black population
are either unemployed or out of labour force. A large share of the unemployed in
2005 have never worked in their life. To make things worse, skill-biased technological
changes lead to an increase in capital-labour ratio in late 1980s and the whole 1990s,
further reducing demand for unskilled labour. At the same time, real wage has been
stable or decreasing between 1995 and 2005 (Banerjee et al., 2008). The increase
in the supply of unskilled labours, together with the shrinkage in labour demand
due to skill-biased technical change as well as the exodus of the white (who are
the owners of capital and factories) largely leads to this persistent unemployment
issues in the contemporary South African labour market (Banerjee et al., 2008).
Furthermore, there is very limited informal employment rate in South Africa, which
is only 7.7% - 9.7% based on various measures of informality in September 2004
Labour Force Survey (Heintz and Posel, 2007), possibly because there is also entry
barriers in those informal sectors (Kingdon and Knight, 2004). This means the
formal wage-employed sector is still the main force in absorbing increased labour
supply.
Summary statistics on labour market outcomes based on 1996 and 2001 census data
confirm this pattern. In Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, in the overall sample, less than
40% are employed over the whole working-age black population, among which self-
employment rate is particularly low (3.2% in 1996 and 2.3% in 2001). The slight
rise in unemployment rate from 1996 to 2001 is consistent with the current finding
that unemployment rates peaked between 2001 and 2003 in South Africa (Banerjee
et al., 2008).
There is, however, large heterogeneity among different ethnic groups. In general
groups with medium and small sizes are more active in the labour market and more
likely to be employed, both in self-and wage-employed jobs. This indicates that
groups with smaller size are in general more active in the labour market and more
competitive in job search, which can be explained by the theoretical model later on
in the paper.
3.3 Data
For our empirical analysis, we make use of different data sources. We rely on census
data for main analysis. There are three years of census data in the Post-Apartheid
area: 1996, 2001 and 2011, all of which are the 10% sample from the original
national sample in publicly available sources. We do not use 2011 census as both
the classification and boundary of magisterial districts have changed dramatically
after 2001, making it less reliable to match the new system of magisterial districts
in 2011 to the older ones. More importantly, in publicly available 2011 census data,
there is no information on which magisterial district each individual resides in.
The unit of analysis is the Magisterial District (MD)9. It is particularly convenient
to use the MD as a small-scale geographical unit for comparative analysis, given that
all other administrative divisions have been revised and re-demarcated repeatedly
since the first democratic elections in 1994. It also provides a reasonably large
geographical unit to define labour market. Our final sample consists of 210 districts
in 2001 census (205 in 1996 census), which were the ”white” areas outside the
historical homelands. Take 2001 census as an example. The excluded districts are
either part of the homelands and thus had distinct political status and partially
different laws and labour market regulations (124 districts)10, or districts where the
black population in 2001 accounted for less than 1% of the overall population (11
districts), or they cannot be matched with 1985 census data that is employed in
9We calculate the ethnic diversity of the magisterial districts where individuals reside in. There
are three reasons why we do not use district of work for the main analysis. Firstly, the mechanism
we provide in this paper regarding how ethnic diversity affects labour market outcomes is more
related to the districts where one resides (i.e. places where one has social interaction even before
entering the labour force) than where one works, which we will explain in the theoretical model.
Secondly, the correlation between district of work and district of residence are very high so that
they provide similar information. Thirdly, more than half of the black population are unemployed
or out of labour force. Therefore the information on their district of work is unavailable and has
to be replaced by the information on district of residence, making the district-level information
among this group and that among the employed people less comparable
10The boundary of the homelands does not coincide with the boundary of contemporary MD.
Taking a conservative method, we define district with less than 10 % overlap with homelands as
”white” districts.
the instrumental variable approach (9 districts)11.
Status in employment. Using both 1996 and 2001 census data, we construct
an individual-level binary variable for employment. The dummy takes value 1 if
one is unemployed or economically inactive and 0 if one is employed (either self-
employed or an employee). Among workers who are employed, we also consider
the allocation of them between self-employment and wage-employment jobs. More
in details, an individual is considered to be self-employed if s/he declares to be
either self-employed, employer or worker in the family business. To do this, we
create another dummy variable only for employed people. It equals 1 if one is self-
employed and takes value 0 if s/he declares to be an employee. We only consider
working-age black population (15-64 years old).
Ethnicity. The ethnolinguistic group each individual belongs to is identified using
the information on the first language they speak in the 1996 and 2001 census. There
are nine black ethnic groups in the country: Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, North
Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda. Following Desmet et al. (2012),
we rely on Lewis’ Ethnologue tree of ethnolinguistic groups (Lewis et al., 2009) to
build our measures of ethnic diversity12. For each magisterial district and census
year, we calculate the relative shares of each ethnic group within the black popu-
lation and combine them into ethnic diversity index: the fractionalisation index13.
Universally used in the empirical literature on ethnic diversity (Desmet et al., 2017;
Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), the
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index (ELF) is a decreasing transformation of the
11OLS regression results remain unchanged if we include the nine districts which cannot be
matched with 1985 census data.
12The nine black ethnolinguistic groups of South Africa belong to the Niger-Congo language
family and correspond to level 11 in the tree of ethnolinguistic groups.
13We consider another index: polarization index in the robustness check. It has been proved
that fractionalisation index performs better in explaining economic outcomes than polarisation
index (Alesina et al., 2003)
Hirschmann-Herfindahl concentration index and is defined as
ELF = 1−
K
∑
k=1
s2k
where sk is the population share of ethnolinguistic group k and K is the overall
number of groups. Intuitively, the index measures the probability that two indi-
viduals who are randomly drawn from the population belong to different ethnic
groups. Larger value of the fractionalisation index indicates higher diversity in the
magisterial district.
Figure 3.2 shows how ethnic diversity, measured by the ELF index, is distributed
in the districts in 1996 in our sample. Districts in darker colours are those with
higher ethnic diversity. There is large variation in ethnic diversity levels across
South Africa. In general, districts in the northeastern part of the country are more
ethnically diverse than those in the southwestern part. In addition, some districts in
the middle part of the country are the most ethnically diverse ones. These patterns
will be explained when we construct instrumental variables. Districts coloured in
white are those inside original homelands, with less than 1% of the black population
or cannot be matched to 1985 census data.
Demographic, socio-economic and geographical controls. From the cen-
suses, we also derive a number of controls, which we introduce in our regressions
either at the individual level or as aggregated information at the district level.
Individual characteristics include gender, age, educational attainment, marital sta-
tus, whether one’s father is alive. Among the district-level controls, we consider
population density, proportion of the black, proportion of people working in man-
ufacturing and service sectors, whether the district is mainly rural or urban, and
whether there is a river and road crossing the district. Additionally, we introduce
other geographical factors, which are particularly relevant to potentially shaping
the economic activities of a region. Starting from the Mineral Resources Data Sys-
tem14, we compute the density of mine for each district. In order to account for the
agricultural suitability of land, we use the measure of terrain ruggedness from Nunn
and Puga (2012)15. As a proxy for the economic development at the local level, we
use the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration night-time light satellite
images data for 1996 and 2001 (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013)16. We also
include the number of conflicts in each district.
The rationale of taking into account these control variables will be discussed in
the section about empirical model specification. Details on the sources of data
and methods in constructing district-level control variables are presented in the
Appendix A2.
Before looking into the data, it is worthwhile to point out some differences in in-
formation collected in 1996 and 2001 census. Firstly, 1996 census distinguishes
between those who are unemployed and out of labour force (i.e. economically in-
active) while 2001 census combines these two categories. We thus conduct analysis
separately as well as jointly for these two groups in 1996 data, and compare the
results based on the joint group with the corresponding results using 2001 census.
Secondly, information on working hours is only available in 2001 census data. We
thus focus on 2001 census in calculating hourly income. In addition, a drawback of
the income information in the census data in both years is that it asks income from
all possible income sources, including labour market income, social grant and other
sources like bonus, rent or interest. As a result, another dataset (i.e. Labour Force
Survey) is required to calculate more precise measurement of wage, which will be
14Mineral Resources Data System, MRDS, is a collection of reports describing metal-
lic and nonmetallic mineral resources throughout the world. Spatial data is available at:
https://mrdata.usgs.gov/mrds/.
15We also tried the measure of slope from the same data source. The results are very similar. We
do not include ruggedness and slope at the same time as they are highly correlated (the correlation
is larger than 0.9), which potentially leads to multicollinearity issues in regressions.
16Night-light data is at 30-second grid level. Here we take the average night-time light density
within each magisterial district by summing up the night-light measure over these grids and divide
it by area of the district.
discussed in the empirical results.
Thirdly, 1996 census data asks information on both first and second language spoken
at home whereas 2001 census only asks people about the first language they speak.
Therefore, we only look at 1996 census to test our channel of social skill acquisition
using proficiency of a second language as a proxy for social skills.
Fourthly, for migrants in each district, we have full information on the exact year
of their migration to the current magisterial districts only in 1996 census. In 2001
census only migration between 1996 and 2001 is recorded. Therefore, in 1996 census
data non-migrants are defined as those who either never moved or moved within
magisterial districts and migrants are defined based on cross-district migration. In
2001 census non-migrants are those who did not migrate between 1996 and 2001 or
migrated within magisterial districts while migrants are people who moved across
districts between 1996 and 2001.
Table 2.1 and 2.2 compare districts whose ethnic diversity is above and below the
medium level of ethnic fragmentation in 1996 and 2001, respectively. The column
”ttest” shows the p-value corresponding to the t-statistics on the difference between
districts with high and low ethnic diversity. In both years more diverse places
perform significantly better in all indicators of employment, including employment
rate, proportion of self-employed people and employees over the whole working-age
black population. Among those people who are employed, there is some difference
among sectors and occupations. In 1996 census places with higher diversity have
larger proportion of people in the manufacturing sector and less in the service sector
and this pattern will change once we include our control variables in regressions.
Districts with larger ethnic diversity also have less proportion of people in the
unskilled occupations among all workers. The similar pattern holds in 2001 census
as well.
The negative correlation between unemployment and ethnic diversity at district
level is further confirmed in Figure 3.3 where we plot the proportion of unemployed
(including economically inactive) people over the whole working-age black popula-
tion against ethnic diversity in each district. The downward-sloping line between
these two variables is observed in both 1996 and 2001.
3.4 Empirical Methodology and Specification
3.4.1 Baseline model specification and potential bias
We study the relationship between ethnic diversity among the black population
living in ”white areas” of South Africa and their labour market outcomes. In par-
ticular, we examine whether the within-black ethnic diversity affects blacks’ em-
ployment. We start by examining the cross-sectional evidence and investigate the
relationship separately for year 1996 and 2001. For both of the years we specify our
linear probability model as follows:
Emplikdp = α+ βELFdp + γXikdp + δZdp + vikdp (3.1)
where Emplikdp is a dummy variable for the labour market outcome for individ-
ual i of ethnicity k in district d in province p, taking value 1 if one is employed,
and 0 otherwise. We also report the results for wage-employment, self-employment
(including self-employed, employer and working in the family business) and the
substitution between wage-employment and self-employment within the subsample
of the employed people. ELFdp takes the value of the within-black index of ethnic
diversity (i.e. fractionalisation index computed in Section 3.317) in district d in
province p. Xikdp is a vector of individual-level characteristics (age, gender, educa-
tional attainment, marital status, whether one’s father is alive). The last one could
be a proxy for family financial and non-financial support. Zdp is a set of both time-
varying demographic and economic controls as well as time-invariant geographical
characteristics at the district level, which will be explained in more detail below.
Unobservables which potentially affect employment rate are included in the term
vikdp. In particular, vikdp incorporates unobservables at province, ethnicity, district
and individual levels, and therefore can be decomposed into the following items:
vikdp = θp + λk + σd + ei + ϵikdp (3.2)
ϵikdp is the random error term. θp is province fixed effect which mainly controls for
historical path dependence in job opportunities in each province, as well as province-
level fiscal variables including social grant provision and policies on taxation and
redistribution. There is also evidence that there is inequality between ethnic groups
(Alesina et al., 2016) and that the gaps between different ethnic groups lie in their
demographic structure, location, education and labour market outcomes (Gradin,
2014). Therefore we introduce λk, ethnic group fixed effects, which allows us to con-
trol for mechanical compositional effect and ensures we are comparing individuals
from the same ethnic group across districts exposed to different levels of diversity.
Cross-sectional estimates suffer from omitted variable bias originating from σd and
ei. For example, the existence of a local economic centre in the district could both
create the demand for labour and encourage diversity, in that job opportunities
attract individuals from other districts with different ethnic backgrounds. Or more
17We use the results about polarization index as a robustness check.
energetic individuals with higher work spirits, who are intrinsically more likely to
be employed than the average population, may sort to more diverse districts which
have more active atmosphere. In these cases, our results will suffer from upward
bias as both ethnic diversity and employment rate are positively correlated with
the unobserved district and individual characteristics.
To address the concern that the results are driven by these confounding factors, we
first include a rich set of district controls Zdp to limit the information in unobserved
items. To account for market size effects, we introduce the population density and
urban/rural status of the district. As proxies for local economic development, we use
the average night-time light density across 30-second grid areas within each district,
and the share of blacks in the district population. For the industrial structure of
the district which potentially leads to differences in labour intensity of firms, we
control for the proportion of people employed in manufacturing and service sectors.
Furthermore, to control for the direct spillover from homelands, we include the
distance to homelands which were severely deprived by the Apartheid government.
To control for the potential cost of ethnic diversity like conflicts, we add the number
of violence in each district in the corresponding years, as conflict has been proved to
be associated with ethnic diversity (Amodio and Chiovelli, 2017) and potentially job
opportunities for the black (for example, there might be more closure of factories
in more turbulent districts). Finally, to control for agricultural suitability and
other geographic factors relevant for the local economic activities we use the terrain
ruggedness, the existence of a river and a road crossing the district and the density
of mineral resources.
The remaining district-level omitted variables are included in σd. Our results will
be biased if they are correlated with employment rates. All this will be dealt with
using the instrumental variable discussed later on.
Unobserved information at the individual level in ei might also bias the OLS result.
We therefore cluster standard errors at the district level to allow for correlation of
the error term cross individuals in the same district. Furthermore, as a robustness
check, we conduct regressions only on people who are born and remain in the
districts (i.e. native people) as well as those who only migrated within districts. If
the main results still hold among the native, the potential selection of people moving
into places with different levels of diversity based on individual-level criteria will not
largely drive the whole story. This will be discussed in more detail in the empirical
results.
The relationship between ethnic diversity and labour market outcomes can also
be investigated at the district level. Then model (3.1) would change accordingly.
Empldp would represent the proportion of individuals in unemployment, wage em-
ployment and self-employment in district d in province p and the ethnicity fixed
effect would be removed. The set of individual characteristics Xikdp should therefore
be aggregated at the district level (e.g. average education in each district). The
district-level regression becomes:
Empldp = α+ βELFdp + δZ˜dp + θp + σd + ϵdp (3.3)
Here δZ˜dp include both the individual-level variables in Xikdp aggregated at the dis-
trict level, and the original district-level variables in Zdp. Similarly, after controlling
for province fixed effect θp, the remaining σd is still a source of omitted variable
bias which will be dealt with using the same instrumental variable approach.
As individual-level regressions contain more information (especially ethnic-specific
characteristics captured by ethnicity fixed effects), we mainly report results based on
individual-level regressions in our analysis whilst presenting the results of district-
level regressions for robustness check.
3.4.2 Instrumental variable approach
Our instrument for ethnic diversity exploits the historical origins of the location of
blacks’ homelands. As is explained in the institutional setting, the nine black ethnic
groups moved long ago from the northern territories of the African continent and
settled in different regions of today’s South Africa, with one ethnic group occupying
one settlements (i.e. defined as ”homelands”). Assume the magnitude of migration
from the homelands to outside districts decreases with the distance between them
and distance is the only determinant in migration. When they moved out of these
homelands to the outside districts (i.e. ”white” districts which we are focusing on in
this paper), the territories that are equidistant to multiple homelands are more likely
to be inhabited by individuals with different ethnic origins, and therefore the ethnic
diversity will be the highest. On the contrary, places only close to one homeland
and far away from the rest become ethnically homogeneous as they have one group
dominant in population size migrating from the closest homeland. Visually, this
prediction is confirmed by the distribution of ethnic diversity in South Africa in
1996 (Figure 3.3). As is shown before, places with relatively higher diversity are
not necessarily places at the border or close to economic centres of the country,
but are those in the middle and northeastern part of the territory surrounded by
multiple homelands.
We therefore need an instrument for each district to capture their equidistance to all
the original homelands. Our instrumental variable strategy proceeds in two stages.
First, similar to Alesina et al. (2015), we estimate a parsimonious gravity model of
migration based on 1985 census data (i.e. pre-1994 distribution of ethnic groups).
We aim at predicting the level of within-black ethnic diversity in each white district
d, solely as a function of a factor that is plausibly exogenous to labour market
outcomes of the blacks: the distance of the district to the homelands. Second,
we start from the predicted stocks to construct a diversity index. Specifically, we
estimate:
Ndk85 = α+ β1Disdk + γk + ϵdk85 (3.4)
where Ndk85 is the actual stock of individuals belonging to ethnic group k in (white)
district d in 1985; Disdk is the bilateral Euclidian distance between the centroid of
district d and the closest border of homeland for ethnic group k18; and γk is the
homeland fixed effect. The determinants in our model are the ones traditionally
employed in the related literature (Mayda, 2010; Beine et al., 2013; Ortega and Peri,
2014; Dumont et al., 2010). In particular, the physical distance between two districts
(the homelands and the white areas) accounts for the migration costs, while the
homeland fixed effects take into account common shocks in living conditions in the
original settlement and the stock of population of each ethnic group in homelands,
which can also influence migration decision. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006), we estimate the model by using the pseudo poisson maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator, which better suits the count data in the dependent variable 19.
By imposing a universal β1 to all ethnic groups, we assume that the per-unit mi-
gration cost is the same for everyone, regardless of their ability and ethnicity. In
addition, by ignoring any characteristics of the destination (e.g. population size,
economic development and job opportunities) in the gravity model, we impose the
condition that the benefit of migration is also the same for everyone. Therefore by
18The reason why we use the centroid of the districts instead of capital city is that capital cities
are not well-defined at the magisterial district level. We use the border instead of the centroid of the
homeland because the shape of the homeland is highly irregular and scattered. Furthermore, the
distribution of population within homeland is highly uneven, making the centroid of homeland
a less reliable measure in capturing the distance between the destination and the location of
potential migrants from homeland.
19We do not control for the population size in the destination in the gravity model as it might be
endogenously determined by the level of economic development in the destination which potentially
affects the flow of migrants into the destination. Here our aim is not to get the most precise
estimate of bilateral migration but to construct the counterfactual number of migrants in each
district under a hypothetical setting where bilateral migration is only determined by distance
between the original homeland and destination.
construction our predicted number of migrants from each homeland is only deter-
mined by the distance between homeland and destination.
In principle, the migration stocks could be predicted by 1996 and 2001 data. Never-
theless, we prefer to use the 1985 census data to rule out the selection of migration
resulting from the movements of the black population after 1994 (this happened
even as early as the repeal of the Pass Law in 1986). In fact, as previously docu-
mented (Section 3.2), while blacks were not allow to choose their place of residence
during Apartheid, after 1986 they could freely migrate and decide where to resettle.
Therefore, the distribution of ethnic groups in 1985 is less affected by the simulta-
neous change of labour market conditions and blacks’ selection into ”white areas”
after 1994. Another reason why we use the 1985 distribution of the black population
is that the equidistance to different homelands is a feature which stays relatively
stable over time. By sticking to 1985 data we can construct an instrumental vari-
able whose value stays the same between 1996 and 2001 to make the IV regression
results in these two years more comparable 20.
Using the predicted stocks N̂dk = α̂+ β̂1Disdk+ γ̂k, we calculate the predicted share
of ethnic group k in the black population of district d and construct the instrument
for the fractionalization index ELF:
ÊLF = 1−
K
∑
k=1
ŝk
2 with ŝk =
N̂dk
∑Kk=1 N̂dk
(3.5)
The same instrumental variable approach with the same model specification at the
first stage can be applied to district level regressions.
The remaining challenge is to find a proper measure of the original homelands
20In reality we do not find much variation in fragmentation index between 1996 and 2001, which
means ethnic diversity stays relatively stable over time.
for each ethnic groups. As there is no document about the exact location and
boundary of these homelands, we use the territories of Bantustans during Apartheid
as proxies for these original homelands. As is discussed in the institutional setting,
with the ascent of the apartheid regime, the white-dominated government of South
Africa designated specific territories as pseudo-national homelands (i.e. ”native
reserves”, called ”Bantustans” in the official documents) for the country’s black
African population. The Bantustans were organized on the basis of ethnic and
linguistic groupings and were a major administrative device for the exclusion of
blacks from the ”white areas” of South African. The location of the Bantustans is
based on the government’s knowledge and documents about the historical location
of homelands of each ethnic group. Ten Bantustans were created for these nine
ethnic groups (there are two Bantustans for Xhosa people - Transkei and Ciskei)
and other groups each occupies one Bantustan21.
To verify that the location and territory of Bantustans can be treated as proxies for
the original homelands for the black people, we compare the distribution of these
Bantustans and the ”Murdock map”. This map, drawn by an anthropologist George
Murdock in 195322, provides the information on what the dominant ethnic group is
in each geographical unit on the map of the whole African continent at the end of
the 19th century. As reflected in the Murdok’s map (panel (a) in Figure 3.4) (each
colour represents a certain group dominating the corresponding place in terms of
population size), up to the end of the 19th century, each of the nine groups have
occupied some specific areas of the country. Although the map does not reveal the
location of original homelands and the boundary of the geographical units on the
map does not coincide with the border of magisterial districts in South Africa, it
21Therefore we treat Transkei and Ciskei as one homeland in the gravity model. When we
calculate the distance between each district and the original homeland of Xhosa people, we measure
the distance between each district and Transkei and Ciskei respectively and choose the smaller
one.
22The map has been digitized by Nathan Nunn, starting from ”Tribal Map of Africa” which is a
fold out map from the book ”Africa: Its peoples and Their Culture History” by George Murdock,
1959.
roughly implies the spatial distribution of each ethnic groups in South Africa as
a joint result of the distribution of original homelands and centuries of emigration
from these original settlements.
Comparing Murdock’s map in panel (a) and the distribution of Bantustans under
the Apartheid system in panel (b) in Figure 3.4, we can find large overlaps of
the Bantustans designated to each ethnic group with the region where the same
group have dominated historically in Murdock’s map. For example, places around
the Bantustan designed for Tswana people (the dark green part in panel (b)) are
also the places dominated by Tswana people (labeled with the same dark green
colour) at the end of the 19th century in Murdock’s map in panel (a). Therefore,
it is reasonable to use the distribution of Bantustans as proxies for the location of
original ethnic homelands.
The map in Figure 3.5 presents the value of predicted diversity index together with
the distribution of Bantustan across the country. The white places with slashes are
either places which cannot be plausibly considered as ”white” South Africa of our in-
terest as they have more than 10% overlap with Bantustans, or places which cannot
be matched with 1985 census data. The spatial pattern of predicted value of ethnic
diversity in this figure is similar to the distribution of ethnic diversity in Figure 3.3
based on the real data. Again, places with the highest predicted ethnic diversity are
those amid multiple homelands (mainly in the middle and northeastern part of the
country). A more important feature is that the distance to the closest homeland
(proxied by Bantustans) does not completely determine the level of predicted ethnic
diversity. That is to say, places with the highest diversity are not necessarily the
closest to a particular homeland, which is particularly prominent for the districts
around the Bantustans of Transkei, Ciskei, Kwazulu and Bophuthatswana. We will
discuss this in more detail in the next section.
Test of validity of the instrumental variable
Identification requires the instrument to capture the ethnic diversity pattern ob-
served in 1996 and 2001 and to be uncorrelated with any other determinants of the
blacks’ labour market outcomes. The first condition is satisfied provided that: 1)
The historical distribution of ethnic groups within the country varies with and is
closely related to the distance of the destination region (”white” district) from mul-
tiple homelands, and 2) Apartheid did not overturn the historical pattern. As for
the second condition, the non-randomness of blacks’ homelands could cast doubts
on its fulfillment. The proximity to the Bantustans might well be correlated with
unobserved factors other than diversity, affecting the blacks’ labour market out-
comes.
However, the instrument exploits the distance to multiple ethnic homelands as a
predictor for diversity. As is mentioned above, the map in Figure 3.5 shows that
districts with higher predicted diversity are the ones that are ”equally” distant to
multiple homelands, and not necessarily the ones that are the closest to a specific
homeland. For example, although being contiguous to one of the Bantustans -
Transkei (identified with the red color in Figure 3.5), districts in the South-East
are among the most ethnically homogeneous areas because they are located at the
periphery of other homelands. To further ensure that the instrument only captures
the relative distance to multiple homelands and not the proximity to a single Ban-
tustan, in the regression we control for the distance to the closest homeland. We
argue that, conditional on proximity to a single homeland, the distance to multiple
homelands is as good as random.
For a more rigorous test of the validity of our instrumental variable, we run regres-
sions to show that the predicted ethnic diversity index is not correlated with many
unobserved district-level characteristics, conditional on all the control variables in
our first stage regressions. Firstly, we test the correlation between the instrumental
variable and potential job opportunities. According to agglomeration economics,
economic centres, as clusters of economic activities, business and capital inflow,
may act as the hub of job creation. Therefore, distance to economic centres may
capture the potential job opportunities an individual is exposed to, based on the
spillover of economic prosperity from the economic centres. There are five main
economic centres in South Africa: Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elisabeth
and Johannesberg. In the validity test we calculate the distance from the centroid
of each magisterial district to the closest economic centre and correlates it with
predicted fragmentation index discussed above.
The second potential confounding factor is the economic activity of the white. On
the one hand, as the Apartheid regime destroyed the self-employment opportunities,
leadership and the training towards skilled occupations of the black in the ”white”
South Africa, the majority of the employers of wage-employed black people are
the white. Although our main regressions focus on the black, the population size
and the employment status of the white are also important in determining black
people’s employment rate, as they might be the providers of potential jobs to the
black workers. On the other hand, the dominance and wealth of the white might
potentially affect the migration decision of the early black migrants. Black people
from different ethnic groups may move to a district where the white behave relatively
better as there are more opportunities (or poorer as there is less stress/competition
from the white) and thus the ethnic diversity of the black might be correlated with
the behaviours of the white. We then calculate the employment rate of the white
among their working-age population for each magisterial district in our sample and
see if it relates to ethnic diversity of the black.
Thirdly, path dependence also matters in determining contemporary employment
opportunities. As the distribution of black settlements is not completely random,
the equidistance to multiple original settlements might reveal some socio-economic
characteristics besides the distance itself (i.e. customs, early conflict or the distribu-
tion of ancient civilisations) which have long-time impact on contemporary devel-
opment. This persistence of particular socio-economic features is usually a concern
in literature which constructs instrumental variables with geographical variables.
However, in our special setting, the Apartheid regime before our sample period
compressed the opportunities of education, job opportunities and residential choice
nationwide among the black and potentially destroyed part of such historical path
dependence. If we can show that the path dependence which potentially correlates
with equidistance to homelands was largely destroyed by the Apartheid regime due
to the shift in residential patterns and the re-allocation of economic activities both
for the black and the white, we will be safer to claim that the historical persistence
is not likely to affect contemporary employment opportunities directly. As there is
no reliable data to reveal the employment pattern of the black during apartheid,
we use the employment pattern of the white in 1980 as a proxy for the remain-
ing path-dependence in employment close to the end of the apartheid and see if it
correlates with our instrumental variable measured with 1996 and 2001 data. For
the employment status of the white in 1980, we do not consider self-employment
as the definition of self-employment is not quite clear under Apartheid regime and
therefore has large measurement errors 23. We also consider the population size of
the white in 1980.
The fourth potential confounding factor is the magnitude of migration. It might
be the case that a place with higher diversity of migrants is also a place attracting
more migrants in magnitude. In other words, if a place attracts a larger migration
pool, the composition of migrants is likely to be more diverse. Migrants behave
differently from the native in many ways and are more selective in their own. If
23There are four census during Apartheid: 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1985 census. We only consider
1980 census as the data quality is higher than that in 1960 and 1970 census. Publicly available
1985 census data has no information on employment status.
places close to multiple homelands attract larger number of migrants due to the
less migration cost incurred, even if we restrict the sample to the native people
in each district, our result may still be biased once there is spillover effect from
migrants to the native people. The effect can be positive if the migrants provide
job opportunities to the native or it can be negative if these two groups compete for
similar positions. Therefore, we need to show that our predicted diversity does not
capture the magnitude of migration (calculated as the total number of migrants in
each district), but the composition of their ethnicity.
Table 3 shows the results on the validity of the instrumental variable based on
1996 and 2001 census data. We regress a set of variables that potentially affect
employment rate on predicted fractionalisation index conditional on all the control
variables in the main regressions discussed above. Panel A, B, C and D present the
tests on the relationship between predicted ethnic diversity and job opportunities,
economic activities of the white, path dependence and magnitude of migrants, re-
spectively. We obtain the coefficients of the tests by regressing the corresponding
dependent variables (as reported in the table) on predicted ethnic diversity condi-
tional on all the control variables in the main regression. These dependent variables
include: distance to the closest economic centre, proportion of white people who
are self-employed over the white population in 1996 and 2001, proportion of white
people who are employees over the white population in 1996 and 2001, proportion
of white people over the whole population in 1996, 2001 and 1980, proportion of
white people who are employees over the white population in 1980 and the num-
ber of black migrants in each district. We do not find systematic relationships
between these potential confounders and our instrumental variable, which means
the predicted ethnic diversity can be considered as a valid instrumental variable.
Other potential threats to the instrumental variable
This section discusses some remaining potential threats to the instrumental variable
which are not likely to be measured with available data.
Firstly, one may argue that the original distribution of ethnic homelands is not
completely random. The fact that one place is close to multiple homelands at the
same time might mean that these homelands are themselves close to each other.
Similarly, one possible pre-requisite for a place to be close to only one homeland is
that those homelands might be scattered and relatively far away from each other.
If the whole region is equipped with better endowments (geography, climate or soil
quality) than the others at the time of the Bantu migration from central Africa,
this place could attract more than one ethnic groups to establish their homelands,
whilst regions with only one ethnic homeland or regions where the distribution
of homelands is more scattered might be less attractive in resources and endow-
ments. Therefore, our instrumental variable - the predicted diversity index might
just capture the distribution of homelands and the original endowments of the whole
surrounding region.
This is not likely to be the case. for the following reasons. The first reason is that
our instrumental variable captures the equidistance to different homelands condi-
tional on the distance to the closest homeland. By construction places far away from
all homelands can still have reasonably high predicted diversity, as long as it is of
equidistance to all these homelands. These places are less likely to be affected by
the original endowments and resources of ethnic homelands. The second reason is
that we have already controlled for geographical endowments (ruggedness and river)
in each district which are potentially correlated with their initial development by
affecting their agricultural production. The third reason is that if our instrumental
variable mainly captures the initial economic development and the endowments or
resources of the region rather than ethnic diversity, the predicted diversity index
should be correlated with the labour market outcomes among both black and white
population. However, as is shown in table 3, our instrumental variable is not sys-
tematically correlated with the employment rate of white workers. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the initial endowments in the regions surrounding ethnic homelands
challenge the exclusion condition of the instrumental variable.
Secondly, there is a possibility that districts close to multiple homelands might be
the trading centres for people from those homelands whilst trade flows in districts
close to only one homeland are less. This might also lead to the difference between
these two types of places in the initial economic prosperity and the establishment
of cities resulting from trade. Here we show this is unlikely to severely violate the
validity of our instrumental variable. Our instrumental variable by construction
allows for the case that a place far away from all homelands can be reasonably di-
verse if it is equidistant to different homelands. And this place is less affected by the
initial trade flows among homelands. Furthermore, places with more initial trade
flows might become contemporaneous economic centres due to the path dependence
in city development and the accumulation of capital and labour. In our validity test
we do not find a systematic pattern of the distance to the closest economic centre
and predicted diversity index.
Thirdly, one may worry that certain events which attract diverse migrants might
happen coincidentally in places close to multiple homelands. For example, the
homeland for Tswana group (i.e. the Bantustan of Bophuthatswana) and places
in Mpumalanga and Limpopo Province (in the northeastern part of the country)
are rich in mineral resources. If our instrumental variable mainly captures the
distribution of mineral resources, and if the discovery of mines in a district motivates
people of diverse backgrounds to migrate into the district and at the same time
boosts economic development, what can be reflected in the predicted ethnic diversity
is mainly the effect of mineral resources. In our analysis we have controlled for the
density of the mines in each district. More importantly, narrative evidence reveals
that the mass migration from central Africa (which can be dated back to the 11th
and 12th century) and the emigration from homelands to ”white” South Africa
happened well before the discovery of mineral resources (mainly starting from the
19th century). Therefore, the discovery of mines and the related events are not
likely to violate the validity of our instrumental variable.
First stage results
Table A0 in the Appendix reports the estimated parameters of the gravity model. It
suggests that the distance between a white district d and an ethnic group’s homeland
is strongly negatively correlated with the size of the same ethnic group’s population
living in district d. Table 4 presents the first-stage regression of the instrument at
the individual level both without and with province fixed effects, together with all
control variables. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the first-stage regression results
based on 1996 (2001) census data. In both years the predicted fragmentation index
ÊLF is positively associated with the observed index ELF. The F-statistics is very
high in all regressions (i.e. much larger than 10), indicating that the instrument is
a very strong predictor of ethnic diversity.
Comparing column 1 (without province fixed effects) and 2 (with province fixed ef-
fects) reveals that the F-statistics decrease drastically from 367.1 to 24.93. There-
fore a large part of the variation in predicted ethnic diversity comes from cross-
province comparisons. However, even if we control for province fixed effects, there
is still remaining variation in predicted diversity index within provinces and the
instrument is still a strong indicator of real-world diversity index. Comparison
between columns 3 and 4 confirms the same pattern in year 2001.
District-level regressions in Appendix Table A1 reveal the same pattern. Predicted
ethnic diversity is positively and strongly correlated with the ethnic diversity index
in real data. F-statistics of the instrument are still large in all regressions, and
similarly they are larger without province fixed effects. All results consistently
show that our predicted ethnic diversity index is strong enough as an instrumental
variable.
3.4.3 Supplementary approach: district-level fixed effect
The fact that we have two-year cross-sectional census data and that the territory of
magisterial districts stay stable between 1996 and 2001 motivate us to find a way
to construct panel data at district level as a supplementary approach to the in-
strumental variable specification. From the district-level model specification (3.3),
we realise that the main source of bias comes from the unobserved σd. Therefore
an alternative way to instrumental variable approach to deal with this bias is to
control for it directly by including district fixed effect based on a panel of districts.
Therefore we construct a balanced panel by matching the magisterial districts be-
tween 1996 and 200224 and conduct the model (3.3) by adding magisterial district
fixed effect σd directly. Any time-invariant variables in Zdp and θp are dropped
automatically. Instead we add time fixed effect ut in the model25.
24Among 205 magisterial districts in 1996 and 210 districts in 2001, 205 of them can be matched,
given that we exclude districts with less than 1% of black people over the whole population.
25A potential further specification is to combine the above two approaches and rely on fixed
effect-IV approach. The rationale to do this is that some district-level unobservables might change
over time which cannot be captured by time-invariant σd. In this case, we have the first difference
specification:
∆Empldt = α+ β∆ELFdt + δ∆Z˜dt + ∆ fdt + ϵdt
Ideally we can find an instrumental variable for fdt. A similar case to this specification can be
found in Dustmann et al. (2017). However, this first-difference specification at district level with
instrumental variable is not appropriate here because there is little variation in both the real-world
ethnic diversity and the predicted ethnic diversity (i.e. the equidistance to different homelands
does not change over time) over time, which is not sufficient for reliable statistical inference.
Empldt = α+ βELFdt + δZ˜dt + σd + ut + ϵdt (3.6)
We report the results of this district-level fixed effect model right after the main
analysis.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Ethnic diversity and labour market outcomes
Ethnic diversity on employment
Table 5 summarizes the main results on the effect of ethnic diversity (measured
by fractionalisation index) on unemployment rate. The dependent variable is a
dummy which equals 1 if one is unemployed or out of labour force and 0 otherwise
(including people who are self-employed and employees). In 1996 census data which
distinguishes people who are unemployed and out of labour force, we create dummies
for unemployment and labour force participation and look at how they respond
to ethnic diversity separately. Columns 1-6 report the results in year 1996 while
columns 7-8 are for year 2001 when unemployed workers and people out of labour
force are combined into one category in the original census data. Furthermore, panel
A in Table 5 reports the results based on the cross-sectional OLS regressions at the
individual level. Panel B in Table 5 provides the corresponding estimates based on
the instrumental variable regressions. We provide results both without and with
province fixed effects for comparison. All regressions control for the individual and
district level characteristics including ethnicity fixed effects discussed above.
In most of the OLS and IV regressions in Table 5 the coefficients of ethnic diversity
on unemployment (or labour force participation or these two outcomes altogether)
are significantly negative, indicating that within-black diversity increases the rate
of employment and labour force participation. Comparing panel A and panel B,
the negative and significant coefficients of ethnic diversity remain in IV regressions
in many columns. In panel B, comparing columns 2, 4 and 6 reveals that ethnic
diversity increases employment mainly by decreasing the number of people who are
actively looking for jobs but still unemployed, rather than bringing people into the
labour force. Table 5 also shows that in most of the regressions the coefficients de-
crease after controlling for province fixed effects, meaning province-specific features
can partly explain the response of employment rate to ethnic diversity.
We now calculate the magnitude of the effects of ethnic diversity on employment
based on the results in columns 6 and 8. In panel A in column 6, one standard
deviation increase in ethnic diversity index in 1996 is associated with 0.0215 point
decrease in unemployment (including inactivity), which is 3.5% of the average un-
employment (including inactivity) rate26. Similarly, in panel A in column 8, one
standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity index in 2001 is associated with
0.0388 point decrease in unemployment (including inactivity), which is 6.1% of the
average unemployment (including inactivity) rate27. Correspondingly, in IV re-
gressions, one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity index in 1996 (2001)
decreases unemployment (including inactivity) by 0.0262 (0.044) point, which is
4.27% (6.92%) of the average unemployment (including inactivity) in 1996 (2001).
26It can be calculated that the standard deviation of ethnic diversity in 1996 is 0.2659. The
coefficient of diversity index in panel A in column 6 is -0.081. Therefore one standard deviation
in diversity index decreases unemployment by 0.081 * 0.2659 = 0.0215. From Table 1.1 we know
that the average unemployment (including inactivity) rate among the black in ”white” districts is
0.613. Therefore this point decrease is 0.0215/0.613= 3.5% of the average unemployment rate.
27It can be calculated that the standard deviation of ethnic diversity in 2001 is 0.2586. Therefore
in 2001 one standard deviation in diversity index decreases unemployment by 0.150 * 0.2586 =
0.0388. From Table 1.2 we know that the average unemployment (including inactivity) rate among
the black in ”white” districts is 0.636. Therefore this point decrease is 0.0388/0.636= 6.1% of the
average unemployment rate.
Comparing the magnitude of estimates in OLS and IV regressions in both years
shows that the magnitude of the effects of ethnic diversity on employment rate
increases largely between 1996 and 2001 (from 3.5% of the average unemployment
rate to 6.1% in OLS and from 4.27% to 6.92% in IV) and IV estimates are slightly
larger than OLS estimates. This can be explained by the fact that IV regressions
capture LATE for workers at the margin of being affected by ethnic diversity. They
might be the most responsive to ethnic diversity in considering their employment
status.
Appendix Table A2 further breaks down employment status into two categories:
self-employment and wage-employee. All the independent variables remain the same
as those in Table 5. In columns 1 and 3 in Appendix Table A2, the dependent
variable is a dummy which equals 1 if one is self-employed and 0 otherwise (including
unemployed, inactive and wage employee). The dependent variable in columns 2
and 4 is a similar one which equals 1 if one is an employee and 0 otherwise. Again,
panel A (B) reports the results for OLS (IV) regressions.
The results show that in the post-apartheid South African context, within-black
ethnic diversity has a positive effect on the labour market outcomes of the blacks,
mainly in wage-employment as is shown in columns 2 and 4. Specifically, one stan-
dard deviation increase in the fractionalisation index is associated with a 0.0226
(0.037) point increase in the wage-employment rate of the working-age black indi-
viduals in 1996 (2001), according to the OLS results. This corresponds approxi-
mately to a 6.4% (10.85%) increase of the average wage-employment rate among
the population of reference in 1996 (2001). In IV regressions, one standard de-
viation increase in the fractionalisation index increases wage-employment rate by
0.027 (0.047) points in 1996 (2001), which is around 7.6% (13.78%) increase of the
average wage-employment rate in 1996 (2001).
Similar to the patterns in Table 5, the effect of ethnic diversity on wage-employment
increases from year 1996 to 2001. IV estimators have slightly larger magnitude than
OLS estimators for possibly the same reason. We do not find anything significant
about self-employment rate. One plausible reason is that there is no enough vari-
ation in self-employment rate across districts for reasonable statistical inference
as the self-employment rate in South Africa is very low in both years (2% - 3%)
according to Table 1.1 and 1.2.
Table 6 further presents how ethnic diversity affects workers’ choice between self-
employment and being an employee. As self-employment rate is between 2% -
3% of the whole working-age black population, we drop self-employed people from
the whole sample and investigate if ethnic diversity increases the probability of
being an employee against unemployed in columns 1 and 3. The magnitude and
significance of the coefficients on ethnic diversity index are very similar to those in
the corresponding columns (columns 2 and 4) in Appendix Table A2. This shows
that most of the effects of ethnic diversity on employment takes place in wage-
employed jobs.
Columns 2 and 4 only include employed people and look at the allocation of these
workers between self- and wage- employment. The dependent variable equals 1 if
one is self-employed and 0 if being an employee. This is to investigate the effect of
ethnic diversity on the potential substitution between self- and wage-employment
among employed black population. We replicate the results of the main analyses by
restricting the sample to people who are either wage-employed or self-employed (i.e.
excluding the unemployed and the inactive). Although the self-employment rate
might be too low for enough variations to generate significant statistical inference,
we find that the coefficients of ethnic diversity are consistently negative in OLS
and IV regressions in both years. That is to say, ethnic diversity helps unemployed
individuals get into employment; a large fraction of those newly employed people
opt for working for others as an employee.
The corresponding district-level regressions based on the model specification 3.3 are
reported in the Appendix Table A3. In these district level regressions, the dependent
variables are the proportion of working-age black people who are unemployed or
inactive; who are wage-employed; who are self-employed and the proportion of
people who are self-employed relative to employees (columns 1-4 and columns 5-8,
for year 1996 and 2001 respectively), given the corresponding individual features
aggregated at district level and district level controls. OLS (IV) estimators are
shown in panel A (B).
The OLS and IV estimates reported in Table A3 confirm the positive impact of
diversity on the employment of the blacks. And this positive impact mainly takes
place in wage-employment. The effect on employment (and wage-employment) in
OLS regressions is slightly smaller than the ones estimated with the individual-level
regressions, while the magnitude of the effect in IV regressions is slightly larger than
that in individual-level regressions28.
Ethnic diversity on wage, income and working hours
In this section we replicate the above individual-level regressions (both OLS and IV)
by replacing the dependent variables with other labour market outcomes, including
working hours, hourly wage and monthly earnings. As information on working hours
is only available in 2001 census data, we only conduct these analyses based on 2001
data. For data on working hours, if values of self-reported weekly working hour are
larger than 80, we treat them as outliers and exclude them from regressions. In
addition, we trim the income data by excluding values above 5 standard deviation
of the mean income. Hourly wage is constructed by dividing monthly earnings by
28Columns 4 and 8 report the results on the effect of ethnic diversity on the rate of self-
employment relative to wage-employment aggregated at district level by only including black
people who are employed. Results in other columns are based on the whole working-age black
population
monthly working hours (i.e. 4*weekly working hours).
Data on monthly income in 2001 census includes both labour market earnings and
income from other sources such as dividend, rent or social grant. We first report
the results based on these rough measures of monthly earnings and replicate the
regressions with more precise data on labour market earnings and working hours.
Panel A in Table 7 reports the OLS and IV regression results on these labour market
measures based on 2001 census data. Dependent variables include: log monthly
income, log hourly income and weekly working hours. As self-employed workers
and employees have very different determinants of working hours and earnings,
and that ethnic diversity mainly increases wage-employment rate, we only focus
on employees in all regressions29. Columns 3 and 6 indicate that ethnic diversity
does not affect weekly working hours among the employees. Therefore the increase
in employment in response to ethnic diversity comes from the extensive margin
by increasing employability of unemployed and inactive people, rather than the
intensive margin (measured by weekly working hours). And this extension of the
extensive margin of labours is not achieved at the sacrifice of decreased intensive
margin.
Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 show some evidence on the increase in both monthly and
hourly income among the black employees in response to higher ethnic diversity.
As is stated above, information on income in census data incorporates all potential
income sources. Therefore we need another dataset which asks information on
labour market earnings in particular. We turn to October Household Survey 1996
to replicate all the results in Panel A 30. We do not choose year 2001 because
starting from year 1998 there is no information on the magisterial districts each
29There are more observations in columns 3 and 6 than others because there are missing values
in income and we trim the income values above 5 standard deviation from the mean.
30It is an annual survey staring from 1993 (which was renamed as Labour Force Survey con-
ducted twice a year from 2000 and became a quarterly survey from 2008). In 1996 survey 72890
individuals are covered, among which 16082 have information on work status.
individual lives in. The results are in Panel B in Table 7. Columns 3 and 6 confirm
that weekly working hours are not responsive to ethnic diversity. In columns 1, 2, 4
and 5 the effects of ethnic diversity on measures of labour market earnings are not
significant, possibly because the increase in employment can come from both the
supply and demand side of the labour market, or because the measures of nominal
earnings are not adjusted for price levels (as there is no price or living cost data at
the magisterial district level).
3.5.2 Supplementary approach: district-level fixed effects
As a supplementary approach to the instrumental variable approach, we provide
estimation results on district-level fixed effects models based on the model specifi-
cation (3.6) in Table 8. We construct a balanced panel between 1996 and 2001 (205
magisterial districts each). The measures of labour market outcomes (i.e. depen-
dent variables) are: proportion of people who are unemployed or inactive among
the whole working-age black population; proportion of employed workers among the
whole working-age black population (excluding self-employed people); ratio of the
number of self-employed workers versus employees and log monthly income among
employees.
Similar to the main IV regression results, higher ethnic diversity is associated with
higher employment, mainly in wage-employment but there is no significant corre-
lation between ethnic diversity and monthly income. In particular, in district fixed
effect regressions we find some evidence that more diverse districts are associated
with higher ratio of wage-employment in relation to self-employment.
The magnitude of coefficients in Table 8 are larger than those in Table 5 and Table
6, which can be explained by two possible reasons. Firstly, district-level regres-
sions do not include ethnicity fixed effect which is used to capture ethnicity-specific
unobservables which affect the labour market outcomes of each ethnicity such as
the attitudes towards work and leisure and ethnic-specific skills. It is however not
appropriate to include this fixed effect in the district-level regressions due to the
potential multicollinearity problem, as the proportion of each ethnic group in a dis-
trict is already a component of the ethnic diversity index (i.e. an item in Herfindahl
Index).
Secondly, the relatively larger coefficients of panel regressions might reflect some
time-varying district-level unobservables. For example, people are more likely to
move to ethnically diverse districts as time goes by as a result of increased benefits
in the destination (i.e. the economy of the districts with higher ethnic diversity
might growth more rapidly than that in more homogeneous districts). In individual-
level IV regressions, our instrumental variable is not likely to be correlated with the
economic development in the destinations by construction (as the distance between
homelands and destination is the only determinant in migration). Therefore the
variation of these unobservables over times does not affect our estimates in IV
regressions. However, as panel regressions with district-level fixed effects may lead
to upward bias of the key estimator as they do not take into account these time-
varying unobservables.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous effects of ethnic diversity on employ-
ment
Table 9 split the whole sample into several sub-samples to investigate the hetero-
geneity in the impact of ethnic diversity on labour market outcomes with individual-
level regressions. In particular, we replicate the regressions in the main specification
by carrying out the same analysis on these sub-samples. By excluding workers who
are self-employed, we use a dummy dependent variable which takes the value 1
if one is an employee and 0 if one is unemployed or inactive31. Panel A and B
in Table 9 replicate the same regressions in columns 1 and 3 in Table 6 by split-
ting the working-age black population into sub-samples. Panel C and D look at
the allocation of employees among different sectors and occupations in response
to ethnic diversity by regressing the probability of working in particular sectors or
occupations on ethnic diversity index only among employees.
Panel A split the sample by educational levels. ”High education” refers to people
with more than 9 years of schooling (i.e. high school, college and postgraduate)
while ”low education” means no education, primary and junior high school educa-
tion. We present both OLS and IV results in both years32. In 1996 the positive and
significant effect of ethnic diversity on wage-employment rate only exists among
low-educated working-age black population. The magnitude of the coefficients of
ethnic diversity index is also larger among the low-educated group. In IV regres-
sions in 2001 the positive effect of ethnic diversity still only holds for low-educated
people. However, there is some difference in its magnitude between 1996 and 2001.
From 1996 to 2001 the magnitude of the coefficient of ethnic diversity index in-
creases largely from 0.05 to 0.12 for high-educated people while for low-educated
people the increase is smaller (from 0.141 to 0.19). A more detailed split of the
sample reveals that the increase in the magnitude of the effect of ethnic diversity
on wage-employment rate takes place only among college graduates while for high-
school graduates the coefficient is insignificant and the magnitude is still around
0.05 (results not shown in the table though).
Panel B split the sample by group size. As is shown in Table 1.1 and 1.2, we have
three ”large” groups whose population share is above 20%, two ”medium” groups
31We also conduct the analysis with a dummy on whether one is unemployed (including inactive
people) or not. The results are quite similar.
32The results are robust to other definitions of ”high” and ”low” educational categories. For
example, we also split the sample into people with more and less than 7 years of schooling, and
people whose years of schooling are above and below the mean value in the district where they
live.
whose share is between 10% and 20% and the remaining ”small” groups making up
less than 5% of the whole black population. We look at these three groups separately
and discuss how they are affected by ethnic diversity. The results reveal that only
the group with ”large” size are positively affected by diversity. None of the columns
show that ”small” groups response to ethnic diversity of the districts they live while
evidence on the ”medium” group is more mixed. It is not very likely that the results
are purely driven by the lack of power of statistical inference due to smaller sample
size. In all the regressions for ”medium” and ”small” groups, the t-statistics is far
from being large enough to generate significant inference. Furthermore, in some
regressions the coefficients of ethnic diversity are negative, especially for those in
the ”small” group in 1996.
Focusing only on the black people who are employees, we can investigate the allo-
cation of these workers among different sectors. Both 1996 and 2001 census data
provides information on the industrial sectors they work, which we classify into
agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors. Panel C presents the results on this
allocation. There is some evidence that ethnic diversity decreases people’s chance
of working in the manufacturing sector, conditional on all the control variables we
have. This further confirms the idea that the employment opportunities generated
from ethnic diversity are not purely driven by the expansion of manufacturing sector
due to the revolutionary events like the discovery of mines.
We study the allocation of employees further by looking into occupations. In both
1996 and 2001 census for each worker there is information on the occupation clas-
sified into a detailed 3-digit code. We aggregate this 3-digit coding system into
types of occupations based on their skill levels: manager, professional, clerk, ser-
vice worker, craft worker, skilled worker in agricultural sector, machine operator
and unskilled worker. The dependent variables in Panel D are dummies on whether
one works in one of these occupations. According to the regression results, ethnic
diversity decreases people’s chance of becoming a machine operator and increases
their probability of being a manager, professional employee and clerk. One common
feature is that occupations such as manager, professional and clerk require more lan-
guage and social skills while the demand for social skills is the least among machine
operators. This is closely linked to our mechanism through which ethnic diversity
influences labour market outcomes, which will be discussed in the modelling part.
3.5.4 Robustness check
We conduct a series of robustness checks in this section to consolidate the result that
ethnic diversity increases employment rate among working-age black population.
Firstly, we provide some further evidence on the argument that our result is not
purely driven by the sorting of migrants. That is, we show that the positive corre-
lation between ethnic diversity and labour market outcomes does not purely come
from the migrants with higher abilities moving to more diverse places and there-
fore are performing better in job searching. We divide the whole working-age black
population into three sub-samples with different levels of sorting: people who were
born and stay in the district or people migrating within districts (i.e. ”native”
people); people moving across districts (i.e. ”migrants”); immigrants moving from
other countries (”immigrants”)33. In Table 10 we run the same IV regressions34 as
those in the main analysis separately for these three groups in 1996 and 2001. The
dependent variables include a dummy on whether one is unemployed and a dummy
on whether one is an employee (excluding self-employed workers).
Columns 1 and 4 show that in both years ethnic diversity positively affects the
labour market outcomes for native people who are the least likely to sort to places
33Note that ”migrants” and ”immigrants” in 2001 census data are those who move across dis-
tricts or countries between 1996 and 2001, whereas in 1996 census they are the people whose last
migration was across districts or countries.
34OLS regressions have very similar results. We only show the results about IV regressions here.
with higher ethnic diversity, as they were born in these districts and remained
there, or moved within districts. The positive effect of ethnic diversity on employ-
ment also exists among immigrants in columns 3 and 6, the mostly selected sample
based on ability and preference (although the number of immigrants in South Africa
belonging to one of the nine ethnic groups is very small compared with the whole
black population). Interestingly, there is no effect of ethnic diversity on employment
among migrants across districts. As we discussed in the validity of the instrumental
variable, there are two potential mechanisms of selection among migrants. Either
the selection occurs in the original place, meaning people with higher ability choose
to move out; or the selection takes place at the destination, meaning people sort
to places with higher economic prosperity or job opportunities or more socially ac-
tive environment when they decide where to move. The result about cross-district
migrants here might suggest that the first selection mechanism is more important
- migrants are of higher ability and therefore behave better wherever they end up,
which indicates that the relationship between ethnic diversity and employment is
not solely driven by the selection of destinations.
Another potential threat to the interpretation of our results as illustrating a positive
impact of ethnic diversity on employment is the emigration of the white after the
end of Apartheid. It has been observed that there has been a large emigration
of the white out of South Africa after 1994 and that white people moved out of
the country for the fear of the worsening economic conditions, weaker government
capacity, or the revenge from the black after the nightmare of Apartheid. A place
has higher within-black diversity might just indicate that the power of the white is
weaker in these places (so that the black community can grow and attract people
with a diverse background). If this is the case, there would be more white people
emigrating from South Africa in a district with larger ethnic diversity index. The
mass emigration of the white may lead to many job vacancies to be filled by black
workers, consequentially improves the job opportunities of the black. If this story
is true, the correlation between ethnic diversity index and employment rate in a
district cannot reflect the impact of ethnic diversity as ethnic diversity index here
is just a proxy for the power of the white in the district.
We therefore regress the number of the white in 1996 and 2001 respectively and
the difference in the number of white residence between 1985 and 1996 (or 1985
and 2001) on ethnic diversity index for each district, using the same set of control
variables. We find in Table 11 that the ethnic diversity index is associated with
neither the absolute number of the white population nor the difference in the white
population before and after the end of Apartheid (which captures the emigration of
the white). This confirms that ethnic diversity is positively related to employment
not simply because these places have more job vacancies left by the white people
who emigrated from the country.
Secondly, we use non-linear econometric methods to estimate the main regressions.
Given that our outcomes are measured by binary variables, we replicate our results
by estimating a logit model, a probit model and a probit model with the instru-
mental variable in both 1996 and 2001. Results are summarized in the Appendix
Table A4. Marginal effects at average ethnic diversity index are reported in all
columns. The positive effect of ethnic diversity on both employment as a whole
and wage-employment in particular (excluding self-employed people in columns 4 -
6) is robust to these specifications. The magnitude of the marginal effects is very
similar to those in Table A4 and Table 6 in baseline regressions. For example in
logit regressions in 2001, the coefficient of ethnic diversity on unemployment is -
0.152, which is roughly the same as the corresponding coefficient in OLS regressions
in Table A4 (-0.150 in column 7). In IV regressions the magnitude in non-linear
models is smaller than that in linear IV models but the significance remains the
same. For example, in probit regressions with our instrumental variable based on
2001 census data, the coefficient of ethnic diversity on unemployment is -0.148 while
in the corresponding IV regression it is -0.171 (column 8 in Table A4).
Thirdly, we check if the main results are robust to an alternative measure of ethnic
diversity. Apart from the fractionalisation index, some literature uses the polariza-
tion index (P) such as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). The index captures
the deviation of the distribution of the ethnic groups from the bipolar distribu-
tion (which represents the highest level of polarization). Following the notations in
defining fractionalisation index, the index is computed as:
P = 1−
K
∑
k=1
(1/2− sk
1/2
)2
sk
The fractionalisation and polarisation index are highly correlated at low levels,
while being uncorrelated and negatively correlated at intermediate and high levels,
respectively (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
We use the same ”equidistance” measure as an instrumental variable for ethnic
diversity here. Following the same approach as that for fractionalisation index,
we use predicted polarisation index obtained from the predicted stock of ethnic
groups in each district as an instrumental variable for real polarisation index. After
getting predicted population share of each ethnic group ŝk in each district based on
the gravity model 3.4, we get the predicted polarisation index:
P̂ = 1−
K
∑
k=1
(1/2− ŝk
1/2
)2
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We use this predicted polarisation index as an instrumental variable for P from real
data and conduct both OLS and IV regressions. We report the first-stage outcomes
in Appendix Table A5.1 and the individual-level regressions in Appendix Table
A5.2. First-stage regressions show that the predicted polarisation index is a strong
indicator of the real polarisation index, although the instrumental variable is less
strong with province fixed effects.
Appendix Table A5.2 reports the results of the polarisation index on both em-
ployment rate in general and wage-employment rate in particular (again excluding
self-employed people). The effect of polarisation index is strong and positive in all
columns without province fixed effects while the corresponding effect with province
fixed effects is weaker. As the polarisation index not only reflects the diversity of
ethnic groups but is also weighted by the relative group size, it is harder to in-
terpret the labour market outcomes in response to polarisation index than that to
fractionalisation index.
Summary of empirical results. The whole empirical section above explains and
consolidates the following results which are the basis for the theoretical model in
the next section:
1. Ethnic diversity increases employment among the working-age black popula-
tion and this mainly takes place in wage-employed jobs.
2. The positive effect of ethnic diversity on employment can only be observed
among the ethnic groups with relatively large size.
3. Ethnic diversity affects low-educated working-age black people more than
better educated ones.
3.6 How Does Ethnic Diversity Affect Employ-
ment: A Theoretical Model and Mechanism
We propose a plausible theoretical framework consistent with our empirical findings
above to explain the positive effects of ethnic diversity on employment and the
heterogeneity of the effects across sub-groups. More specifically, we focus on social
skill investment which increases with ethnic diversity.
3.6.1 A plausible theoretical framework
The story is as follows. Assume that inter-ethnic communication requires more skills
than intra-ethnic interaction. In a more diverse place, the necessity to communicate
with individuals from different ethnic groups may motivate people to learn and
practise more social skills. The acquisition of this extra skill, which is helpful in
reducing coordination costs or increasing labour productivity (which we will discuss
later on), could make individuals more competitive and increase their chances of
finding jobs.
In more detail, people obtain utility from interacting with others. Establishing a re-
lationship with someone from a different ethnic group requires more skills than that
within the same ethnic group (this may be due to cultural barriers like language)
between ethnicity. In a more ethnically diverse place people have to communicate
with a larger proportion of individuals outside their own ethnic group to maintain a
certain level of social connection. Therefore they put in more efforts in developing
social skills as long as the benefit of interacting with a different ethnic group out-
weighs the cost of learning efforts. Social skills here can be of many types, including
both cognitive skills like language and non-cognitive skills like communication skills
or social attitudes. When these people enter the labour market, these skills are ben-
eficial to their labour market performance, in addition to human capital investment.
We will explain this in more detail below.
What needs to be emphasised here is that more ethnically diverse places do not
necessarily have more social interaction in general but the overall investment in
social skills should be higher because a larger proportion of social interaction comes
from inter-group connection and inter-ethnic interaction requires more skills than
intra-ethnic communication.
The distinction between social connection and investment in social skills is analogue
to the literature which differentiates social connectedness and network formation
(Chay and Munshi, 2015). Their stories implies that there exists a threshold only
above which social connectedness and network-based outcomes are positively cor-
related. Similarly, in our story, the level of social connection can be high in both
ethnically homogeneous and diverse places, but investment in social skills is only
high when a large proportion of this social connection takes place between ethnic
groups as intra-ethnic communication is relatively costless.
Model setup
We provide a model of a coordination game to explain the mechanism. We assume
that individuals gain utility from social interaction at the cost of investing in social
skills. As the cost of communicating with a different ethnic group is larger than that
with the same group, we normalise the cost of communication within each ethnic
group to be 0 and set the costly investment in social skill for inter-ethnic interaction
to be c per unit. We assume that the amount of investment in social skills xi also
equals the output of the investment (i.e. the amount of skills acquired). We have
the following setup of a coordination game:
Players. Each group only differs in terms of their population size. Suppose there
are m ethnic groups in total. We denote these different groups as m different sets
N1,N2, . . .Nm, each with a group size nk and k = 1, 2, . . .m. The overall population
in each district is N, so that ∑mk=1 nk = N.
Strategies. Each individual invests xi in social skills. For simplicity we assume
xi is a binary variable which equals 1 (0) if i invests (does not invest)35. One can
only participate in inter-ethnic social interactions if he invests in social skills. The
total amount of people each individual i in ethnic group Nk with a group size nk
has access to in the inter-ethnic communication is calculated as xi ∑j ̸=k ∑q∈Nj xq.
There is complementarity between i’s own investment in social skills and the overall
investment level of people outside group k. If xi = 0, i cannot benefit from social
interaction even if everyone outside his group invests in social skills36. Therefore the
total number of people interacting with i (both inside and outside his own group)
can be calculated as nk + xi ∑j ̸=k ∑q∈Nj xq.
Utility. Individual i belonging to group k obtains utility from social interaction
which depends on the size of his own groups nk and the number of people he can
reach in other ethnic groups, the latter relying on both his own investment in
social skills and the efforts from other ethnic groups. The utility from overall social
interaction is written as f (nk + xi ∑j ̸=k ∑q∈Nj xq), which is assumed to be increasing
at a diminishing rate. That is, f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. The implication is that utility
from social interaction increases as more people participate in communication, but
this has a diminishing return as people get tired from social life when the number
of contacts increases. We can thus write the net utility Uik from overall social
interaction for individual i in group k as follows:
35One can potentially treat xi as a continuous variable or make xi heterogeneous in commu-
nicating with different ethnic groups. For example, similar to Akerlof (1997), we can introduce
the investment of xij if individual i is interacting with group j, and xij is a decreasing function
of social distance between groups i and j. However, this binary setting of xi is already enough to
explain the key empirical findings about ethnic diversity discussed above.
36This is a reliable assumption in our setting as we later on use proficiency of English/Afrikaans
as the second language as a proxy for social skills. One can communicate with people from another
ethnic group only if both learn a second official language.
Uik = f (nk + xi ·∑
j ̸=k
∑
q∈Nj
xq)− cxi (3.7)
Equilibrium. In this paper we focus on pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Clearly
the coordination game has multiple equilibria. For example, xi = 0, ∀i is a Nash
equilibrium. This is because starting with this initial condition, no one has the
incentive to deviate. In more detail, for an individual i in group k, his utility from
social interaction is:
Uik =

f (nk)− c, if xi = 1
f (nk), if xi = 0
Therefore individual i always gets higher utility by not investing in social skills.
That is to say, in order for the social interaction to happen, there might be some
initial efforts to stimulate communication.
As it is not possible to conduct comparative statics across different Nash equilibria
in this setting, we only focus on the equilibrium where the number of individuals
investing in social skills is as large as possible, and see how the equilibrium state
changes in response to group size. By doing this, we can demonstrate how the
maximum possible level of skill investment changes with ethnic diversity.
One important feature of this particular equilibrium is that to guarantee the max-
imum participation in inter-ethnic communication, individuals always choose to
invest in social skills unless the net utility from doing so is strictly smaller than
that from deviating. In other words, even if the individual is indifferent between
investing and not investing, he will always choose to invest in social skills.
Social interaction, skill acquisition and distribution of group size
In this game, player i from group k chooses either xi = 1 or xi = 0 to maximise his
total utility from social interaction, given the population size of each ethnic group
as well as the investment of x among people outside group k. We derive two lemmas
before proceeding to the effect of diversity on investment in social skills.
Lemma 3.1. People from the same ethnic group choose the same amount of in-
vestment.
Proof. Suppose player 1 and player 2 both come from ethnic group k with group
size nk. Without loss of generality we assume x1 = 1 and x2 = 0. We focus on the
pure strategy equilibrium with the maximum number of skill investment. As both
1 and 2 maximise their utility from social interaction, we have:

f (nk +∑j ̸=k ∑q∈Nj xq)− c ≥ f (nk), for player 1
f (nk +∑j ̸=k ∑q∈Nj xq)− c < f (nk), for player 2
Clearly these two inequalities contradict each other. Therefore we must have x1 =
x2 = 1 or x1 = x2 = 0.
Based on this, we have lemma 3.2:
Lemma 3.2. People from different groups will choose the same amount of invest-
ment as long as the population size of these groups is the same.
Proof. Suppose player i and player j come from ethnic group k and l, and nk = nl.
Without loss of generality we assume xi = 1 and xj = 0. According to lemma 3.1,
everyone from group k (l) chooses xi = 1 (xj = 0). As both i and j maximise their
utility from social interaction, we have:

f (nk + nl · 0+∑p ̸=k,p ̸=l ∑q∈Np xq)− c ≥ f (nk), for player i
f (nl + nk · 1+∑p ̸=k,p ̸=l ∑q∈Np xq)− c < f (nl), for player j
When nk = nl, these two inequalities hold altogether if and only if f (nk+∑p ̸=k,p ̸=l ∑q∈Np xq)−
c > f (nk + nk + ∑p ̸=k,p ̸=l ∑q∈Np xq) for each possible xq in group p. As f ′ > 0,
nk ≥ 0, c > 0, this inequality cannot hold.
Therefore we must have xi = xj = 1 or xi = xj = 0.
Combining lemma 3.1 and lemma 3.2, we can link the size distribution of ethnic
groups and social skill investments. To guarantee the maximal level of skill invest-
ment in equilibrium, we start with the initial condition where xi = 1, ∀i and study
people’s incentive to deviate from this condition.
We can derive the following two propositions.
Proposition 3.1. Social skill investment increases with the number of different
ethnic groups in a district.
Proof. Consider a symmetric case where each group has the same groups size. In
this case for any ethnic group k, we have nk = Nm , ∀k = 1, 2, . . .m. According to
lemma 3.1 and lemma 3.2, everyone has the same social skill investment x, regardless
of his ethnic group.
We can re-write the utility function of social interaction for an individual i in any
ethnic group in the following way:
Uik =

f (Nm + (N − Nm ))− c, if xi = 1
f (Nm ), if xi = 0
For xi = 1, ∀i to be a Nash Equilibrium, no player is going to deviate by choosing
x = 0 instead. Suppose c satisfies c < f (N), we have:
f (N)− c ≥ f (N
m
)
Since 0 < f (N)− c < f (N) and f ′ > 0, there exists a fixed n∗ such that f (N)−
c = f (n∗). Given f ′ > 0 and f (n∗) ≥ f (Nm ), we have:
m ≥ N
n∗
(3.8)
Therefore, the larger the m is, the more like the Nash Equilibrium xi = 1, ∀i will
be maintained.
Fixing the total number of ethnic groups in a district, the even (uneven) distribution
of these groups may also affect social skill acquisition. Now suppose the number
of groups m is fixed but groups are not distributed evenly. We have the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Social skill investment increases when the distribution of popu-
lation size among different groups becomes more even.
Proof. Since the total population size is N, we must have relatively larger groups
k such that nk > n∗ (Otherwise the overall population size is smaller than N).
Again starting from xi = 1, ∀i as the Nash Equilibrium. The utility of social
interaction for individual j in group k is:
Ujk =

f (nk + (N − nk))− c, if xj = 1
f (nk), if xj = 0
Individual j in this group will deviate if:
f (N)− c < f (nk) ⇒ nk > n∗ (3.9)
As there always exists nk > n∗ when group sizes are unevenly distributed, the
largest group k will deviate and choose xk = 0. For the remaining groups, suppose
group l is the second largest group. Given the largest group deviates from the
equilibrium xi = 1, ∀i, the same logic shows that for group l to deviate as well, we
must have:
f (N − nk)− c < f (nl) (3.10)
Since f ′ > 0, we find that the motivation for deviating increases with group size. In
particular, when group sizes are more unevenly distributed, more groups will have
large size so that they will deviate from the equilibrium where everyone chooses to
invest in social skills.
Social interaction, skill acquisition and ethnic diversity
We prove from the above propositions that skill investment is higher when the
number of groups is larger or the group size is more evenly distributed. And how
does these relate to ethnic diversity?
We therefore decompose ethnic diversity index into the number of groups and the
distribution of group share as follows. Suppose each group has a share si over the
whole population.
ELF = 1−
n
∑
i=1
s2i = 1−
n
∑
i=1
((si − 1n ) +
1
n
)2
It is obvious to get the following decomposition:
ELF = 1− 1
n
−
n
∑
i=1
(si − 1n )
2 = 1− 1
n
− n · var(si) (3.11)
Thus ethnic diversity increases with the number of different ethnic groups and
decreases with the variance of group share (which increases if the distribution of
group size is more uneven). Based on proposition 3.1 and proposition 3.2, we have
the following proposition 3.3:
Proposition 3.3. Social skill investment increases with ethnic diversity, either due
to the increase in the number of different groups or the more even distribution of
group size.
Following proposition 3.2, we also have proposition 3.4:
Proposition 3.4. Ethnic groups with relatively smaller group size are not affected by
the ethnic diversity because they always participate in inter-group social interaction
and invest in skills regardless of ethnic diversity.
This is because when the initial condition is xi = 1, ∀i, the small group will not
deviate as long as their group size is below a certain level (regardless of the strate-
gies of the large group). In other words, they always choose to remain the initial
condition regardless of the decision of larger groups. Therefore the small group will
in general have more inter-group social interaction and social skill investment than
the large group but their social interaction is not affected by ethnic diversity of the
district. The intuition is that as the small groups get relatively less utility from
intra-group communication, they rely more on inter-group connection and therefore
are less sensitive to the incentive to deviate caused by changes in the level of ethnic
diversity.
One thing to notice is that in our data ”large”, ”medium” and ”small” groups are
defined by the group size in the national population while in the model ”small” and
”large” groups are defined at district level. However, definitions at these two levels
are compatible in our data. A detailed investigation of the population share in each
district in both 1996 and 2001 shows that in general groups with large population
size at the national level are also the dominant group in ethnically homogeneous
districts, while groups with small population share at the national level also makes
up a very small part of the population in those districts. In diverse places the
population size of these groups becomes more balanced.
Social skills and labour market outcomes
The social skills acquired through inter-group interactions in a diverse place might
potentially improve workers’ employment opportunities in several ways.
Less search cost in job hunting. Social skill lowers the cost of searching for
potential jobs, therefore increasing labour supply. More social skills help individuals
build closer and stronger intra-group contacts. For example, people with higher
social skills are better at making use of networks and other methods in gaining job
information or asking for referrals. Current literature shows that social network is
an important factor in providing more job opportunities for low-educated labours
both in South Africa (Magruder, 2010) and in other developing countries (Munshi,
2003).
Increased productivity of certain skills. Recent literature which incorporates
different tasks in the production function (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) and high-
lights the importance of social skills (Deming, 2017). Under the framework that low
and high-skill workers have their own comparative advantages in dealing with dif-
ferent tasks and the range of tasks performed by low-skill workers is determined by
where their comparative advantages are, Deming (2017) explains that social skill
increases the productivity of certain tasks by allowing workers with comparative
advantages to trade their tasks, which leads to more efficient production. In our
story, acquiring additional social skills may also potentially increase the productiv-
ity of certain tasks and increase the employment chances for low-skilled workers by
allowing them to perform a wider range of tasks.
Overcoming skill deficit. A simple explanation on why social skill stimulates
employment is that it works as a substitute for other skills required by employers. In
particular, low-educated workers may lack skills necessary for certain occupations,
which prevents them from getting the position. For example, if the candidate for
the position of a salesman lacks necessary skills of communication, proficiency of
additional language may compensate for this communication skills and guarantees
him for the position. As the substitutability between social skill and skills acquired
through formal education helps more people qualified for the positions they apply
for in a more diverse place, the employment rate will increase accordingly. Skill
acquisition from inter-group interaction here functions in a way similar to what
is emphasised in related literature that community-based network can work as a
substitute for endowments by helping individuals from disadvantaged families get
out of low-skill occupational traps (Munshi, 2011).
In conclusion, social skill improves employment either by reducing search cost in the
job hunting, increasing productivity of certain skills or substituting for some skills
necessary for certain occupations. One implication of the above three channels is
that ethnic diversity may be more influential to low-educated individuals, as they
can be more restricted by the high search cost, low productivity and lack of certain
basic skills.
Ethnic diversity, social skill acquisition and employment: empirical evi-
dence
In this section we provide some evidence to show that social skill acquisition in-
creases with ethnic diversity. There is no straightforward information in census
data on social skills. The closest one we can approach is the information on second
language at home, including whether or not one speaks a second language and which
language they speak. A black person is considered to have some proficiency in a
second language if he speaks either one of the nine ethnic languages or a common
language (English or Afrikaans). Language is often considered as a cognitive skill
which can be learnt from school. In this setting, however, controlling for educational
background and investigating into the heterogeneity in the acquisition of language
skills among sub-groups, we hope the proficiency of the second language can capture
some information on the skills one acquires from inter-group interactions.
More importantly, whether one speaks a second language (and which language
he speaks) reflects more of his investment in social skills than the inheritance of
language skills from his parents. This results from a series of laws and regulations
during the Apartheid regime. Firstly, inter-racial marriage was prohibited during
Apartheid starting from 1949 when the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act came
into effect. The act was repealed in 1985 by the Immorality and Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Amendment Act. In 1996 and 2001 census, parents and spouse of
the working-age black people of our interest either lived through Apartheid when
marriage between black and white (or black and coloured) was abandoned, or they
got married before the independence of South Africa from the British colonisation
when there was already informal racial segregation. Thus it is not very likely that
the proficiency of English or Afrikaans among the current generation was purely
obtained from their parents in the inter-racial marriage. Even among the black
population, inter-ethnic marriage is also rare. As is discussed at the beginning
of the paper, inter-ethnic relationship was deteriorated during Apartheid so that
marrying someone from another ethnic group is not a common case. Appendix
table A6 shows that in 1996 census, the contemporary inter-ethnic marriage rate
is less than 4%. This phenomenon is even more rare in the parental generation as
their inter-ethnic marriage rate is only 1%. Although the sample is selected as only
spouse and parents cohabiting with the household head are included in the census,
this statistics can still reflect the low inter-ethnic marriage rate.
Furthermore, whether one speaks a second language is not very likely to capture the
language proficiency of individuals before they decided to move out of the home-
lands. As is discussed in the institutional setting, there were almost no indigenous
black people in the ”white” areas in South Africa and the contemporary population
in these districts are mainly the decedents of the migrants from different homelands
before the arrival of white colonisers. Therefore it is unlikely that those ancestors
learnt English or Afrikaans before migration. For contemporary migration, both
1996 and 2001 census data show that more than 50% of people never move from the
time of birth up till the time of the census survey. Even among recent migrants,
intra-district migration is much larger than inter-district migration.
To prove the channel in our theoretical model, we first show that ethnic diversity
improves social skill acquisition (i.e. measured by second language proficiency) and
then we demonstrate that higher social skill is correlated with higher employment
rate conditional on ethnic diversity. As the information on second language profi-
ciency is only reported in 1996 census data, we only show the results in 1996 census
in this section.
Appendix table A6 also reveals that the proportion of people who speak a second
language is not too small. Among the whole black population, around 22.5% speaks
a second language, 8.7% (13.8%) of which speaks a common language (ethnic lan-
guage). In the regression analysis we focus on the common language (English or
Afrikaans) instead of ethnic language as the former one is more related to labour
market performance in wage-employment and less likely to reflect family inheritance
as the ban on inter-racial marriage was more strict than inter-ethnic marriage during
Apartheid37.
We introduce a dummy variable on whether one can speak English or Afrikaans as a
second language and regress it on ethnic diversity in 1996, conditional on the same
set of control variables in the main analysis. Simple OLS regressions may suffer
from the same problem as is discussed before. For example, there are two potential
types of selection of migrants related to their language proficiency. Firstly, migrants
with higher ability are able to move out of the homelands and these people might
have already mastered a second language prior to migration. Secondly, migrants
with better language proficiency choose to move to a more diverse area where there
are more job opportunities. If the first type of selection is the case, people with
higher ability than their counterparts in the original homelands can potentially
move to both ethnically homogenous and diverse places. Thus we should not see any
correlation between ethnic diversity and proficiency of second language if language
skills are purely captured by the selection of migrants at the time of moving out of
homelands. The second selection of migration comes from the fact that migrants
with higher ability (including language efficiency) move to more diverse places as
migrants who cannot speak a common language may find it difficult to communicate
with people outside their ethnic groups. To deal with this selection, we use the
same instrumental variable approach as is implemented in the main analysis (using
predicted value of ethnic diversity in 1996 as an instrument for real ethnic diversity).
Table 12 shows both OLS and IV regression results about how ethnic diversity af-
fects individuals’ second language proficiency. Panel A, B and C investigates the
results for the whole black population, the heterogeneity of the effects of ethnic
37But in regressions the proficiency of both common language and ethnic language can respond
to ethnic diversity.
diversity by educational levels and group size. The coefficients in Panel A in both
OLS and IV regressions are significantly positive, indicating that ethnic diversity
increases the probability of learning a second language (English or Afrikaans). We
break down educational levels into detailed categories to further capture the het-
erogeneous effects of ethnic diversity on skill acquisition: primary school (up to 7
years of schooling), junior school (up to 9 years of schooling), senior high school
(up to 12 years of schooling) and college and above. The significant effect of ethnic
diversity only exists among the group with the lowest level of education. In panel
C, a comparison between groups with large, medium and small population size in-
dicates that ethnic diversity has a strong and positive effect on language skills only
among the ethnic groups with relatively large population size, which is consistent
with proposition 3.4 in the model. In addition, the instrumental variable remains
strong in both whole-sample and sub-sample regressions.
We then look at whether acquisition of social skills improves labour market out-
comes by regressing employment probabilities on the proficiency of a second lan-
guage (English or Afrikaans) conditional on ethnic diversity, as is presented in Table
13. The dependent variable in panel A is a dummy on whether one is employed or
not (including unemployed and inactive) while in panel B the dependent variable
equals 1 if one is an employee and 0 if one is unemployed or inactive. The indepen-
dent variable in all these OLS regressions is a dummy on whether one can speak
English or Afrikaans as a second language. Again we look at the whole sample,
sub-samples across different levels of education and the difference among groups
with large, medium and small population size.
In all regressions learning a second common language is positively and significantly
associated with higher employment rate (both overall employment rate and wage-
employment rate). Columns 2 - 5 in Table 13 show that the returns to a second
language (English and Afrikaans) decrease with educational levels, indicating that
low-educated workers benefit more from additional language skills.
We focus on the evidence on investment in social skills rather than the overall
level of social interaction because our theoretical model highlights that investment
in social skills is higher in a more ethnically diverse place while allows for the
possibility that there is no difference in the overall level of social interaction between
ethnically diverse and homogeneous places. These two phenomena are compatible
because inter-ethnic communication, which requires more skills than intra-ethnic
connection, is only part of the overall social interaction.
A further empirical evidence on the mechanism of the model comes from the de-
composition of ethnic diversity index into the number of ethnic groups and the
variation of population share among these groups. According to proposition 3.1
and proposition 3.2 in the theoretical model, employment rate should increase with
the number of ethnic groups in a district and decrease if the distribution of group
size becomes more uneven.
Based on Equation 3.11, we decompose the Herfindahl Index (1-ELF) into two
terms: reverse of the number of ethnic groups and the number of ethnic groups
times the variance of each group’s population share. According to the theoretical
model, we should observe both of the two terms to be negatively correlated with
employment. In other words, when we regress unemployment rate on these two
terms, the coefficients for both should be positive, which is the case in Table 14. In
both 196 and 2001, we report the association between these two decomposed terms
on unemployment rate at individual regressions both for the whole sample and for
the sub-sample (larger vs. smaller groups; highly- vs. low-educated individuals).
Also consistent with proposition 3.4, these two factors only affect ethnic groups with
relatively larger size. Columns 5 and 6 show evidence that the link between number
of ethnic groups, variance in each group’s population share and employment rate is
stronger for low-educated black people.
Summary of the theoretical model and mechanism
In summary, diversity along ethnic lines could provide individuals with cognitive
and non-cognitive social skills, which improves their employability. That is to say,
even if ethnic diversity does not necessarily increase the amount of overall social
interactions within a district, it may still motivate people in more diverse areas to
learn and practise more skills such as a common/official language. This is because
communication with individuals from different ethnic groups requires more efforts
and skills than intra-ethnic interaction. The acquisition of this extra skill, which
is helpful in reducing coordination costs or increasing productivity of certain skills,
could increase individuals’ chances of finding a job.
In our model, without imposing any intrinsic difference in taste, skills or attitudes
between different ethnic groups, the tradeoff between the cost of and benefit from
developing social skills leads to the conclusion that inter-ethnic social interaction
and investment in social skills are the mostly likely to occur in a place with large
number of different groups and a place where the distribution of group size is rela-
tively even, both of which imply high ethnic diversity. It is because starting from
an initial condition where everyone invests in social skills, less people deviate from
this investment decision in the equilibrium state in a more ethnically diverse place.
This effect occurs mainly among the ethnic groups with relatively larger group size.
In the labour market, the acquisition of these extra social skills is helpful in lowering
the barrier to formal jobs by reducing coordination and search costs, by increasing
productivity of certain skills or by substituting for some necessary skills which are
otherwise not available especially to low-educated people.
3.6.2 Ruling out some alternative explanations
Ethnic diversity might positively affect the labour market outcomes of the blacks
through several channels. Here we rule out some alternative explanations through
which ethnic diversity improves labour market outcomes based on our data and
narratives.
Labour supply: skill complementarity. There might be some skill comple-
mentarities among different ethnic groups, as each may have their own comparative
advantages in skills. For example, South Sotho are believed to have special skills as
shaft-sinkers on the mines (Guy and Thabane, 1988). Therefore, diversity generates
creativity and innovative environment by combining people with different skills. In
this case, we can also expect diversity to affect differently individuals with different
level of education. A priori, we would expect to find a stronger effect for the higher
educated whose activities would benefit more from knowledge-sharing and problem
solving. However, when we run OLS and IV regressions for people with high and
low levels of education, we find in the above empirical part that the relationship
between ethnic diversity as measured by the fractionalization index and employ-
ment is positive for the low-educated and not that obvious for the high-educated,
pointing at the substitutability rather than the complementarity between education
and ethnic diversity.
Furthermore, if ethnic diversity generates skill complementarity, it might also give
birth to new occupations as new skills can be learnt from other ethnic groups and
this creates opportunities for occupations which rely on otherwise infeasible tasks.
Therefore, if ethnic diversity stimulates new ideas and skills, we may observe a larger
range of occupations in a more diverse place. We regress the range of occupations
in each district 38 on ethnic diversity. We take the results from 1996 census as an
38We measure the range of tasks by counting the total number of different occupations observed
in each district. Occupations are counted in 3-digit code level.
example in Appendix Table A7. We do not find any positive relationship between
diversity and potential new occupations in either OLS or IV regressions .
Labour supply: social grant. Social grant, such as Old Age pension, potentially
dis-incentivise labour force participation in South Africa (Banerjee et al., 2008).
At the same time there is a possibility that a more ethnically homogenous place is
associated with higher level of public goods provision, which might include social
grants. In particular, governments in a more ethnically homogeneous place might
be willing to offer more social grants due to the nepotism towards the dominant
group in that place or less coordination cost among ethnic groups. If the receipt
of social grants dis-incentivise working-age people to enter labour force, this could
also explain the association between higher ethnic diversity and higher employment
rate. However, this is not the case in our setting for two reasons. Firstly, provision
of social grants is mainly designed at the national level, which does not vary across
magisterial districts. Secondly, we include province fixed effects to account for
potential discrepancy of social grants at province level.
Labour demand: discrimination. Discrimination in the labour market is a po-
tential reason why homogeneous places discourage employment, as employers de-
liberately prevent the minority groups from gaining job opportunities and therefore
the demand for minority labours is declined (Goldberg, 1982). It has been proved
that the disutility from discrimination against minority groups in the production
network harms the productivity of co-workers (Hjort, 2014; Borjas and Bronars,
1989).
A more diverse place can reduce the discrimination against minority groups by
encouraging higher level of tolerance and openness. As the chance of interacting
and communicating with other ethnic groups increases in a more ethnically diverse
place, discrimination in the labour market becomes less of an issue, either because
employers have access to more information about the productivity and behaviours
of ethnic minorities, or because they are more open to people from different back-
grounds.
If this story is the case, we would expect that ethnic groups with smaller size benefit
more from increased ethnic diversity than those with relatively larger size, which
contradicts our empirical evidence.
Labour demand: diversity of taste. Another potential driving force of labour
demand might be the diversity of taste. As people from different ethnic groups have
diversified tastes for consumption goods, the variety of consumption increases when
a place becomes more ethnically diversified. This induces the diversity of production
as well, resulting in higher variety of labour inputs in the production process. When
different labour inputs are complementary in the production function, this love
for variety of labours increases the total demand for labour, therefore improving
workers’ chance in the labour market. However, if this is the case, we should see
the positive effect of ethnic diversity among both large and small ethnic groups,
which also contradicts the empirical findings. There is also related literature about
how greater diversification of sectoral demands reduces unemployment (Neumann
and Topel, 1991). However this works under the condition that workers are mobile
enough, which is not likely to be a prevalent case in South Africa where many black
people locate far away from economic centres and the transportation cost is very
high to them.
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper provides empirical support for the positive role played by within-black
ethnic diversity and blacks’ labour market outcomes in post-Apartheid South Africa
based on an instrumental variable approach. We also propose a plausible theoretical
model to explain how the need for inter-ethnic social interaction stimulates invest-
ment in social skills in more diverse places, making black workers better equipped
for the labour market.
The finding reveals that ethnic identity, together with inter-ethnic relationship, is
still a distinctive feature shaping people’s social life and labour market in modern
South African society. The distinction between ethnic groups does not fade away
after years of integration, which might result from the Apartheid regime which re-
inforced ethnic identity. In addition, although the climate of hatred and mistrust
generated by the Apartheid system had substantial repercussions on the social fab-
ric, inter-ethnic connections still occur within the black population.
Our result is different from, yet can be reconciled with the association between
ethnic diversity and inter-ethnic cleavages or the erosion of social cohesion. Firstly,
most of those literature highlights the under provision of public goods and social
capital in ethnically fragmented communities in developing countries (Alesina et al.,
2016), or the conflict between different ethnic groups (Amodio and Chiovelli, 2017).
Our story takes a different angel by focusing on skill investment motivated by so-
cial interaction. This can just be another side of inter-personal relations which can
co-exist with conflicts or coordination problems. Secondly, we have shown in our
model that the initial condition in skill investment is important in shaping the ul-
timate equilibrium. If the society starts from the situation where no one actively
participates in inter-ethnic communication, benefits from inter-ethnic connection
will stay at the low level forever. Therefore, societies where ethnic diversity is nega-
tively associated with socio-economic indicators might have worse initial conditions
in inter-ethnic interaction.
We also find the heterogeneous effects of ethnic diversity on labour market outcomes
for different sub-groups. In particular, labour market outcomes of the ethnic groups
with larger size and low-educated people are more responsive to ethnic diversity.
The former indicates that our story is not likely to be the case where the minority
assimilates to the majority by integrating into their culture and language, nor is it
the story that diversity alleviates discrimination against minority groups (in both
cases only the small group will respond to diversity level). Rather, in our story
groups with both large and small sizes participate in social interaction and invest
in social skills in response to ethnic diversity.
The finding that low-educated people benefit more from ethnic diversity is differ-
ent from several papers highlighting skill complementarity and knowledge spillovers
(mostly in developed countries where diversity affects high-skilled labours more),
but are analogue to findings in related topics where social interaction acts as a
substitute for family background or formal education. For example, Munshi (2011)
shows that community-based network can compensates for people’s disadvantaged
family background by bootstrapping these people out of low-skill occupational traps.
This substitution mechanism might not always be efficient, though. As in Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2006), community-based network continues to channel Indian boys
into local language schools and consequentially traditional occupations which have
lower returns than emerging white-collar occupations, suggesting a dynamic ineffi-
ciency.
Could any interventions be designed to increase employment opportunities for the
black South African? As is presented in the theoretical framework, a successful in-
tervention must encourage more inter-ethnic connection which can motivate people
to invest in more social skills. It can be an efficient policy as we show that the ini-
tial investment in social skills is important to the ultimate equilibrium. Therefore,
an attempt at fostering inter-ethnic communication in a more diverse society will
have long-lasting effects on overall skill investments. Policies which directly im-
prove black people’s social skills may also be effective in preparing them for better
employment opportunities.
These interventions to improve people’s labour market performance have far-reaching
implications not only in different aspects of South African society but also in dealing
with ethnic issues all over the world. On the one hand, reducing unemployment can
have other important consequences on South African society. For example, it has
been estimated that in contemporary South Africa a 10 percentage point reduction
in unemployment lowers the Gini coefficient by 3 percent (Anand et al., 2016).
On the other hand, this paper can also shed light on dealing with inter-ethnic re-
lations in other African countries or even developed countries. In recent decades,
Western societies have also become considerably more ethnically diverse due to
the net immigration flows and the growing presence of ethnic communities (Put-
nam, 2007), which gives rise to more social problems. For example, there is some
negative evidence of ethnic diversity on the support for redistribution which in par-
ticular harms low-income earners (Dahlberg et al., 2012). Furthermore, current
immigration policies in the US and the European refugee crisis also require urgent
modification in policy interventions to improve inter-ethnic relationships and ex-
plore the positive impact of ethnic diversity on economic outcomes, to which our
mechanism about inter-ethnic interactions can be generalised.
(a) Timeline of Bantu migration and early development in South Africa
(b) Timeline of modern South Africa starting from Apartheid
Notes: The figures presents the timeline of important nodes in South African history: Bantu
migration from central and eastern Africa, emigration of ethnic groups from original homelands,
the White colonisation, the discovery of mines and Apartheid regime. Sources of narratives:
Mwakikagile (2010) and Gradin (2014).
Figure 3.1. Timeline of Bantu migration, historical development and Apartheid regime
in South Africa
Notes: The figure presents the geographical pattern of ethnic diversity across South African
districts in 1996. Within-black ethnic diversity is measured with Fractionalisation Index
analogue to Herfindahl Index. The results are calculated by the authors based on 1996 data.
The pattern of ethnic diversity in 2001 is very similar.
Figure 3.2. Distribution of ethnic fractionalization index in 1996
(a) Unemployment and ELF 1996
(b) Unemployment and ELF 2001
Notes: The figures present the results on the correlation between ethnic diversity and
unemployment rate. Both are measured at the magisterial district level (therefore
unemployment rate is calculated as the proportion of employed people over the whole
working-age black population in a district). The results are calculated by the authors based on
1996 and 2001 census data.
Figure 3.3. The relationship between ethnic diversity and unemployment in South
Africa in 1996 and 2001
(a) Murdock’s map
(b) Bantustan
Notes: The figures compares the distribution of ethnic groups in South Africa in Murdock map
and the location of Bantustans as proxies for ethnic homelands. Murdock map comes from
George Murdock’s 1959 work which illustrates the dominant ethnic group in each geographical
unit, which is highly consistent with the Bantustans for these ethnic groups assigned by the
Apartheid government. This confirms that the location of these Bantustans can well reflect the
spatial distribution of original homelands for those ethnic groups.
Figure 3.4. Comparison between the historical settlements od the black ethnic groups
and Bantustans
Notes: The figures shows the spatial distribution of our instrumental variable for ethnic diversity
- the predicted ethnic factionalisation index. Following the idea that district more (less)
equidistant to multiple homelands are more (less) diverse, we first calculate the stock of each
ethnic group in each district based on the distance in between with a gravity model. The
instrumental variable is a fractionalisation index calculated based on the predicted stock of
migrants.
Figure 3.5. Distribution of predicted ethnic fractionalization index
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Table 1.2. Summary statistics of demographics and employment among black ethnic
groups in 2001
Population size Share of the black population Self employed Wage employee Unemployed+inactive
Xhosa 3105625 0.249 0.017 0.299 0.684
[0.130] [0.458] [0.465]
Zulu 2798132 0.224 0.025 0.331 0.643
[0.156] [0.471] [0.479]
South Sotho 2531013 0.203 0.020 0.324 0.657
[0.139] [0.468] [0.475]
Tswana 1373413 0.110 0.018 0.373 0.610
[0.132] [0.484] [0.488]
North Sotho 1341608 0.107 0.027 0.396 0.577
[0.163] [0.490] [0.494]
Tsonga 552403.3 0.044 0.048 0.421 0.531
[0.214] [0.494] [0.50]
Ndebele 292188.3 0.023 0.029 0.370 0.601
[0.168] [0.483] [0.490]
Swazi 324071.7 0.026 0.028 0.376 0.597
[0.164] [0.484] [0.491]
Venda 172927.4 0.014 0.034 0.457 0.509
[0.183] [0.498] [0.500]
Overall 12491382 1.000 0.023 0.341 0.636
[0.149] [0.474] [0.481]
Note: The number and proportion of each ethnic group in the whole black population are calculated in the ”white” magisterial
districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population.
Employment outcomes are calculated from individual-level 1996 census data. ”Self-employed” refers to the proportion of self-
employed people in each ethnic group over the whole working-age population of the corresponding ethnic group. Other labour
market outcomes are calculated in similar ways. The 2001 census data does not distinguish unemployed and economically inactive
people.
Table 2.1. Summary statistics of ethnic fragmentation and labour market outcomes in
1996
High ELF Low ELF
Mean S.d Obs Mean S.d. Obs ttest
ELF 0.507 0.018 103 0.044 0.005 102 ***
self employment 0.028 0.0019 103 0.021 0.00195 102 ***
wage employee 0.4 0.012 103 0.32 0.0144 102 ***
unemployed 0.57 0.012 103 0.658 0.014 102 ***
agriculture 0.466 0.019 103 0.454 0.018 102
manufacture 0.115 0.011 103 0.09 0.011 102 *
service 0.419 0.013 103 0.455 0.017 102 **
manager 0.0136 0.001 103 0.0117 0.002 102
profession 0.07 0.004 103 0.082 0.0066 102 *
clerk 0.0318 0.0031 103 0.0198 0.0024 102 ***
serve 0.0728 0.0035 103 0.063 0.0048 102 *
craft 0.107 0.0084 103 0.125 0.0116 102
skilled agriculture 0.121 0.0062 103 0.107 0.0062 102 *
operator 0.088 0.005 103 0.062 0.004 102 ***
unskill 0.495 0.0139 103 0.529 0.0124 102 **
Note: This table compares labour market outcomes in districts with relatively high (i.e. above
the median value) and low levels of ethnic diversity. The sample is only for the ”white” magis-
terial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for
more than 1% of the overall population. Employment outcomes are calculated from individual-
level 1996 census data. ”Self-employed” refers to the proportion of self-employed people in each
ethnic group over the whole working-age population of the corresponding ethnic group.”Wage
employee” and ”unemployed” are calculated in similar ways. We only focus on people who are
employed when comparing the allocation of workers across industrial sectors and occupations.
Table 2.2. Summary statistics of ethnic fragmentation and labour market outcomes in
2001
High ELF Low ELF
Mean S.d Obs Mean S.d. Obs ttest
ELF 0.527 0.016 105 0.077 0.007 105 ***
self employment 0.0218 0.003 105 0.0185 0.002 105
wage employee 0.396 0.013 105 0.315 0.014 105 ***
unemployed 0.582 0.014 105 0.667 0.014 105 ***
agriculture 0.338 0.024 105 0.376 0.023 105
manufacture 0.183 0.017 105 0.096 0.008 105 ***
service 0.478 0.019 105 0.527 0.023 105 *
manager 0.017 0.0026 105 0.0167 0.0046 105
profession 0.082 0.0057 105 0.08 0.0058 105
clerk 0.056 0.003 105 0.054 0.007 105
serve 0.081 0.005 105 0.076 0.0047 105
craft 0.059 0.005 105 0.084 0.0087 105 ***
skilled agriculture 0.117 0.007 105 0.074 0.005 105 ***
operator 0.108 0.0057 105 0.088 0.0051 105 ***
unskill 0.48 0.0144 105 0.527 0.0147 105 **
Note: This table compares labour market outcomes in districts with relatively high (i.e. above
the median value) and low levels of ethnic diversity. The sample is only for the ”white” magis-
terial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for
more than 1% of the overall population. Employment outcomes are calculated from individual-
level 1996 census data. ”Self-employed” refers to the proportion of self-employed people in each
ethnic group over the whole working-age population of the corresponding ethnic group.”Wage
employee” and ”unemployed” are calculated in similar ways. We only focus on people who are
employed when comparing the allocation of workers across industrial sectors and occupations.
Table 3. Validity of instrumental variables
[1] [2]
Dependent variable 1996 2001
Panel A: Job opportunities
Distance to the closest economic centre -274,037 -244,879
(301,492) (258,991)
Panel B: Economic activities of the white
Share of white who are self employed contemporarily 0.231* 0.0309
(0.138) (0.136)
Share of white who are wage employed contemporarily 0.0966 0.187
(0.169) (0.159)
Proportion of white 0.337 0.149
(0.220) (0.141)
Panel C: Path dependence
Share of white who are wage employed in 1980 -0.227 -0.244
(0.216) (0.220)
Proportion of white in 1980 -0.126 -0.716***
(0.261) (0.232)
Panel D: Migration
Number of migrants 0.433 10,612
(0.313) (25,718)
District controls YES YES
Individual controls (district average) YES YES
Province fixed effect YES YES
Obs 205 210
Note: This table conducts validity test of the instrumental variable based on 1996 and 2001
census data. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to
1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population.
All regressions are at the district level. We control for district-level variables especially geo-
graphical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and province fixed
effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4. First-stage regression results: individual level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent var. ELF ELF ELF ELF
1996 1996 2001 2001
Predicted ELF 2.012*** 1.518*** 2.022*** 1.668***
(0.105) (0.304) (0.110) (0.280)
Edu 0.000720* 0.000110 0.000875*** 0.000291
(0.000404) (0.000305) (0.000321) (0.000223)
Male 0.00283*** 0.000412 0.00286** 0.00127**
(0.00104) (0.000624) (0.00121) (0.000640)
Age 5.27e-07 -5.56e-05 7.35e-05 -2.72e-05
(8.56e-05) (5.51e-05) (7.63e-05) (4.11e-05)
Married 0.00884*** 0.00318** 0.00928*** 0.00442***
(0.00230) (0.00159) (0.00208) (0.00141)
Father alive 0.00196* 0.000665 0.00380*** 0.00159**
(0.00111) (0.000928) (0.00127) (0.000714)
Pop density 4.41e-05* 4.06e-05*** 3.15e-05 3.12e-05**
(2.65e-05) (1.52e-05) (2.25e-05) (1.27e-05)
Urban 0.0384*** 0.00880 0.0301** -1.31e-05
(0.0141) (0.0113) (0.0133) (0.0106)
River 0.0720*** 0.0832*** 0.0466* 0.0622**
(0.0273) (0.0293) (0.0254) (0.0281)
Density mine 3.071** 0.371 3.025** 0.543
(1.473) (0.829) (1.381) (0.752)
Prop black -0.141 -0.282*** -0.218 -0.434***
(0.119) (0.0591) (0.178) (0.0823)
Distance closest -0.000269 -0.000485*** -0.000243 -0.000520***
(0.000166) (0.000171) (0.000180) (0.000152)
Ruggedness 0.00131 0.00661 -0.00699 -0.00331
(0.00832) (0.00814) (0.00812) (0.00659)
Per capita light 0.520** 0.353 0.871** 0.538
(0.213) (0.235) (0.340) (0.366)
Road 0.0613** 0.00810 0.0608* 0.0101
(0.0287) (0.0299) (0.0325) (0.0296)
Conflict 0.0127 0.0209** -0.00173 -0.00496***
(0.0176) (0.00908) (0.00338) (0.00191)
Proportion manu 0.283** 0.288** 0.308*** 0.252***
(0.126) (0.114) (0.0856) (0.0790)
Proportion service 0.596*** 0.382*** 0.349*** 0.180**
(0.119) (0.131) (0.0892) (0.0864)
Ethnicity fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Province fixed effect NO YES NO YES
F-statistics of the instrument 367.1 24.93 336.8 35.53
R-squared 0.805 0.872 0.817 0.883
Observations 464,130 464,130 697,369 697,369
Note: This table reports the first-stage results of the instrumental variable based on 1996 and 2001
census data and report the F-statistics of the instrumental variable. The sample is only for the ”white”
magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more
than 1% of the overall population. All regressions are at the individual level. We report all the control
variables, both district-level variables especially geographical features and individual-level controls for
socio-economic status. We control for ethnicity fixed effects and compare the results with and without
province fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5. Ethnic diversity, unemployment and labour force participation: individual
level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent variable unemployed inactive unemployed + inactive unemployed + inactive
1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 2001 2001
Panel A: OLS estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.0158 -0.0199 -0.151*** -0.0610** -0.135*** -0.0810** -0.152*** -0.150***
(0.0115) (0.0177) (0.0208) (0.0246) (0.0200) (0.0322) (0.0250) (0.0373)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.194 0.195 0.152 0.153 0.174 0.175
Observations 464,130 464,130 464,130 464,130 464,130 464,130 697,368 697,369
Panel B: IV estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.0229 -0.141*** -0.167*** 0.0427 -0.144*** -0.0984 -0.153*** -0.171**
(0.0142) (0.0471) (0.0223) (0.0602) (0.0221) (0.0756) (0.0248) (0.0863)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
F statistics of the instrument 367.1 24.93 367.1 24.93 367.1 24.93 336.8 35.53
R-squared 0.033 0.032 0.194 0.153 0.152 0.195 0.174 0.175
Observations 464,130 464,130 464,130 464,130 464,130 464,130 697,369 697,369
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on unemployment rate at individual-level regressions based on 1996 and 2001
census data. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for
more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated
at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We compare the results with and without province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with
fractionalisation index. We separate unemployed and economically inactive groups only for 1996 results as these two categories are combined in 2001
census. ”Unemployed + inactive” is a dummy variable which equals 1 if one is unemployed or inactive and 0 if one is employed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 6. Ethnic diversity and employment status: individual level regresions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent variable wage employment self/wage wage employment self/wage
1996 1996 2001 2001
Panel A: OLS estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF 0.0850** -0.0197 0.147*** 0.013
(0.0329) (0.017) (0.0374) (0.0137)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.1938 0.0109 0.1728 0.0081
Observations 449,200 180,535 681,529 253,809
Panel B: IV estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF 0.112 -0.052 0.176*** -0.041
(0.0768) (0.0398) (0.0854) (0.0354)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 25.01 23.55 35.82 32.14
R-squared 0.1938 0.0108 0.1728 0.0075
Observations 449,200 180,535 681,529 253,809
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on employment and the allocation between
self- and wage-employment at individual-level regressions based on 1996 and 2001 census data. The sample
is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population
accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical
features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We also control for
province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. In column 1 and 3 we drop
self-employed people as they are a very small proportion of the whole working-age population. Column 2 and 4
are based only on the employed black people. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7. Ethnic diversity, intensive margin and wage: individual level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent variable log monthly log hourly hour log monthly log hourly hour
income wage income wage
Panel A: Individual level, census data
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF 0.366*** 0.411*** -1.425 0.527*** 0.455* 2.261
(0.0722) (0.0935) (1.263) (0.195) (0.274) (3.731)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 32.35 32.35 32.19
R-squared 0.345 0.314 0.053 0.344 0.313 0.052
Observations 228,256 228,256 232,533 228,256 228,256 232,533
Panel B: Individual level, LFS data
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.0676 -0.0207 0.118 0.498 0.102 23.17
(0.254) (0.247) (2.978) (1.033) (0.910) (16.41)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 5.514 5.315 5.595
R-squared 0.481 0.473 0.054 0.479 0.473 0.018
Observations 3,615 3,478 3,660 3,615 3,478 3,660
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on other labour market outcomes at individual-level
regressions, including working hour, hourly wage and monthly earnings. We only report the result in 2001 as there is no
information on hours of working in 1996 census. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be
matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for
district-level variables especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity
fixed effects. We control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. All the columns
only focus on employees. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8. Ethnic diversity and employment: district fixed effects models
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent variable unemploy + inactive wage employ self/wage log monthly income
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.291*** 0.340*** -0.133* -0.382
(0.0709) (0.072) (0.0696) (0.365)
Individual controls (district average) YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.493 0.488 0.2436 0.730
Observations 410 410 410 410
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on employment based on the district-level balanced panel. The
sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for
more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables which vary over time and individual-level controls
aggregated at district level and province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. The dependent
variable in olumns 1 is the proportion of unemployed over the whole working-age black population. Column 2 is defined in a
similar way but we exclude those who are self-employed. Column 3 has the dependent variable which is the ratio of the number
of self-employed to that of employees at district level. Column 4 only focuses on back people who are employed. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9. Heterogeneous effects of ethnic diversity on wage-employment: individual
level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
Dependent variable 1996 1996 2001 2001
Panel A: By education
High edu 0.0403 0.05 0.163*** 0.12
(0.0305) (0.0889) (0.031) (0.0924)
Obs 151,944 151,994 291,307 291,307
Low edu 0.097*** 0.141* 0.1365*** 0.19**
(0.035) (0.078) (0.042) (0.09)
Obs 297,206 297,206 390,222 390,222
Panel B: By ethnicity
Large 0.107*** 0.124 0.152*** 0.1827**
(0.034) (0.0816) (0.031) (0.0842)
Obs 320,901 320,901 459,108 459,108
Medium 0.023 -0.170 0.204*** -0.0374
0.0737 (0.2234) (0.06) (0.213)
Obs 91,373 91,373 149,632 149,632
Small -0.0215 -0.574* 0.038 0.217
(0.0975) (0.295) (0.081) (0.4079)
Obs 36,926 36,926 72,789 72,789
Panel C: By industrial sector
Agriculture 0.0610* 0.0302 0.000105 0.0514
(0.0334) (0.0700) (0.0326) (0.0705)
Continued on next page
Table 9 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
Dependent variable 1996 1996 2001 2001
Obs 165,605 165,605 180,227 180,227
Manufacturing -0.0219** -0.00688 -0.00801 -0.0118
(0.00899) (0.0190) (0.00980) (0.0196)
Obs 165,605 165,605 180,227 180,227
Service -0.0390 -0.0233 0.00791 -0.0396
(0.0276) (0.0603) (0.0299) (0.0695)
Obs 165,605 165,605 180,227 180,227
Panel D: By occupation
Manager 0.00380 0.0159* 0.00744** 0.0236***
(0.00400) (0.00965) (0.00332) (0.00764)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Profession -0.0204 0.101** -0.0170 0.0844*
(0.0176) (0.0425) (0.0133) (0.0489)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Clerk 0.0171*** -0.00244 0.0226** 0.0331
(0.00578) (0.0149) (0.0102) (0.0243)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Serve -0.0249** 0.0331 0.0173 -0.0411
(0.0118) (0.0309) (0.0156) (0.0360)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Craft -0.0203 -0.0360 -0.0401 0.0247
(0.0272) (0.0669) (0.0261) (0.0465)
Continued on next page
Table 9 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
Dependent variable 1996 1996 2001 2001
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Skilled agriculture 0.00620 -0.0677 0.0196 -0.0524*
(0.0218) (0.0427) (0.0168) (0.0308)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Operator -0.0342** -0.140*** -0.0391** -0.0584
(0.0156) (0.0457) (0.0172) (0.0367)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Unskilled 0.0727** 0.0962 0.0292 -0.0139
(0.0343) (0.0714) (0.0358) (0.0637)
Obs 153,294 153,294 224,942 224,942
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports the main results about the heterogeneous effects of ethnic
diversity on the probability of being an employee at individual-level regressions by sub-
groups in both 1996 and 2001 census. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial
districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts
for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables
especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average
and ethnicity fixed effects. We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity
is measured with fractionalisation index. ”High” (”Low”) education is defined as years
of schooling above (below) 9. All the columns in Panel C and Panel D only focus on
employees to illustrate the allocation of employed workers across different industrial
sectors and occupations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10. Ethnic diversity and employment: separating native, migrants and
immigrants
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable unemployed + inactive wage employment
native migrants immigrants native migrants immigrants
Panel A: IV estimates, 1996 census
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.1615** 0.1216 -0.4639 0.1717** -0.1108 0.5057*
(0.0798) (0.1284) 0.288 (0.0817) (0.1300) (0.292)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 26.20 17.81 10.56 26.23 17.83 10.86
R-squared 0.1907 0.1929 0.2998 0.1876 0.1962 0.307
Observations 305,458 128,215 4,657 296,864 122,956 4,283
Panel B: IV estimates, 2001 census
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.153* -0.248 -0.877* 0.159** 0.25 0.936*
(0.0786) (0.205) (0.478) (0.079) (0.017) (0.51)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 37.03 19.58 9.15 37.17 20.19 9.16
R-squared 0.1713 0.1960 0.2916 0.1682 0.1978 0.3147
Observations 568,260 119,696 20,390 556,296 116,089 19,250
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on employment separately for native, migrants and
immigrants at individual-level regressions based on 1996 and 2001 census data. ”Native” is defined as people who were born
in the district and never move out or within-district migrants. ”Migrants” are cross-district migrants while ”immigrants” are
those who migrated from another country. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to
1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level
variables especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects.
We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. In columns 4-6 we drop
self-employed people as they are a very small proportion of the whole working-age population. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 11. Ethnic diversity and the emigration of the white
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable num of white in 1996 num of white in 1985 diff: 96 - 85 num of white in 2001 num of white in 1985 diff: 01 - 85
1996 1996 1996 2001 2001 2001
Panel A: OLS estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF 20,689 2,156 18,533 -1,301 7,043 -8,344
(23,884) (31,934) (17,342) (27,706) (24,844) (14,749)
R-squared 0.762 0.781 0.432 0.752 0.894 0.748
Observations 205 205 205 210 210 210
Panel B: IV estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF 146,930 225,351 -78,421 36,125 15,864 20,261
(185,524) (202,881) (62,681) (110,761) (85,383) (36,230)
F statistics of instruments 9.959 9.959 9.959 30.86 30.86 30.86
R-squared 0.734 0.720 0.316 0.750 0.893 0.743
Observations 205 205 205 210 210 210
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table looks at whether ethnic diversity is correlated with the number of white population in 1996 and 2001 and the emigration of the white from the district after the
end of Apartheid at district-level regressions. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for
more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical features and individual-level controls aggregated at district average. We also
control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 12. Ethnic diversity and skill acquisition: second language
[1] [2]
Dependent variable OLS IV
Panel A: Whole sample
Overall 0.034* 0.109*
(0.0184) (0.0659)
F statistics of the instrument 25.67
Obs 654,116 654,116
Panel B: By education
Edu <=7 0.0345** 0.076*
(0.01496) (0.0458)
F statistics of the instrument 27.12
Obs 379,257 379,257
7 < Edu <=9 0.034 0.1478
(0.0254) (0.092)
F statistics of the instrument 22.69
Obs 110,508 110,508
9 < Edu <=12 0.041 0.247
(0.033) (0.1575)
F statistics of the instrument
Obs 151,343 151,343
Edu >12 0.1027 0.412
(0.0658) (0.2985)
F statistics of the instrument 11.86
Obs 13,008 13,008
Panel C: By ethnicity
Large 0.027 0.160**
(0.0205) (0.077)
F statistics of the instrument 19.84
Obs 469,737 469,737
Medium 0.046 -0.068
(0.037) (0.2)
F statistics of the instrument 7.26
Obs 131,601 131,601
Small -0.0175 0.011
(0.03) (0.088)
F statistics of the instrument 13.01
Obs 52,778 52,778
Individual controls YES YES
District controls YES YES
Province FE YES YES
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on the acquisition of social
skills (proficiency of second language as a proxy) at individual-level regressions based on 1996
census data (as there is no information on the second language in 2001 census). The sample
is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose
black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-
level variables especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district
average and ethnicity fixed effects. We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is
measured with fractionalisation index. We look at both the whole sample and sub-samples split
by educational levels and group size. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A0. Gravity model predicting the stock of black population in white districts:
PPML estimator
Dependent variable: ethnic population Njk
Coef. Std. Err. t-stat
Distance Disjk -.0039 ( .0007) -5.17
Ethnic group fixed effects:
Group 1 .9750 ( .2139) 4.56
Group 2 .6133 (.1769 ) 3.47
Group 3 .1778 (.2248 ) 0.79
Group 4 -.4604 (.2311 ) -1.99
Group 5 .2220 (.2259) 0.98
Group 6 .8940 (.1803) 4.96
Group 8 .0469 (.1833) 0.26
Group 9 -.8184 (.2776) -2.95
Constant 9.157 ( .2176) 42.08
R-squared .092
Observations 1989
Note: This table reports results about the gravity model which helps estimate the
stock of each ethnic group in each ”white” district based on 1985 census data. The
sample is for all the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1996 and
2001 census. We control for homeland fixed effects and run a regression of the stock of
ethnic groups on the distance between their corresponding homelands and each district
using PPML models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix - History and Econometrics
A1 Bantu migration and the formation of ethnic
diversity from historical narratives
Below we provide a summary of the history of the Bantu migration from central and
eastern Africa and the settlement of these groups in South Africa for each ethnic
groups in details. Narrative evidence is summarised from Mwakikagile (2010) and
Gradin (2014).
Ethnicity Time of mi-
gration into
SA
Homelands Time of
moving into
white areas
Bantustan
Xhosa Before 1400s Today’s East-
ern Cape
After conflicts
with the na-
tive Khoisan
Ciskei and
Transkei
Zulu 16th century Eastern
part, today’s
Kwazulu-
Natal
Early 1800s KwaZulu
Swazi 15th and 16th
centuries
Southern part
of Tongaland
in what is now
Mozambique
17th and 18th
centuries into
the Pongola
River
KaNgwane
Ndebele Before 1835 Today’s
Northern
Province,
Mpumalanga
and Gauteng
By 1835
towards
Swaziland
and Northern
Transvaal
KwaNdebele,
Lebowa
North Sotho 1500s Today’s
Limpopo and
Northwest
After the war
with Boers
and Ndebele
Qwawa
South Sotho 1500s Today’s
Limpopo and
Northwest
After the war
with Boers
and Ndebele
Qwawa
Tswana 1500s Today’s
Limpopo and
Northwest
After the war
with Boers
and Ndebele
Bophuthatswana
Tsonga Before the
early 1500s
Close to to-
day’s Mozam-
bique
After conflicts
with Zulu
Gazankulu
Venda Before 800s
A.D.
A mountain-
ous area in
the northern
part close
to Limpopo
River
800s A.D. to
Matopo Hills
Venda
A2 Data Source and construction of district-level
variables
In this section we present data sources and the construction of our district-level
control variables in detail. Emphasis has been given on those geographical measures.
Variable Data source Construction of
variable
Panel A: from census
Area of the district Census 1996 and 2001
district-level shape file
Calculated from the
shape file directly in
ArcGIS.
Population density Census 1996 and 2001 Calcualte the total
number of black in
each district in census
data and divide it by
area.
Proportion of the black Census 1996 and 2001 Calculate the number
of black over the whole
population.
Proportion of manufacturing Census 1996 and 2001 Calculate the number
of people working in
manufacturing sec-
tor over the whole
employed black people.
Proportion of service Census 1996 and 2001 Calculate the number
of people working in
service sector over the
whole employed black
people.
Urban/rural Census 1996 and 2001 Information on
whether one lives
in an urban or rural
settlement is explicitly
in census data.
Variable Data source Construction of
variable
Panel B: sources on geography
Overlap: district and homeland A map (shape
file) of homeland
provided by Tim
Brophy and Adrian
Frith.
Intersect the
boundary of dis-
tricts with that
of homelands and
see the overlap in
ArcGIS.
River Census 2001 river
shape file
Overlapping shape
file of districts
and river and di-
rectly calculate in
ArcGIS.
Road Census 2001 major
road shape file
Overlapping shape
file of districts
and road and di-
rectly calculate in
ArcGIS.
Ruggedness From Nunn and
Puga (2012). We
also tried the
measure of slope
from the same data
source with similar
results.
Same as Nunn and
Puga (2012).
Density of mine Mineral Re-
sources Data
System (MRDS)
https://mrdata.usgs.gov/mrds/.
Overlapping shape
file of districts and
mines.Calculating
number of mines in
each district and
divide it by area.
Nighlight per capita The National
Oceanic and
Atmospheric
Administration
night-time light
satellite images.
www.noaa.gov/stories/our-
earth-at-night.
Calculating night-
light measures in
a district (summa-
tion of the index
over grids).Dividing
it by the whole pop-
ulation in the dis-
trict obtained from
census data.
Distance: districts and homeland A map (shape
file) of homeland
provided by Tim
Brophy and Adrian
Frith.
Calculate Eu-
clidean between
centroid of districts
and the border of
homelands.
Distance to closest homeland A map (shape
file) of homeland
provided by Tim
Brophy and Adrian
Frith.
Choose the min-
inum value of the
distance to all
homelands.
Conflict The Geo-referenced
Event Dataset
of the Uppsala
Conflict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP-GED
v1.5) for 1996.
The Armed Con-
flict Location and
Event Data Project
(ACLED) database
for 2001.
Same as Amodio
and Chiovelli
(2017).
Table 13. Skill acquisition and labour market outcomes: second language
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent variable Overall Edu <=7 7 < Edu <=9 9 < Edu <=12 Edu >12 Large Medium Small
Panel A: unemployed as dependent variable, conditional on diversity
Second official -0.133*** -0.171*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.048*** -0.123*** -0.‘144*** -0.176***
(0.0128) (0.1917) (0.0175) (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.01) (0.022) (0.036)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.2 0.1766 0.23 0.2592 0.1632 0.192 0.212 0.229
Obs 461,942 206,934 98.949 143,928 12,131 329,416 93,673 38,853
Panel B: wage employ as dependent variable, conditional on diversity
Second official 0.132*** 0.1689*** 0.1187*** 0.078*** 0.049*** 0.121*** 0.1429*** 0.1796***
(0.013) (0.02) (0.0179) (0.0086) (0.0076) (0.011) (0.023) (0.0356)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.1994 0.1793 0.2244 0.2533 0.1650 0.1914 0.2088 0.2357
Obs 447,103 200,034 95,859 139,537 11,673 319,580 90,817 36,706
Note: This table reports results the relationship between social skill acquisition (proficiency of second language as a proxy) and employment at
individual-level regressions based on 1996 census data. We control for ethnic diversity and investigate whether this language skill is positively
correlated with employment chances. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black
population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical features, individual-
level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with
fractionalisation index. In Panel A we keep the whole working-age black sample while in Panel B we drop self-employed people as they are a very
small proportion of the whole working-age population. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 14. Decomposing ethnic diversity into number of groups and variance in
population share
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable Whole sample Large Medium Small High edu Low edu
Panel A: 1996 census
1/No. of groups 0.168*** 0.189*** 0.135 -0.476 0.099** 0.185***
(0.0425) (0.043) (0.2798) (0.532) (0.0457) (0.043)
N*Var(share) 0.0825** 0.101*** 0.025 -0.026 0.039 0.095***
(0.032) (0.0326) (0.07) (0.092) (0.03) (0.034)
R-squared 0.1954 0.1884 0.2037 0.2238 0.2784 0.1837
Observations 464,130 330,792 94,256 39,082 156,877 307,253
Panel B: 2001 census
1/No. of groups 0.29*** 0.27*** -0.371 0.6636 0.313*** 0.262***
(0.066) (0.056) (0.754) (1.0915) (0.054) (0.0724)
N*Var(share) 0.1535*** 0.1555*** 0.2145*** 0.0273 0.173*** 0.1406***
(0.037) (0.0313) (0.0567) (0.0765) (0.031) (0.0413)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.1754 0.1672 0.1796 0.1961 0.2214 0.1727
Observations 697,369 468,704 153,041 75,624 298,235 399,134
Note: This table reports results based on the decomposition of ethnic diversity index into items relating to
number of ethnic groups and group share, and how these two items are associated with unemployment rate at
individual-level OLS regressions with 1996 and 2001 census data. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial
districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the
overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical features, individual-level controls
aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity
is measured with fractionalisation index. We look at both the whole sample and sub-samples split by educational
levels and sample size. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A1. First-stage regression results: district level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent var. ELF ELF ELF ELF
1996 1996 2001 2001
Predicted ELF 0.0455*** 1.128*** 1.820*** 1.520***
(0.0168) (0.358) (0.104) (0.274)
District controls YES YES YES YES
Individual controls (district average) YES YES YES YES
Province fixed effect NO YES NO YES
F-statistics of the instrument 291.5 9.959 304.4 30.86
R-squared 0.815 0.870 0.853 0.897
Observations 205 205 210 210
Note: This table reports first-stage regression results for our instrumental variable at the district-
level regressions based on 1996 and 2001 census data. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial
districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1%
of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical features and
individual-level controls aggregated at district average. We also compare results with and without
controls for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A2. Ethnic diversity and different employment status: individual level
regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent variable self employment wage employment self employment wage employment
1996 1996 2001 2001
Panel A: OLS estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.00399 0.0850** 0.00972** 0.140***
(0.00573) (0.0329) (0.00464) (0.0366)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.014 0.173 0.010 0.159
Observations 464,130 464,130 697,369 697,369
Panel B: IV estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.00416 0.103 -0.00740 0.178**
(0.0131) (0.0750) (0.0120) (0.0825)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 24.93 24.93 35.53 35.53
R-squared 0.014 0.173 0.010 0.159
Observations 464,130 464,130 697,369 697,369
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on self- and wage-employment rate at individual-level
regressions based on 1996 and 2001 census data. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched
to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level
variables especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We
also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. ”Self-employment” is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if one is self-employed and 0 for all other working-age black population. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A3. Ethnic diversity and employment: district level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent variable unemployed + inactive wage employee self employment self/wage unemployed + inactive wage employee self employment self/wage
1996 1996 1996 1996 2001 2001 2001 2001
Panel A: OLS estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.0786*** 0.0744*** 0.018 0.0042 -0.118*** 0.105*** 0.012* 0.0276
(0.0265) (0.0273) (0.0195) (0.0074) -0.0354 (0.0356) (0.007) (0.0204)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.885 0.865 0.4567 0.5573 0.874 0.859 0.3595 0.2719
Observations 205 205 205 205 210 210 210 210
Panel B: IV estimates
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.202** 0.189** -0.037 0.0132 -0.146 0.196** -0.0497* -0.091
(0.0906) (0.0962) (0.066) (0.023) (0.0909) (0.0818) (0.0299) (0.0498)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 9.959 9.959 9.959 9.959 30.86 30.86 30.86 30.86
R-squared 0.871 0.852 0.4264 0.5533 0.874 0.852 0.1769 0.089
Observations 205 205 205 205 210 210 210 210
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on employment and the allocation between self- and wage-employment at district-level regressions based on 1996 and 2001 census data. The
sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables
especially geographical features and individual-level controls. We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. Dependent variables are the proportion of
people in each employment status over the whole working-age black population. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4. Estimations based on non-linear econometric models
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable Unemployed + inactive Wage employment
Logit Probit IV Probit Logit Probit IV Probit
Panel A: 1996 census
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.08** -0.078** -0.0782 0.084** 0.0822** 0.08
(0.0337) (0.033) (0.0798) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.082)
Observations 464,130 464,130 464,130 449,200 449,200 449, 200
Panel B: 2001 census
Ethnic fractionalisation ELF -0.152*** -0.149*** -0.148* 0.1496*** 0.1467*** 0.1446*
(0.0388) (0.0387) (0.088) (0.039) (0.039) (0.0869)
Observations 697,369 697,369 697,369 681,529 681,529 681,529
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on employment based on non-linear econometric
models in 1996 and 2001. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census
and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables
especially geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We
also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured with fractionalisation index. In column 4, 5 and 6
we drop self-employed people as they are a very small proportion of the whole working-age population. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A5.1. RQ index as a measure of ethnic diversity: first stage regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Individual level District level Individual level District level
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001
Dependent var. RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ RQ
Predicted RQ -3.116*** -3.024*** -3.440*** -3.164*** -1.778*** -1.624** -1.688** -1.556**
(0.373) (0.397) (0.404) (0.456) (0.643) (0.638) (0.782) (0.726)
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province fixed effect NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
F-statistics of the instrument 69.66 58.00 72.49 48.07 7.64 6.48 4.67 4.59
R-squared 0.681 0.688 0.673 0.682 0.7673 0.7795 0.7512 0.7761
Observations 464,130 697,369 205 210 464,130 697,369 205 210
Note: This table reports first-stage results about our instrumental variable for polarisation index based on 1996 and 2001 census data, at both
district- and individual-level regressions. The sample is only for the ”white” magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose
black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially geographical features
and individual-level controls aggregated at district average. We also compare results with and without control for province fixed effects. Ethnic
diversity is measured with polarisation index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A5.2. RQ index as a measure of ethnic diversity: individual level regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
1996 1996 2001 2001 1996 1996 2001 2001
Dependent variable unemploy wage employment unemploy wage employment unemploy wage employment unemploy wage employment
Panel A: OLS estimates
RQ -0.0841*** 0.084*** -0.102*** 0.101*** -0.008 0.011 -0.05* 0.05
(0.0205) (0.02) (0.0204) (0.02) (0.026) (0.026) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.192 0.1909 0.173 0.1705 0.1949 0.1934 0.1744 0.1721
Observations 464,130 449,200 697,369 681,529 464,130 449,200 697,369 681,529
Panel B: IV estimates
RQ -0.125*** 0.1224*** -0.104*** 0.1047*** 0.025 -0.128 0.148 -0.138
(0.0375) (0.037) (0.0395) (0.0396) (0.091) (0.093) (0.1244) (0.123)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
F statistics of the instrument 69.66 70.06 58 58.37 7.64 7.69 6.48 6.52
R-squared 0.192 0.1905 0.173 0.1705 0.1948 0.1934 0.1705 0.1685
Observations 464,130 449,200 697,369 681,529 464,130 449,200 697,369 681,529
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on employment at individual-level regressions based on 1996 and 2001 census data. The sample is only for the ”white”
magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level variables especially
geographical features, individual-level controls aggregated at district average and ethnicity fixed effects. We also compare results with and without control for province fixed effects. Ethnic
diversity is measured with polarisation index. In column 2, 4, 6 and8 we drop self-employed people as they are a very small proportion of the whole working-age population. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A6. Inter-ethnic marriage rate and ethnic diversity: 1996 census
Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Inter-ethnic marriage
Own generation 0.966 0.18 96,031
Parental generation 0.99 0.0966 532
Second language among married people
Any second language 0.2356 0.424 95,580
Second English/Afrikaan 0.0888 0.284 95,580
Second ethnic language 0.147 0.354 95,580
Second language among whole sample
Any second language 0.225 0.418 203,327
Second English/Afrikaan 0.087 0.283 203,327
Second ethnic language 0.138 0.345 203,327
Note: This table reports inter-ethnic marriage rate (i.e. marriage be-
tween different ethnic groups within the black population). Ethnicity
is identified from the first language spoken by both household head
and spouse for the current generation, and household head’s parents
for the parental generation. We also report the proportion of the black
population who can speak a second language.
Table A7. Ethnic diversity and the range of occupations
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent Var manager Var profession Var clerk Var serve Var craft Var skill agri Var operator Var unskill
Panel A: OLS estimates
Ethnic fragmentation index 0.932 1.406 -1.287 -1.021 -0.246 -0.729 -1.868 -3.493***
(1.015) (3.560) (0.870) (1.126) (0.589) (1.797) (1.687) (1.225)
R-squared 0.788 0.861 0.825 0.759 0.536 0.810 0.826 0.800
Obs 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Panel B: IV estimates
Ethnic fragmentation index -4.433 -9.978 -7.992*** -10.17* -4.572* -22.31** -23.09*** -9.843*
(4.783) (16.02) (3.044) (5.782) (2.498) (10.60) (7.873) (5.533)
F statistics of the instrument 9.959 9.959 9.959 9.959 9.959 9.959 9.959 9.959
R-squared 0.752 0.851 0.759 0.645 0.354 0.641 0.606 0.762
Obs 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports results about the effect of ethnic diversity on the variety of occupations among employees in 1996. The sample is only for the ”white”
magisterial districts which can be matched to 1985 census and whose black population accounts for more than 1% of the overall population. We control for district-level
variables especially geographical features and individual-level controls aggregated at district average. We also control for province fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is
measured with fractionalisation index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Chapter 4
The influence of family on
children’s trust formation
4.1 Introduction
The role of culture on economic choices and its effect on economic development
is the subject of a lively debate in recent research. Among the cultural traits,
trust towards others is one of the the most studied by social scientists (see Alesina
and Giuliano, 2016 for a review).1 Following the seminal contributions of Banfield
(1958), Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 2000), trust has been found to
affect economic development (Knack and Keefer, 1997), innovation (Fukuyama,
1995), individual performance (Butler et al., 2016), financial development and trade
(see Guiso et al., 2004, 2008c, 2009), and firm productivity (Bloom et al., 2012;
La Porta et al., 1997). For a comprehensive review of the role of trust in economics,
1In this paper, we refer to “generalized” trust, which concerns our beliefs about the anonymous
other. In other words, trust refers to the relations among individuals who are not bound by the
kind of personal ties that bind members of the same family, or fellow workers (Algan and Cahuc,
2013).
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see Algan and Cahuc (2013).2
Considering the important influence of trust on economic outcomes, the process of
its formation is of key interest. At a broader level, theoretical work has highlighted
the role of intergenerational transmission of values – such as trust – shedding light on
the persistence of ethnic differences (Bisin and Verdier, 2001).3. More recent studies
have attempted to provide empirical content to the intergenerational transmission of
values. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
Dohmen et al. (2012) analyze the transmission of trust and risk attitudes from
parents to children within a regression framework whereby children’s attitudes are
modelled as a function of those of parents. Their results suggest the presence of a
positive intergenerational correlation.4
We build upon existing work and exploit longitudinal data to study how trust is
transmitted from parents to their children. The cruciality of longitudinal data
transpires in several steps of our analysis. First, we can disentangle the role of
the direct transmission of trust from parents to children from that played by other
factors of the environment shared by siblings. This distinction would not be possible
with cross-sectional data.
2Effectively, Arrow (1972) states that “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself
an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of
mutual confidence.” Following his reasoning, the absence of markets or their malfunctioning, the
misallocation of resources and, more generally, the differences in economic performance, could be
ultimately attributed to the lack of trusting behavior.
3Related work has shown the importance of intergenerational transmission on fertility and work
practises across cultures (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Guiso et al., 2006; Fernández, 2008)
4An alternative strategy to identify the intergenerational transmission process is to focus on
immigrants’ attitudes. The central idea is to understand how immigrants’ values – shaped by the
diverse cultural and institutional background of their home countries – react and adapt to the
environment in the common host country. For example, Ljunge (2014) estimates the intergener-
ational transmission of trust by analysing children of immigrants in 29 European countries with
ancestry in 87 different nations. His approach entails performing regressions of the level of trust
of second-generation immigrants on the average trust of the country of origin of parents. Remark-
ably, their results suggest that the transmission of trust is relevant only on the mother’s side.
Moschion and Tabasso (2014) use a similar approach with data on second generation immigrants
in Australia and the United States to study how the mechanism of the transmission process varies
in the two host countries.
Second, we delve into the assumption that individual trust is invariant over time.
This conjecture has been the crucial but somewhat controversial argument on which
the existing empirical analysis hinges. It is crucial because parents’ and children’
trust used in regression analyses are contemporaneously measured at the time of
the interviews – while ideally they should be gauged at the time the transmission
took place. These two measurements are equivalent only under the invariance of
trust over time. It is a controversial hypothesis too since, for instance, in their U.S.
longitudinal study, Poulin and Haase (2015) find that generalized trust changes
with age. We exploit a three-wave panel dataset constructed from the German
Socio-Economic Panel to model the dynamics of individual trust over a decade,
distinguishing between its permanent and transient component. Within this frame-
work, we test for the invariance of the permanent component of trust finding no
evidence to reject it for mothers, children and fathers below the median age. Re-
markably, we find that the transient component accounts for a large fraction of the
variance of observed trust.
Third, building on the distinction between the two components, we argue that
only permanent trust matters for the transmission process. To circumvent the
unobservability of permanent trust, we show that the unfeasible regression of the
permanent trust of children on the permanent trust of their parents is equivalent to
estimating the regression of the observable counterparts of permanent trust using
the lagged levels of parents’ trust as instruments for the corresponding current level.
Last but not least, we show how to evaluate the relative importance of the in-
tergenerational transmission and the residual siblings correlation to the formation
of children’s trust. As pointed out by Solon et al. (1991) in their study on the
role of family background as a determinant of the economic status of children, the
distinction between transient and permanent components is crucial.
In summary, the contribution of our study is threefold. 1) From a methodological
point of view, we provide a setup for the study of the evolution of individual trust
over time – as well as of its intergenerational transmission – which can be adapted
to other attitudes and cultural values; 2) We complement existing work on inter-
generational transmission of trust by clarifying the conditions required to attach
a structural interpretation to parameter estimates of a regression of the trust of
children on the contemporaneous trust of their parents; 3) We separately identify
the intergenerational correlation and the residual siblings correlation; 4) We derive
both a simple estimator of the transmission parameters and an appropriate measure
of the strength of the transmission process between generations.
The main results can be summarised as follows: i) in line with previous work, but
with stronger effect, we find that it is the mother that has a substantial role on
the transmission of permanent trust to children. On the other hand, the correla-
tion between the permanent trust of fathers and their children is due to the strong
correlation between the permanent trust of the two parents; ii) the strength of the
intergenerational transmission is far from being substantial. We find that the par-
ents’ permanent trust accounts for approximately 20% of the variance of children’s
permanent trust; iii) on the other hand, the residual siblings correlation accounts
for a large proportion of that variance, pointing to the existence of environmental
factors shared by siblings which are independent on their parents’ trust but are
relevant to the formation of their own trust.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
review of the literature on cultural transmission. Section 3 outlines a framework
where we introduce the distinction between permanent and transient trust and
clarifies the conditions required to attach a structural interpretation of the regression
parameters. Section 4 describes the data and the econometric model. Section
5 presents the results of the test for invariance of trust and of the estimates of
intergenerational transmission parameters and residual siblings correlation. Section
6 follows with a discussion of our results and of their implication for the literature
on long term persistence. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical background
The first theoretical frameworks for the study of cultural transmission are due to
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1988), who apply mod-
els of evolutionary biology to the transmission of beliefs, preferences and norms.
These works show how cultural traits can be acquired through learning and other
forms of social interactions. Cultural transmission is seen as the result of the direct
vertical socialization (the role played by parents), and the horizontal and oblique
socializations (taking place in the society). Horizontal and oblique socializations
can be described as imitation and learning behaviors, and refer mainly to the inter-
actions with peers and the environment outside the family. Cultural transmission is
different from genetic evolution, although the two can interact. The distinct effects
of the cultural, environmental, and genetic factors on cognitive and non-cognitive
skills of an individual is at the core of a lively debate on “nature” versus “nurture”,
which is the object of study of several disciplines, from behavioral genetics to social
sciences (for a survey, see Sacerdote, 2011).
With the growing evidence of the persistence of ethnic and religious traits across
generations, cultural transmission has recently gained new emphasis in the theo-
retical and empirical literature. It has been documented how migrants generally
struggle to maintain specific traits of the culture of the country of origin. The cul-
tural renaissance of several ethnic and religious communities in the U.S. (Orthodox
Jews, for example) apparently endangered, is a significant case. Similarly, Africa
has witnessed the persistence of tribal distinctions even after the emergence of na-
tional institutions.5 During the last decade, Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) have
significantly extended existing models. In particular, they introduced the parental
socialization choice, which is motivated by what they call imperfect empathy. In
their framework, parents are altruistic and care about children’s choices, which are
however evaluated using the parents’ preferences. Children acquire traits through
their parents’ socialization choices and by learning from the social environment in
which they grow up. Parents choose the optimal socialization effort taking into
consideration also the environment. Specifically, parental choices depend on the
distribution of the population with respect to the relevant trait. Bisin et al. (2009)
further extend this model by analyzing multi-trait populations. In our empirical
analysis, we endeavor to reconcile vertical and horizontal socialization within the
family by quantitatively estimating and distinguishing the roles of the intergenera-
tional correlation (deemed to capture vertical socialization) and the residual siblings
correlation (which is thought to embody horizontal socialization).
4.3 Analytical framework
Let the observable level of trust for father i at time t be:
T fit = T f
p
it + v fit (4.1)
where T f pit is his permanent level of trust at time t and v fit is a zero mean transient
shock uncorrelated over time and unrelated to past, current and future values of
the permanent trust. To fix ideas, let the evolution of the permanent level of trust
over time be driven by the following model:
T f pit = ρT f
p
it−1 + (1− ρ)u fit (4.2)
5For a comprehensive review, see Bisin and Verdier (2005).
where u fit is a permanent shock hitting T f pit at time t. The permanent shock is
uncorrelated over time and uncorrelated to past values of the permanent trust.
The intuition motivating this model is as follows. T f pit−1 is the level of permanent
trust of father i at time t − 1 summarizing past and current events relevant to
his lasting belief on whether one can trust people. At time t he experiences the
unpredictable shock (u fit, v fit). The component u fit brings news relevant to the
father’s lasting belief, therefore updating his permanent trust according to equation
(4.2). The component v fit affects the current level of observable trust but does not
bring any news relevant to the father’s lasting belief. Accordingly, it does not leave
any trace on the father’s future belief.
With this simple framework we introduce two novel aspects. First, we distinguish
between observable and permanent trust. Previous studies do not contemplate a
transient component of trust, implicitly assuming that the transient shock v fit is
negligible. Presumably, only permanent trust is relevant for the intergenerational
transmission, in that transient shocks – being uninformative about the updating
process of father – are unlikely to be passed to the child. In the following, we will
show that the latter is actually a testable implication of the model. Since the father’s
permanent trust is observable only through v fit, the presence of a transient shock
raises the classic measurement error problem to the purpose of the econometric
identification of the intergenerational transmission.
The second aspect is that we delve into an important implicit assumption made
in the existing literature, namely that trust is invariant over time. Empirically
speaking, this assumption is rejected by the evidence we provide in Table 4.1. Still,
it could be recast in our framework with reference to the permanent component of
trust:
T f pit = T f
p
it−1 = T f
p
i (4.3)
In the following, we show that this restriction has testable implications. Key to
the feasibility of this test is the availability of panel data of individuals observed at
least at three points in time.
The observable trust for mothers and children, Tmit and Tcit, their permanent trust,
Tmpit and Tc
p
it, their transient and permanent shocks vmit, vcit, umit and ucit, as
well as the equations linking permanent and observable trust and their dynamics
are defined in the same manner as for fathers.
Turning to the transmission process, the equation relating the permanent trust of
children to the contemporaneus permanent trust of their parents is:
Tcpit = β0 + β1T f
p
it + β2Tm
p
it + ϵit (4.4)
where the subscript t refers to the time at which the interview takes place. Note
that information is collected at the same time for fathers, mothers and children.
Our equation is similar to the one adopted in the existing literature on intergenera-
tional transmission of trust, the important novelty being that in our framework we
emphazise that it is the permanent trust which is passed on from parents to their
children.
There are a number of issues one needs to carefully take into account in order
to attach a structural interpretation to the coefficients in equation (4.4) and to
consistently estimate them. Since in our dataset the permanent trust of children is
observed (up to measurement errors) when they are at least 17 years old, modelling
the mechanism of transmission from the early childhood to the late adolescence of
children is not possible. This is a common and known limitation in this type of
studies. However, a feasible and interesting alternative is to model the link between
the level of permanent trust of children at age 17 – when the intergenerational
transmission is presumably completed – and the trust that parents put in the process
up to that time. This is a kind of reduced form model linking inputs to the outputs
and silently skipping over the circumstances inside the black box of the transmission
process.
Even when recasting the problem this way, several issues persist. First, the trust
that parents input in the transmission process is the one that covers the years when
transmission took place, not the one we observe at the time we collect our survey
data. This implies that to achieve a meaningful structural interpretation of the
parameters in equation (4.4), one needs to explicitly account for the dynamics of
the permanent trust of parents over time.
Second, to our purposes, we should ideally use the trust of children exactly at age
17 (or just above 17), i.e., right at the age by when the transmission is presumably
completed. To gain statistical precision, we instead include in our sample children
of any age (see Section 4.4.1 for details on sample selection). Hence the trust we
observe for children refers to their age at the time of the interview, and not at 17.
The major implication is that one needs to explicitly account for the dynamics of
the permanent trust from age 17 onwards.
The third issue relates to the fact that, even though parameters in equation (4.4)
deserved a structural interpretation, their identification would be problematic if
the permanent trust of children and of their parents were affected by correlated
permanent shocks, since this would induce the endogeneity of the permanent trust
of parents. Related to this, an additional potential issue could be a reverse causal
link going from the trust of children to the trust of their parents. Both these cases
of endogeneity would lead to inconsistent OLS estimates.
Importantly, however, there is at least one special case when all the issues above do
not arise. If the permanent trust of parents and children were time invariant, this
means that observing them (up to measurement errors) at the time of the survey
would still provide a valid measure for both the permanent trust of parents when the
transmission took place and the trust of children at age 17. Moreover, invariance of
permanent trust would be sufficient to exclude the existence of permanent shocks,
therefore ruling out the endogeneity of T f pit and of Tm
p
it in equation (4.4). It is
therefore crucial to test whether the hypothesis of trust invariance holds, before
turning to the estimation of the transmission equation.
A fourth issue is that to obtain a feasible version of the transmission equation (4.4),
one needs to replace the unobservable permanent trust of children and of their
parents by their error-ridden observable counterparts:
Tcit = β0 + β1T fit + β2Tmit + ϵit + vcit − β1v fit − β2vmit (4.5)
This raises the problem of how to estimate this feasible equation taking into account
the endogeneity problem raised by the measurement errors in the observable trust
of parents (as well as by the possible correlation between the measurement errors
of parents and of their children).
Last but not least, key to the identification of the structural parameters in equation
(4.4) is controlling for possible confounders which could be correlated to the trust
of parents and children. To deal with this issue, we check the sensitivity of the
estimates of (4.5) to the inclusion of several observables.
To quantify the strength of the transmission process, we follow the standard practice
in the literature on intergenerational transmission and consider the fraction of the
variance of Tcp explained by (T f p, Tmp). This depends both on the size of the
coefficients β1 and β2 and on the degree of correlation between the permanent trust
of parents:
β21var{T f pit}+ β22var{Tmpit}+ 2β1β2cov{T f pit , Tmpit}. (4.6)
Distinguishing between observable and permanent trust is crucial to properly assess
the extent to which children inherit trust from their parents. Even leaving aside
the issue of how to estimate the coefficients β1 and β2 (see below Section 4.4.2), it
is clear that the relevant R2 should be evaluated with respect to the variance of Tcp
and not of Tc. Whether this distinction is important is an empirical issue to which
we turn in Section 4.5.1, where we provide an estimate of the variance of the two
components.
4.4 Econometrics
4.4.1 Data
Our panel of parents and children is drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP). The SOEP is a large longitudinal survey extensively used by economists
and that has been the base for intergenerational studies (see, e.g., Dohmen et al.,
2012). The survey was introduced in West Germany in 1984 and collected data
on 12,000 households; in 1990, it was extended to include about 2,000 households
from East Germany.6 Two features of SOEP are key to our study. First, the survey
“tracks” individuals, which means that those who move internally in Germany can
still be followed over time, thereby reducing attrition. Second, it provides indicators
to match children with their biological parents inside the panel. This feature is
essential in order to construct families and observe them over time. A family is
defined as the parental couple (mother and father) and their biological child(ren).
Given the structure of SOEP it is not necessary for the family members to live in
6A detailed description of SOEP data can be found in Wagner et al. (2007). The panel has been
assembled using PanelWhiz, see Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2010) for details. In our analysis, we
have used SOEP v31: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2014, version 31, SOEP,
2015, doi: 10.5684/soep.v31.
the same household in order to be observed in the panel.7
We included in the sample all couples who took part continuously into the survey
in the waves 2003, 2008 and 2013 with at least one child of age 17 or older in 2013.
Crucial to our analysis, this sample selection implies that we observe the trust of
both parents in three time periods. The trust of children included in the sample
is observed at least in 2013. For a subset of children, trust is also observable in
either or both the previous waves (2003 and 2008) provided they were at least 17
and present during the survey (see Table B2 in the Appendix for details on the
number of waves children are observed). The age distribution of fathers, mothers
and children in 2013 is set in Figure 4.1.
The resulting panel comprises 1,652 children within 1,126 families. In the left panel
of Table 4.2 we report the distribution of families by number of children included
in our sample in 2013. The right panel reports the distribution of families by the
total number of children in the same year. This total includes also children who are
outside the sample (because they are still younger than 17, or because they were
not originally sampled, or because of other reasons).
The key variable of our analysis is the generalized trust. This is recorded as the level
of agreement with the statement “On the whole, one can trust people” on a four-
point scale. 8 From the SOEP we derived additional variables, including gender,
age, number of siblings, nationality, education and information on the place of
residence when aged 15. We report summary statistics for these variables in Table
B1 in the Appendix separately for mothers, fathers and children. We additionally
include the average level of trust in the region, following the argument of Dohmen
7It is possible, however, that some children already left the households at the time of the first
survey, and hence they are not part of the panel, despite being part of the family. Table 4.2
classifies families in terms of number of children who are part of the sample and total number of
children (i.e., including those outside the sample).
8In our analysis we treat trust as if it were a continuous variable. In the Appendix we show
that this approximation just adds a component to the measurement error on the permanent trust
easily accommodated for in our model.
et al. (2012) that trust in the area of residence might affect children’s trust or the
transmission process.9
A remarkable aspect that emerges from a deeper inspection of the raw data – and
not easily detectable with cross-sectional studies – is the variability of observed
trust over time. Figure B1 in the Appendix shows the graphs of the difference in
the level of trust for two consecutive waves, for both fathers and mothers. The
graphs reveal that about 40% of parents report a different value of trust across two
consecutive waves.
Additional evidence about this aspect comes from Table 4.1, where we report auto-
covariance matrices of trust for the three waves forming our sample. The results are
reported separately for fathers, mothers and children and for whether we include
or not additional covariates in the computation of the covariances.10 A cursory in-
spection of these matrices immediately reveals that the observable trust is far from
stable over time, complementing what observed in Figure B1. The autocorrelation
of order one is in the range 0.35 - 0.44. This is in stark contrast with the assumption
– implicit in the existing literature on the transmission of trust – that trust is stable
over time. We argue that the low degree of persistence observed in our data is due
to the transient component of trust, as defined in equation (4.1). The consequent
issue is that we need to establish whether the permanent component of trust – i.e.,
the one relevant for the intergenerational transmission – is invariant over time. The
evidence in Table 4.1 will be the basis for our test for the invariance of permanent
trust over the years developed in the next Section.
9Our definition of region follows closely Dohmen et al. (2012), and consists of the 96 policy-
regions of Germany (also known as RORs).
10In the model with controls, covariances are calculated using residuals from a regression of
trust on the full set of covariates (see Table B1). Note that the number of children reported in the
Table is smaller than the total available in the sample, since only children observed in all three
waves are used in the calculation of the autocovariances.
4.4.2 Specification testing and estimation
The testable implication of the invariance condition (4.3) written with reference to
fathers is:
cov{T fi2003, T fi2008} = cov{T fi2003, T fi2013} = cov{T fi2008, T fi2013}. (4.7)
In words, if the permanent trust T f pit does not vary over time and the variation over
time of the observable trust T fit is only due to random shocks, then the covariance
between the observable trust at time t and at time s equals the variance of the
permanent trust for any choice of (t, s). That is, if the permanent trust is invariant
over time, the three covariances in each panel of Table 4.1 should be equal (up to
sampling variability).
Condition (4.7) could be violated due to different reasons. Particularly relevant to
our case, it would not hold if the transient shocks were correlated at lag 1. It would
also be violated if the equation driving the dynamics of T f p were as in equation
(4.2). In both cases the covariance between observable trust in (2013, 2008) would
be different from the corresponding covariance in (2013, 2003).
To implement the test, note that (4.7) is equivalent to:
cov{T fi2003, T fi2008 − T fi2013} = cov{T fi2008, T fi2003 − T fi2013} = cov{T fi2013, T fi2003 − T fi2008} = 0.
(4.8)
To test the first condition, it is sufficient to perform the regression of T fi2008 −
T fi2013 on T fi2003 (or the other way around) and check whether the regression
coefficient is zero. The same applies for the remaining two conditions. Clearly, a
panel of observations of at least length three is needed to perform this test.
On accepting the invariance condition (4.7), the decomposition of the variance of
the observable trust into its components due to the permanent trust and to the
transient shock, respectively, proceeds the following way.
var{v fit} = var{T fit} − var{T f pi }. (4.9)
The variance of T f pi follows from condition (4.7). To estimate the parameters of
the feasible transmission equation (4.5), note that T fit−1 and Tmit−1 are valid
instrumental variables for T fit and Tmit provided that the transient shock is not
correlated over time. Also, note that with a panel of length three the model is
overidentified since T fit−2 and Tmit−2 are valid instruments as well.
These settings provide the basis for an additional test of the hypothesis of no au-
tocorrelation of the transient shock. Under the alternative hypothesis of autocor-
related shocks, the IV at time t− 1 is plausibly more correlated to the disturbance
term in equation (4.5) than the IV at time t− 2. Therefore, the Sargan overiden-
tification test should detect a violation of the null hypothesis. The same test is in
principle useful also to detect a violation of our conjecture that transient shocks
of parents’ trust are irrelevant for the transmission process. If these shocks were
otherwise relevant, the exclusion restriction on our candidate IV would not hold
since past values of parents’ observable trust would matter for current values of
children’s observable trust, even conditional on the current values of parents’ per-
manent trust. Since the degree of violation of the exclusion restriction is likely to
vary with the lag of the instrument, the Sargan overidentification test should detect
whether the null hypothesis does not hold.
To summarize the strength of the transmission of trust from parents to children we
use the conventional R2 of equation (4.4). The variance of Tcp explained by the
regression can be calculated according to expression (4.6). The variance of Tcpit, T f
p
it
and Tmpit are derived as a corollary of the invariance condition in Equation (4.7).
A convenient way to recover the covariance between the permanent trust of parents
is to perform a regression of T fit on Tmit using Tmit−1 as an IV to eliminate the
bias due to the measurement error. This is a consistent estimate of the regression
coefficient of T f pit on Tm
p
it. The next step is to rescale the estimated coefficient by
var{Tmpit} to obtain the covariance between the trust of parents.
4.4.3 Sibling correlation in trust
To investigate further on the role of the family environment in the transmission
process, we exploit the variation stemming from families with more that one child
in the sample – which are about 38% of our sample (see Table 4.2). The availability
of siblings in the data allows to estimate a transmission equation which includes a
family specific unobservable effect. This can be achieved by estimating a modified
version of equation (4.4):
Tcpij = β0 + β1T f
p
ij + β2Tm
p
ij + αj + ϵij (4.10)
The subscript ij refers to children belonging to the same family j (we drop the
time suffix to ease the exposition). Similarly to Bingley and Cappellari (2012),
we identify both the parental and sibling effects by estimating intergenerational
and sibling correlations within a unified framework. The residual sibling effect αj
includes parental influences not captured by the direct transmission of trust, as
well as other environmental factors shared by siblings that are independent from
the parents. Schools, friendship networks and other circumstances operating at
the community level are examples of this residual sibling effect. Note that our
framework allows us to identify the direct transmission of trust from parents to
children, but not other channels of intergenerational transmission of trust that are
independent from parents’ trust.
There are two important remarks about the identification of var{αj} and its inter-
pretation. First, since the identification of the variance is based on the between-
siblings covariance of the residuals from the feasible IV regression of Tc on T f and
Tm, var{αj} could partially capture the correlation between the transient shocks
of siblings. However, this is a testable implication. Under the null hypothesis of
no correlation between the transient shocks of siblings, the covariance between the
trust of one sibling in 2013 and the trust of another sibling at, say, time t, does not
depend on t since it is equal to the covariance between the permanent trust of the
two siblings. We implement this test in the same way as in equation (4.8).
Second, var{αj} strictly refers to families with at least two children in the sample
(about 38%). Note, however, that the overall (i.e., including out of sample) number
of siblings – and thus of families with more than one child – is much larger. The
second panel of Table 4.2 shows that nearly 85% of the families in our sample have
more than one child, meaning that the estimate of var{αj} is virtually representative
of the majority of our sample.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Testing for invariance of permanent trust
Table 4.3 presents the results of the test for invariance of permanent trust sepa-
rately for fathers, mothers and children. The pattern of autocovariance for mothers
and children provides clear evidence that observable trust is equal to a time invari-
ant component plus a random shock. This result holds true even after stratifying
by age (with the exception of few correlations statistically significant at the 10%
level). On the other hand, the null hypothesis is rejected for fathers. By inspecting
again Table 4.1, it is clear that this violation is driven by the difference between
cov{T fi2013,T fi2008} and cov{T fi2013,T fi2003}. Table 4.3 further shows that the null
hypothesis is rejected for relatively old fathers, but not for younger fathers. This
result is unaffected by the inclusion of the full set of regressors. We will take into
account the results of the invariance tests in the analysis of transmission of trust.
The most important consequence of the tests in Table 4.3 for the identification
of the transmission parameters is that by age 17 (and above) – i.e., the age at
which the transmission of trust is presumably completed – the permanent trust
of children is not affected by permanent shocks (at least over the time span 2003
to 2013), irrespectively of their age. Even if, given the available data, it is not
possible to directly test whether this occurs also at ages before 17, we proceed in
our analysis maintaining that in Equation (4.4) there is no endogeneity of T f p and
Tmp attributable to permanent shocks correlated between parents and children.
Table 4.4 presents the decomposition of the variance of observable trust into the
permanent trust and transient shock components. The main aspect is that for
mothers and children the permanent trust accounts for approximately one third of
the variance of the observed trust, while the remaining is attributable to the noise
of the transient shock. This fraction is slightly larger for fathers, and accounts for
about half of the variance of the observable trust.
4.5.2 Estimating the transmission parameters
Table 4.5 presents the results of the estimation of the feasible transmission equation
(4.5). We report estimations for OLS and IV models; for the latter we estimate both
regression pooling together all siblings and one with a family random effect. The
instruments used are the first and second lag of trust for both fathers and mothers.
The validity of our instruments is supported by the absence of autocorrelation of
the transient shocks, for which we provided evidence (for mothers and younger
fathers) in the previous section. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test strongly rejects the
hypothesis of exogeneity of T f and Tm while the Sargan overidentification test does
not reject the null hypothesis adding further evidence in favor of the validity of our
assumption of no autocorrelation for the transient shock.
Despite the usual loss of precision, the IV estimate for the coefficient of mothers
is strongly significant and three times larger than the OLS estimate. On the other
hand, the estimate for the coefficient of father is remarkably similar to the OLS
(with the latter being estimated with higher precision). This pattern holds for both
models with and without full controls. To corroborate this result, we replicated
the regression on the subsample that contains fathers of age below the median, i.e.,
those for which there is no evidence of violation of the restriction of permanent
trust invariance. Results are essentially unaffected, even if the effect of mothers is
even stronger – see Table B4.
The evidence that accounting for measurement errors makes a major difference for
the estimated coefficient for mothers while it does not matter at all for the estimated
coefficient for fathers might seem puzzling. In the Appendix we show in fact that
this is in line with known results in the literature on measurement errors, according
to which when both regressors are affected by measurement errors, the sign of the
resulting bias is a priori uncertain.
We also replicated the analysis by splitting the sample by gender of the child (Table
B5 in the Appendix). Results are qualitatively similar to the baseline, although the
effect of mother’s trust is stronger for female children.
The key result of this analysis is that a clear hierarchy emerges in the roles of
mothers and fathers with the formers being more influential in the transmission
process. The order of magnitude of the estimated coefficients are in line with those
found by Dohmen et al. (2012), even if our results show a sharper difference between
mothers’ and fathers’ roles.
As for the strength of the intergenerational transmission, we summarize it as the
fraction of the variance of Tcpit explained by the permanent trust of parents. As
a first step, we estimate the strength of the correlation between the permanent
trust of fathers and mothers as outlined at the end of the previous section. The IV
estimate of the regression of T f p on Tmp is approximately equal to the correlation
coefficient between the two variables and is 0.647 (s.e. 0.076) for the model without
controls and 0.571 (s.e. 0.081) for the model with full controls.11. The R2 pertinent
to the transmission process is about 0.23 in the model without controls and drops
to 0.17 in the model with full controls. In words, this means that a large fraction of
the variability in the permanent trust of children is not attributable to the parents’
permanent trust. Failing to distinguish between permanent trust and transient
shocks would result in a severe underestimation of the strength of the transmission
process.
Turning to the results of the random effect specifications, we notice that the pat-
tern of estimates are similar to the IV model estimated without considering sibling
correlations. The striking result, however, lies in the estimated contribution of
the family-specific unobservable aj component to the variance of Tcp. The ratio of
var{αj} to var{Tcp} is three times larger than the contribution of the parents’ per-
manent trust. This effect becomes slightly larger when controls are included. Taken
together, family-specific characteristics – whether observable (permanent trust) or
unobservable (αj) – account for nearly 90% of the variance of children’s permanent
trust. 12
Table B6 in the Appendix shows that the sibling correlation estimate is not biased
by the correlation between transient shocks of siblings. Only one out of the six tests
11Recall that the variance of T f p is approximately equal to the variance of Tmp - see Table 4.4.
12The inclusion of controls in the regression yields similar results, with only marginal changes
in the relative contribution of the parents’ permanent trust and of αj.
rejects the null hypothesis, and only at the 10% significance level.
The empirical relevance of αj in Equation (4.10) casts suspicion about a possible
omitted variable bias in the estimation of the coefficients of parents’ permanent
trust. However, note that such bias would not affect the overall quantitative rele-
vance about the family-specific characteristics to the transmission process.
4.6 Discussion
In Table 4.6, we present the decomposition of the variance of the trust of children
in 2013. Two striking facts emerge. First, the observed variability of the children’s
trust is dominated by random shocks – nearly two thirds of the total variance. On
the other hand, permanent trust explains the remaining one third. Note, we identify
the size of these components by exploiting the longitudinal variation of trust.
Second, less than one fourth of the variance of children’s permanent trust is at-
tributable to the direct transmission of permanent trust from parents. We identify
the size of this component by exploiting the correlation between children’s and
parents’ trust (accounting for the attenuation bias due to transient shocks).
Approximately two thirds of the variance of children’s permanent trust is attributable
to residual sibling correlations. This captures characteristics of the environment –
within or outside the family – which are shared by siblings. In principle, also this
component might include intergenerationally-transmitted trust through channels
that work independently from parents’ trust.
Overall, direct transmission of trust from parents and residual sibling correlations
account for just less than 90% of the variance of the permanent trust of children.
Even if the evidence we provide emphasizes the major role played by the family
environment in shaping children’s trust, it is clear that the direct transmission from
parents plays a minor role in the persistence of trust over generations.
One challenge is how to reconcile our evidence with some results coming from the
literature on long term persistence of trust. For example, Guiso et al. (2008a)
show that the establishment of free cities in Center-North Italy during the medieval
period generated a positive shock in the accumulation of social capital in the affected
municipalities which is perceivable even nowadays. In a companion paper, the
authors develop a theoretical model to show how the intergenerational transmission
of trust is compatible with their empirical evidence (Guiso et al., 2008b).
A possible argument to reconcile our evidence of a weak “short run” intergenera-
tional transmission effect with the results by Guiso et al. (2008a) comes from the
literature on intergenerational mobility of income and wealth. Building on Güell
et al. (2015), Barone and Mocetti (2016) argue that intergenerational mobility of
earnings up to the end of the 19th century in Florence might have been much lower
than what observed today. The authors put forward the idea that in less mobile so-
cieties like those prevailing in the pre-industrial era, intergenerational transmission
took place thanks to a variety of social institutions and not only through the direct
parent-child transmission. Additional arguments postulating the environment as a
driver of the long term persistence of trust come from simple models of cultural
transmission (see the review in Bisin and Verdier, 2011). In these models, if trust is
not vertically transmitted, the child draws it at random from the population. Our
results suggest a possible “amendment” to these frameworks: the random draw
from the population is sibling-specific rather than being individual-specific, i.e., it
affects in the same manner the trust of children who grew up in the same family
environment.
4.7 Summary and conclusion
We study the intergenerational transmission of trust using a sample of parents
and children drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Our key asset is
the availability of longitudinal information, which is crucial to distinguish between
two different ways the family might shape children’s trust: the direct transmission
from parents to children and the influence exerted by a broadly defined family
environment shared by siblings, such as parental influences not captured by the
direct transmission of trust, as well as other local effects shared by siblings and
that are independent on the parents (e.g. schools, friendship networks or other
factors operating at the community level).
Longitudinal information is also essential in order to disentangle the two components
of observable trust, namely permanent trust and transient shock. This distinction
is vital because it is plausible to postulate that parents transmit to their children
only their permanent trust, i.e., their lasting belief on whether one can trust other
people, while the transient shock – being temporary by construction – is unlikely
to be passed to the children. Our argument is akin to the point made by Solon
et al. (1991) in their analysis of intergenerational transmission of economic status.
We show that permanent trust only accounts for one third to a half of the observed
cross sectional variability of trust. To the purpose of the econometric identification
of the transmission parameters, the remaining part of the variability rises the classic
measurement error problem.
Next, with our panel data we can test the invariance of trust over time – an impor-
tant assumption which is implicitly maintained in the previous literature but that
has not been proven empirically before. In particular, we show that permanent
trust is invariant for mothers and for children over the time window 2003 to 2013,
while this holds true only for younger fathers.
Based on the evidence that permanent trust is invariant, we model the relationship
between the permanent trust of children and the contemporaneous permanent trust
of their parents. The structural interpretation that we give to the parameters of
this equation is that they capture the link between the trust that parents input
in the transmission process (up to when their children are 17 year old) and the
level of permanent trust of their children at the time the transmission is completed.
The estimation of these structural parameters requires replacing the unobservable
permanent trust of children and of their parents by their error-ridden observable
counterpart. The importance of having longitudinal information is once again ev-
ident since we can use the lag trust of parents as a valid instrumental variable to
mitigate the measurement error problem. The remarkable result that transpires is
that mothers play a stronger role than fathers in the transmission process. This
result is in line with previous findings (see, for instance, Dohmen et al., 2012), but
the difference found in the parental roles is stronger.
Finally, exploiting the availability of families with more than one child in our sample,
we estimate the variance of the unobservable family-specific effect which is thought
to represent additional environmental factors shared by the siblings and relevant
to their permanent trust. The variance explained by this component is three to
four times larger than the variance explained by the permanent trust of parents.
Taken together, the intergenerational correlation and the residual sibling correlation
account for approximately 90% of the variance of the permanent trust of children.
In conclusion, while the family environment in which children grew up determines
most of their permanent trust, the direct role of intergenerational transmission is
rather exiguous.
Tables and Figures
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Figure 4.1. Age distribution in 2013
Table 4.1. Autocovariance matrices for observable trust
Fathers Mothers Children
No controls
2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013
2003 0.4400 0.1688 0.1381 0.4057 0.1351 0.1358 0.4409 0.1307 0.1262
2008 0.4370 0.1698 0.4112 0.1445 0.3761 0.1334
2013 0.3908 0.3805 0.3585
With controls
2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013
2003 0.3483 0.1039 0.1019 0.3204 0.0917 0.1094 0.3675 0.1028 0.0672
2008 0.3682 0.1372 0.3045 0.0942 0.3471 0.1021
2013 0.3153 0.2956 0.2574
N 1126 1126 798
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013
Sample is composed by fathers, mothers and children for whom trust is observed in all
three waves.
The sample of children in the table is smaller than the number used in the analyses
(N=1652) since some children turn 17 after 2003 and a few others were added to SOEP in
waves subsequent to 2003.
Control variables include for parents and children: age, education (No Degree or In School
/ Secondary School Degree / Intermediate School Degree / Technical, Upper Secondary or
Other Degree), nationality (German / foreign), number of siblings, place where raised up
to age 15 (unreported / small city / medium city / large city / countryside). For children,
gender and the average level of trust in the ROR in 2013 are also included.
Table 4.2. Distribution of families by number of children
Number of Sample Overall
children Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
1 699 62.08 176 15.63
2 349 30.99 576 51.15
3 59 5.24 249 22.11
4 17 1.51 89 7.90
5 2 0.18 24 2.13
6 or more - 0 12 1.07
Total 1126 100 1126 100
Source: SOEP wave 2013.
Sample is composed by families with fathers and mothers for
whom trust is observed in all three waves and with children for
whom trust is observed at least in wave 2013.
The first and second column refer to the distribution of families
in the sample by the number of children included in the sam-
ple reported in 2013. The third and fourth column refer to the
distribution of families by the overall number of children (i.e., in-
cluding also children outside the sample) reported in 2013. The
number of children in each family is calculated using information
on the number of siblings reported by the children in the sample.
Table 4.3. Invariance of permanent trust
Dep. Main No controls With controls
Variable regressor Fathers Mothers Children Fathers Mothers Children
All age groups
T2013 − T2003 T2008 0.0025 0.0227 0.0070 0.0906 0.0083 –0.0018
(0.0371) (0.0385) (0.0493) (0.0646) (0.0623) (0.0727)
T2013 − T2008 T2003 –0.0697** 0.0017 –0.0104 –0.0055 0.0555 –0.0967
(0.0344) (0.0365) (0.0413) (0.0614) (0.0568) (0.0597)
T2008 − T2003 T2013 0.0813** 0.0227 0.0201 0.1119* –0.0516 0.1357*
(0.0359) (0.0374) (0.0498) (0.0672) (0.0623) (0.0758)
N 1126 1126 798 385 385 397
Below median age
T2013 − T2003 T2008 –0.0041 –0.0394 0.0218 –0.0010 –0.0374 –0.0989
(0.0489) (0.0535) (0.0664) (0.0702) (0.0700) (0.0883)
T2013 − T2008 T2003 –0.0523 –0.0158 –0.0715 0.0064 0.0714 –0.1782**
(0.0458) (0.0504) (0.0546) (0.0818) (0.0855) (0.0732)
T2008 − T2003 T2013 0.0606 –0.0265 0.1168* –0.0093 –0.1156 0.1442
(0.0501) (0.0532) (0.0661) (0.0907) (0.0831) (0.0949)
N 602 584 418 226 225 230
Above median age
T2013 − T2003 T2008 0.0171 0.0994* –0.0119 0.1701 0.0960 0.0909
(0.0569) (0.0542) (0.0734) (0.1302) (0.1161) (0.1231)
T2013 − T2008 T2003 –0.0863* 0.0247 0.0620 –0.0217 0.0545 0.0078
(0.0516) (0.0523) (0.0625) (0.1169) (0.0925) (0.0979)
T2008 − T2003 T2013 0.1041** 0.0782 –0.0832 0.1850* 0.0392 0.1061
(0.0516) (0.0524) (0.0766) (0.1094) (0.1069) (0.1523)
N 524 542 380 159 160 167
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by fathers, mothers and children for whom trust is observed in all three waves.
The sample of children in the table is smaller than the number used in the analyses (N=1652) since
some children turn 17 after 2003 and a few others were added to SOEP in waves subsequent to 2003.
Table 4.4. Variances of permanent trust and transient shock
Permanent trust Transient shock
No controls
2003 2008 2003 2008
Fathers 0.2063 0.2076 0.2338 0.2294
Mothers 0.1344 0.1437 0.2712 0.2675
Children 0.1355 0.1382 0.3055 0.2379
With controls
2003 2008 2003 2008
Fathers 0.1058 0.1398 0.2424 0.2284
Mothers 0.0768 0.0789 0.2436 0.2256
Children 0.1571 0.1561 0.2104 0.1910
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013
Sample is composed by fathers, mothers and chil-
dren for whom trust is observed in all three waves
Permanent trust derived using Equation (4.9) under
accepting the invariance condition in Equation (4.7)
and the covariances from Table 4.1.
Table 4.5. Intergenerational transmission
No controls With controls
OLS IV IV R.E. OLS IV IV R.E.
Father’s trust 0.1014*** 0.1439 0.1637 0.0801** 0.1113 0.1311
(0.0318) (0.1132) (0.1272) (0.0321) (0.1025) (0.1204)
Mother’s trust 0.0954*** 0.3275** 0.3695** 0.0690* 0.2792** 0.3201**
(0.0334) (0.1479) (0.1585) (0.0356) (0.1346) (0.1474)
Constant 1.5984*** 1.7859*** 2.0041*** 0.9471 1.4777 1.8808*
(0.1236) (0.6501) (0.6019) (0.5778) (1.0359) (1.0387)
Partial R2 Eq F. 0.545 0.458 0.530 0.433
Partial R2 Eq M. 0.542 0.457 0.530 0.434
F-stat Eq F. 0.225 0.221 0.194 0.191
F-stat Eq M. 0.182 0.177 0.165 0.164
DWH χ2 5.3382 6.0637 4.1932 4.9098
p-value Sargan 0.2308 0.4326 0.3433 0.5296
R2(T f p, Tmp) 0.0437 0.2342 0.2997 0.0235 0.1481 0.1979
R2(aj) 0.1038 0.1462
N families 427 427
N 953 928 928 953 928 928
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by fathers and mothers for whom trust is observed in all three waves and children
for whom trust is observed in wave 2013.
OLS: Ordinary least squares; IV: Instrumental variable; IV R.E.: Instrumental variable with random
effects. In the IV models, observable trust of fathers and mothers in 2013 is instrumented by their
observable trust in 2008 and 2003.
Partial R2 refers to the Shea’s partial R-squared of the first stages.
F-stat refers to the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stages.
p-val Sargan indicates the p-value of the Sargan test for overidentification.
DWH χ2 refers to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity.
R2(T f p, Tmp) refers to the unfeasible regression for the permanent trust. See Equation (4.4).
R2(aj) refers to the variance explained by unobservable characteristics of the family.
Table 4.6. Decomposition of observed variance of children in 2013
No controls With controls
Variance of observable trust in 2013 0.3585 0.2574
Variance of transient shock∗ 0.2379 0.1910
Variance of Tcp 0.1206 0.0664
Intergenerational transmission 0.0276 0.0030
Household environment 0.0790 0.0000
Residual component 0.0140 0.0634
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013
Sample is composed by children for whom trust is observed in 2013.
∗The variance of the transient shock in 2013 is not identifiable and is
thus replaced by the variance in 2008.
Components estimated using (4.9) and results from regressions in Ta-
ble 4.5.
Table 4.7. Sibling correlations
2-siblings All siblings First 2 siblings
Sibling’s trust 1.0151* 1.0322** 0.8922** 1.2343 0.6669
(0.5213) (0.5183) (0.4327) (1.2814) (0.5365)
Constant –0.0437 –0.1201 0.2426 –0.5473 0.6904
(1.2362) (1.2179) (1.0208) (2.8635) (1.2114)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
N 1129 1129 1211 1873 1645
First stage
Born in first quarter 0.1146*** 0.1037** 0.1140*** 0.0402 0.0711*
(0.0410) (0.0450) (0.0437) (0.0401) (0.0369)
Partial R2 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.002
F-stat 5.225 5.259 6.750 1.009 3.740
OLS estimates 0.3033*** 0.2994*** 0.2729*** 0.3166*** 0.3171***
(0.0420) (0.0415) (0.0396) (0.0309) (0.0337)
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by: siblings of 2-siblings families (Col I-III); siblings from all type of
families (col IV) and first 2 siblings from all type of families. Data refer to 2003 only, except in
column III, which refers to 2003, 2008 and 2013.
All models are using instrumental variables.
Partial R2 refers to the Shea’s partial R-squared of the first stages.
F-stat refers to the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stages.
Table 4.8. Sibling correlations - first born
2-siblings All siblings First 2 siblings
Sibling’s trust 1.5233 1.8707 1.6254 0.0286 0.0286
(2.5834) (3.3939) (2.2409) (1.0878) (1.0878)
Constant –1.2530 –1.6789 –1.1544 2.2664 2.2664
(6.1364) (7.5357) (4.9964) (2.4312) (2.4312)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
N 544 544 547 793 793
First stage
Born in first quarter 0.0721 0.0384 0.0512 0.0512 0.0512
(0.0676) (0.0702) (0.0698) (0.0590) (0.0590)
Partial R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
F-stat 0.369 0.299 0.538 0.752 0.752
OLS estimates 0.3011*** 0.3008*** 0.3054*** 0.3152*** 0.3152***
(0.0425) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0339) (0.0339)
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by: siblings of 2-siblings families (Col I-III); siblings from all type of
families (col IV) and first 2 siblings from all type of families. Data refer to 2003 only, except in
column III, which refers to 2003, 2008 and 2013.
All models are using instrumental variables.
Partial R2 refers to the Shea’s partial R-squared of the first stages.
F-stat refers to the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stages.
Table 4.9. Sibling correlations - second born
2-siblings All siblings First 2 siblings
Sibling’s trust 0.8980** 0.8836** 0.7198* 1.0661 1.0661
(0.4342) (0.4454) (0.3936) (0.7145) (0.7145)
Constant 0.2346 –0.0912 0.4829 –0.3773 –0.3773
(1.0290) (1.0580) (0.9324) (1.5775) (1.5775)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
N 585 585 664 852 852
First stage
Born in first quarter 0.1415*** 0.1500** 0.1545*** 0.0818* 0.0818*
(0.0511) (0.0589) (0.0567) (0.0488) (0.0488)
Partial R2 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.003
F-stat 7.013 6.383 7.343 2.818 2.818
OLS estimates 0.3055*** 0.3062*** 0.2493*** 0.3246*** 0.3246***
(0.0442) (0.0440) (0.0411) (0.0360) (0.0360)
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by: siblings of 2-siblings families (Col I-III); siblings from all type of
families (col IV) and first 2 siblings from all type of families. Data refer to 2003 only, except in
column III, which refers to 2003, 2008 and 2013.
All models are using instrumental variables.
Partial R2 refers to the Shea’s partial R-squared of the first stages.
F-stat refers to the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stages.
Table B1. Summary statistics
Children Fathers Mothers
Trust: 2013 2.2912 2.368 2.3117
(0.6172) (0.6227) (0.611)
Trust: 2008+ 2.3511 2.3874 2.3372
(0.624) (0.654) (0.6347)
Trust: 2003++ 2.3679 2.3565 2.3341
(0.6637) (0.6535) (0.6359)
Males* 0.5097 1 0
(0.5001) (0) (0)
Age 28.7464 58.8469 56.1858
(8.4223) (8.91) (8.4305)
Number of siblings 1.5145 2.0048 2.1483
(1.0897) (1.734) (1.7952)
German national* 0.9643 0.9437 0.9395
(0.1856) (0.2306) (0.2385)
Education: No Degree/In School* 0.1907 0.0212 0.026
(0.393) (0.144) (0.1593)
Education: Secondary School Degree* 0.112 0.3493 0.2869
(0.3154) (0.4769) (0.4525)
Education: Intermediate School Degree* 0.2669 0.2887 0.4201
(0.4425) (0.4533) (0.4937)
Education: Technical/Upper Secondary/Other Degree* 0.4304 0.3408 0.2669
(0.4953) (0.4741) (0.4425)
Place raised at 15: Unreported* 0.1659 0.1822 0.1901
(0.3721) (0.3861) (0.3925)
Place raised at 15: Large city* 0.1992 0.1489 0.1562
(0.3995) (0.3561) (0.3631)
Place raised at 15: Medium city* 0.2488 0.2312 0.2191
(0.4324) (0.4217) (0.4138)
Place raised at 15: Small city* 0.3087 0.4195 0.4159
(0.4621) (0.4936) (0.493)
Place raised at 15: Countryside* 0.0775 0.0182 0.0188
(0.2674) (0.1336) (0.1357)
N 1652
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Sample is composed by fathers and mothers for whom trust is observed in all three waves and
children for whom trust is observed in wave 2013.
* refers to dummy variables.
+ trust is calculated on the subsample of 1179 children for whom trust is observed in 2013 and
in 2008; ++ trust is calculated on the subsample of 810 children for whom trust is observed
also in 2013 and 2003.
Table B2. Structure of the panel
Number of waves
1 2 3
Trust: Children, 2013 2.295 2.2926 2.2882
(0.6526) (0.6131) (0.5987)
Trust: Fathers, 2013 2.2777* 2.4173 2.396
(0.6367) (0.5881) (0.6265)
Trust: Fathers, 2008 2.3557 2.4427 2.3784
(0.6751) (0.6526) (0.6412)
Trust: Fathers, 2003 2.3514 2.3766 2.3496
(0.6901) (0.6354) (0.641)
Trust: Mothers, 2013 2.269 2.3181 2.3333
(0.6336) (0.5652) (0.619)
Trust: Mothers, 2008 2.282* 2.3562 2.3596
(0.6382) (0.6106) (0.6433)
Trust: Mothers, 2003 2.3297 2.3613 2.3233
(0.6425) (0.6322) (0.6342)
N 461 393 798
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Columns header refers to the number of waves children are
observed. 1 means that children are observed only in 2013;
2 means that children are observed in 2013 and in 2008 or in
2013 and in 2003; 3 means that children are observed across
the three waves
* indicates that trust values are significantly different with
respect to those pertinent to the subsample of children ob-
served across the three waves (i.e. p-values of a t-test for the
difference of two means are below 0.05).
Table B3. Correlation between transient shocks - parents/children
Dep. Main No controls With controls
Variable regressor Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers
All age groups
T2013 − T2003 Tc2013 0.0516* –0.0035 0.0381 0.0096
(0.0294) (0.0305) (0.0377) (0.0391)
T2013 − T2008 Tc2013 0.0148 0.0115 0.0224 –0.0091
(0.0278) (0.0308) (0.0357) (0.0401)
T2008 − T2003 Tc2013 0.0368 –0.0150 0.0157 0.0187
(0.0284) (0.0319) (0.0362) (0.0428)
N 1652 1652 877 877
Below median age
T2013 − T2003 Tc2013 0.0323 –0.0409 0.0245 –0.0495
(0.0387) (0.0382) (0.0445) (0.0495)
T2013 − T2008 Tc2013 0.0063 –0.0391 0.0229 –0.0846*
(0.0360) (0.0383) (0.0428) (0.0489)
T2008 − T2003 Tc2013 0.0259 –0.0018 0.0016 0.0351
(0.0373) (0.0404) (0.0406) (0.0527)
N 891 875 500 502
Above median age
T2013 − T2003 Tc2013 0.0796* 0.0446 0.0902 0.0992
(0.0451) (0.0492) (0.0624) (0.0608)
T2013 − T2008 Tc2013 0.0291 0.0773 0.0086 0.0738
(0.0434) (0.0499) (0.0622) (0.0718)
trustob2013 –0.0142 0.1170
(0.0607) (0.0724)
trustreg 0.4823 –0.1354
(0.5820) (0.4102)
T2008 − T2003 Tc2013 0.0505 –0.0327 0.0816 0.0254
(0.0439) (0.0513) (0.0679) (0.0779)
N 761 777 377 375
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by fathers and mothers for whom trust is observed in
all three waves and children for whom trust is observed in wave 2013.
Table B4. Intergenerational transmission - fathers below median age
No controls With controls
OLS IV IV R.E. OLS IV IV R.E.
Father’s trust 0.1053*** 0.0093 –0.0027 0.0990** –0.0017 –0.0204
(0.0401) (0.1155) (0.1197) (0.0409) (0.1185) (0.1251)
Mother’s trust 0.1116*** 0.4715*** 0.5045*** 0.0859** 0.4562*** 0.4978***
(0.0409) (0.1225) (0.1300) (0.0428) (0.1241) (0.1315)
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by fathers and mothers for whom trust is observed in all three waves The sample
is further reduced to only fathers with age below the median and children for whom trust is observed
in wave 2013.
OLS: Ordinary least squares; IV: Instrumental variable; IV R.E.: Instrumental variable with random
effects. In the IV models, observable trust of fathers and mothers in 2013 is instrumented by their
observable trust in 2008 and 2003.
Table B5. Intergenerational transmission - by gender
No controls With controls
Males
OLS IV IV R.E. OLS IV IV R.E.
Father’s trust 0.1350*** 0.1203 0.1269 0.1182*** 0.0935 0.0935
(0.0365) (0.1242) (0.1266) (0.0388) (0.1301) (0.1328)
Mother’s trust 0.0963** 0.3034** 0.3009** 0.0856** 0.2660** 0.2660**
(0.0407) (0.1306) (0.1326) (0.0431) (0.1297) (0.1325)
Females
OLS IV IV R.E. OLS IV IV R.E.
Father’s trust 0.0761** 0.0989 0.0637 0.0414 0.0684 0.0520
(0.0386) (0.0906) (0.0936) (0.0371) (0.0897) (0.0936)
Mother’s trust 0.1536*** 0.3994*** 0.4494*** 0.1168*** 0.3629*** 0.3955***
(0.0383) (0.1026) (0.1054) (0.0383) (0.1024) (0.1063)
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by fathers and mothers for whom trust is observed in all three waves and children
for whom trust is observed in wave 2013.
OLS: Ordinary least squares; IV: Instrumental variable; IV R.E.: Instrumental variable with random
effects. In the IV models, observable trust of fathers and mothers in 2013 is instrumented by their
observable trust in 2008 and 2003.
Table B6. Correlation between transient shocks - siblings
Dep. Main No controls With controls
Variable regressor Sibling 1 Sibling 2 Sibling 1 Sibling 2
T2013 − T2003 Tc2013 –0.1142 –0.0503 –0.0902 0.0063
(0.1011) (0.1086) (0.1374) (0.1341)
T2013 − T2008 Tc2013 0.0616 0.1082 0.0880 0.1576
(0.0944) (0.0979) (0.1084) (0.1163)
T2008 − T2003 Tc2013 –0.1758 –0.1584 –0.1781 –0.1513
(0.1070) (0.1131) (0.1416) (0.1308)
N 161 161 161 161
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level.
Sample is composed by N pairs (324 individuals) of children observed in families
where there are at least two siblings in 2013 and for whom trust is observed.
Pairs are formed by the two youngest siblings. Sibling 1 (2) indicates that
the dependent variable refers to the youngest (second youngest) sibling and
the main regressor refers to the second youngest (youngest) sibling. Controls
include all covariates for both siblings and for the parents. We include only
once control variables that are highly collinear between siblings (nationality,
number of siblings, place of living at age of 15 and average trust in the region
of residence)
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Figure B1. Difference in parental trust over time
Source: SOEP waves 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Figure B2. Trust over the life cycle
Appendix - Econometrics
B1 Measurement error bias with two explanatory
variables
In the transmission equation:
Tcpit = β0 + β1T f
p
it + β2Tm
p
it + ϵit (4.11)
the permanent trust of fathers and mothers are measured with error. Results in
Table 4.5 show that using lagged trust as an instrumental variable to correct for
the resulting bias makes a major difference for the estimated coefficient of mothers,
while it is nearly irrelevant for the estimated coefficient of fathers. This result
might seem puzzling in light of the textbook notion that measurement errors on
the explanatory variable imply an attenuation bias. To provide an explanation, we
make use of an approximation to the OLS bias due to measurement error proposed
by Theil (1961), who shows that when there are two regressors both affected by
measurement errors the approximate OLS bias is:
bias(β1) = − β1λ11− ρ2 +
β2λ2ρ
1− ρ2 (4.12)
bias(β2) = − β2λ21− ρ2 +
β1λ1ρ
1− ρ2 (4.13)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between the true regressors and λj, j ∈ {1, 2} is
the ratio of the variance of the measurement error to the variance of the respective
observable regressor (i.e., the sum of the variances of the measurement error and of
the true regressor). If ρ were equal to zero, the bias would collapse to the standard
attenuation bias. In this instance, the correlation between the two explanatory
variables is large (ρ is 0.647 for the model without controls and 0.571 for the model
with controls), hence the second component on the right-hand side of the equation
has a positive sign, counterbalancing the standard attenuation bias, since both β1
and β2 are positive in our case. Deriving the values of λj and β j from Tables 4.4 and
4.5 and plugging them in the equations (4.12) and (4.13), we obtain a bias for the
coefficient of fathers of 0.173 and of 0.139 in the models without and with controls,
while the biases for the coefficients of mothers are -0.351 and -0.313, respectively.
This is in line with the difference we observe between the OLS and the IV estimates
in Table 4.5, also taking into account sampling variability.
B2 Discreteness of observable trust as additional
measurement error
To fix ideas, let us focus on the trust of fathers. We develop our analysis as if the
observable trust takes values on a continuous scale. In reality, however, responses to
the trust question are categorical, ranging between 1 to 4. A way to rationalize the
problem is to think about the observable trust as a discretized version of a latent
continuous score. That is, the respondent thinks about trust on a continuous scale,
but the way the question is asked induces to round the score to the nearest integer
in the range 1 to 4. In the following, we show that under mild conditions, the
rounding generates an additional layer of measurement error. The straightforward
implication is that the results of our analysis are unaffected, provided that the
measurement error v f is redefined to include both the transient shock and the error
due to rounding.
The key point to the validity of our analysis is that the measurement error must be
uncorrelated to the permanent trust. Let T f ′ be the unobserved continuous trust
such that T f = rnd(T f ′), i.e., the observable trust T f is the rounded version of
T f ′. Let v f ′ be the transient shock such that T f ′ = T f p + v f ′. The issue is then
to derive sufficient conditions for having:
cov(rnd(T f ′)− T f p, T f p) = cov(rnd(T f p + v f ′)− T f p, T f p) = 0. (4.14)
Note that the last condition is equivalent to:
cov(rnd(T f p + v f ′), T f p)
var(T f p)
= 1, (4.15)
i.e., the regression coefficient of rnd(T f p + v f ′) on T f p should be equal to 1. For
this to happen it is sufficient to prove that:
E(rnd(T f p + v f ′)|T f p) = T f p. (4.16)
If the transient shock v f ′ is symmetrically distributed, the result follows straight-
forwardly since the discrete probability distribution resulting from rounding is sym-
metrically distributed around T f p. If v f ′ is not symmetrically distributed the result
holds approximately. We performed some simulations using an heavily asymmetric
distribution (a χ2(2)) obtaining essentially the same result as in the symmetric
case.
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